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Abstract. We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes ex-
periments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The
repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost—the more lucrative is the agent’s
stream of future rents following a failure, the more costly are current incentives for the
agent, giving the principal an incentive to reduce the continuation value of the project. We
characterize the set of recursive Markov equilibria. We also find that there are non-Markov
equilibria that make the principal better off than the recursive Markov equilibrium, and
that may make both agents better off. Efficient equilibria front-load the agent’s effort,
inducing as much experimentation as possible over an initial period, until making a switch
to the worst possible continuation equilibrium. The initial phase concentrates the agent’s
effort near the beginning of the project, where it is most valuable, while the eventual
switch to the worst continuation equilibrium attenuates the dynamic agency cost.
∗We thank Dirk Bergemann for helpful discussions and the editor and three referees
for helpful comments. We thank the National Science Foundation (SES-0549946, SES-
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Incentives for Experimenting Agents
Johannes Hörner and Larry Samuelson
1 Introduction
1.1 Experimentation and Agency
Suppose an agent has a project whose profitability can be investigated and poten-
tially realized only through a series of costly experiments. For an agent with sufficient
financial resources, the result is a conceptually straightforward programming problem. He
funds a succession of experiments until either realizing a successful outcome or becoming
sufficiently pessimistic as to make further experimentation unprofitable. But what if he
lacks the resources to support such a research program, and must instead seek funding
from a principal? What constraints does the need for outside funding place on the ex-
perimentation process? What is the nature of the contract between the principal and
agent?
This paper addresses these questions. In the absence of any contractual difficulties, the
problem is still relatively straightforward. Suppose, however, that the experimentation
requires costly effort on the part of the agent that the principal cannot monitor (and
cannot undertake herself). It may require hard work to develop either a new battery or a
new pop act, and the principal may be able to verify whether the agent has been successful
(presumably because people are scrambling to buy the resulting batteries or music), but
unable to discern whether a string of failures represents the unlucky outcomes of earnest
experimentation or the product of too much time spent playing computer games. We now
have an incentive problem that significantly complicates the relationship. In particular,
the agent continually faces the temptation to eschew the costly effort and pocket the
funding provided for experimentation, explaining the resulting failure as an unlucky draw
from a good-faith effort, and hence must receive sufficient rent to forestall this possibility.
The problem of providing incentives for the agent to exert effort is complicated by
the assumption that the principal cannot commit to future contract terms. Perhaps
paradoxically, one of the advantages to the agent of a failure is that the agent may then
be able to extract further rent from future experiments, while a success obviates the need
for the agent and terminates the rent stream. A principal with commitment power could
reduce the cost of current incentives by committing to a string of less lucrative future
contracts (perhaps terminating experimentation altogether) in the event of failure. Our
principal, in contrast, can alter future contract terms or terminate the relationship only
if doing so is sequentially rational.
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1.2 Optimal Incentives: A Preview of Our Results
The contribution of this paper is threefold.
First, we make a methodological contribution. Because the action of the agent is
hidden, his private belief may differ from the public belief held by the principal. We
develop techniques to solve for the equilibria of this hidden-action hidden-information
problem. We work with a continuous-time model which, in order to be well defined,
incorporates some inertia in actions, in the form of a minimum length of time dt between
offers on the part of the principal.1 The bulk of the analysis, beginning with Appendix A
(which is posted online, as are all other appendices), provides a complete characterization
of the set of equilibria for this game, and it is here that we make our methodological
contribution. However, because this material is detailed and technical, the paper (in
Sections 3–4) examines equilibrium outcomes in the frictionless limit obtained by letting
dt go to zero. These arguments are intuitive and may be the only portion of the analysis
of interest to many readers. One must bear in mind, however, that this is not an analysis
of a game without inertia, but a description of the limits (as dt → 0) of equilibrium
outcomes in games with inertia. Toward this end, the intuitive arguments made in Sections
3–4 are founded on precise arguments and limiting results presented in Appendix A.
Solving the model also requires formulating an appropriate solution concept in the spirit
of Markov equilibrium. As explained in Section 3.1, to ensure existence of equilibrium, we
must consider a weakening of Markov equilibrium, which we refer to as recursive Markov
equilibrium.
Second, we study the optimal provision of incentives in a dynamic agency problem. As
in the static case, the provision of incentives requires that the agent be given rents, and
this agency cost forces the early termination of the project. More interestingly, because a
success also terminates the project, the agent will exert effort only if compensated for the
potential loss of his continuation payoff that higher effort makes more likely. This gives
rise to a dynamic agency cost that shapes the structure of equilibrium. Compensating
the agent for this opportunity cost can be so expensive that the project is no longer
profitable to the principal. The project must be then downsized (formally, the rate of
experimentation must be slowed down), to bring this opportunity cost down to a level
that is consistent with the principal breaking even. Keeping the relationship alive can
thus call for a reduction in its value.
When does downsizing occur? It depends on conflicting forces. The faster the rate at
which learning occurs, or the lower the common prior belief, the shorter the maximum
possible duration of experimentation before the project is abandoned for good. This
brings down the continuation payoff of the agent, and so helps prevent the occurrence of
1There are well-known difficulties in defining games in continuous time, especially when attention is not
restricted to Markov strategies. See, in particular, Bergin and MacLeod [4] and Simon and Stinchcombe
[28]. Our reliance on an inertial interval between offers is similar to the approach of Bergin and MacLeod.
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downsizing. On the other hand, a lower common prior belief also means lower expected
profitability, making it harder for the principal to break even without downsizing. As a
result, whether and when downsizing occurs depends on the players’ beliefs, the players’
patience, and the rate of learning. While the (limiting) recursive Markov equilibrium
outcome is always unique, downsizing in this equilibrium might occur either for beliefs
below, or for beliefs above a given threshold. If a failure conveys a substantial amount of
information, for example, then it must be that a success is likely if the project is good.
Hence, exerting effort is risky for the agent, especially if he is thinks it quite likely that
the project is good. As a result, a high rate of learning leads to downsizing for high prior
beliefs of the principal, who would be better off if she were more pessimistic! We might
then expect optimistic agents who anticipate learning about their project quickly to rely
more heavily on self-financing or debt contracts, not just because their optimism portends
a higher expected payoff, but because they face particularly severe agency problems.
Recursive Markov equilibria highlight the role of the dynamic agency cost. Because
their outcome is unique, and the related literature has focused on similar Markovian solu-
tion concepts, they also allow for clear-cut comparisons with other benchmarks discussed
below. However, we believe that non-Markov equilibria better reflect (for example) actual
venture capital contracts (see Section 1.3 below). The analysis of non-Markov equilibria
is carried out in Section 3.2, and builds heavily on that of recursive Markov equilibria.
Unlike recursive Markov equilibria, constrained efficient (non-Markov) equilibria always
have a very simple structure: they feature an initial period where the project is oper-
ated at maximum scale, before the project is either terminated or downsized as much as
possible (given that, in the absence of commitment, abandoning the project altogether
need not be credible). So, unlike in recursive Markov equilibria, the agent’s effort is al-
ways front-loaded. The principal’s preferences are clear when dealing with non-Markov
equilibria—she always prefers a higher likelihood that the project is good, eliminating the
non-monotonicity of the Markov case. The principal always reaps a higher payoff from
the best non-Markov equilibrium than from the Markov equilibrium, and the non-Markov
equilibria may make both players better off than the Markov equilibrium.
It is not too surprising that the principal can gain from a non-Markov equilibrium.
Front-loading effort on the strength of an impending (non-Markov) switch to the worst
equilibrium reduces the agent’s future payoffs, and hence reduces the agent’s current
incentive cost. But the eventual switch appears to squander surplus, and it is less clear
how this can make both parties better off. The cases in which both parties benefit from
such front-loading are those in which the Markov equilibrium features some delay. Front-
loading effectively pushes the agent’s effort forward, coupling more intense initial effort
with the eventual switch to the undesirable equilibrium, which can be sufficiently surplus-
enhancing as to allow both parties to benefit.
Third, our analysis brings out the role of bargaining power in dynamic agency prob-
lems. A useful benchmark is provided by Bergemann and Hege [2], who examine an
3
analogous model in which the agent rather than the principal makes the offers in each
period and hence has the bargaining power in the relationship.2 The comparison is some-
what hindered by some technical difficulties overlooked in their analysis. As we explain in
Appendix A.9, the same forces that sometimes preclude the existence of Markov equilib-
ria in our model also arise in Bergemann and Hege [2]. Similarly, in other circumstances,
multiple Markov equilibria may arise in their model (as in ours). As a result, they cannot
impose their restriction to pure strategies, or equivalently, to beliefs of the principal and
agent that coincide, and their results for the non-observable case are formally incorrect:
their “Markov equilibrium” is not fully specified, does not always exist, and need not be
unique. The characterization of the set of “Markov equilibria” in their model, as well as
the investigation of non-Markov equilibria, remains an open question. However, we believe
that the outcome they describe is indeed the outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
satisfying a requirement similar to our recursive Markov requirement, and we conjecture
that the set of such (recursive Markov) equilibrium outcomes converges to a unique limit
as frequencies increase.3
Using this outcome as the point of comparison, there are some similarities in results
across the two papers. Bergemann and Hege find four types of equilibrium behavior, each
existing in a different region of parameter values. We similarly identify four analogous
regions of parameter values (though not the same). But there are surprising differences:
most notably, the agent might prefer that the bargaining power rest with the principal.
The future offers made by an agent may be sufficiently lucrative that the agent can
credibly claim to work in the current period only if those future offers are inefficiently
delayed, to the extent that the agent fares better under the principal’s less generous
but undelayed offers. However, one must bear in mind that these comparisons apply to
“Markov” equilibria only, the focus of their analysis; the non-Markov equilibria that we
examine exhibit properties quite different from those of recursive Markov equilibria.
The comparison is developed in detail in Section 4, which also provides additional
benchmarks. We consider a model in which the principal can observe the agent’s effort,
so there is no hidden information problem, identifying circumstances in which this ob-
servability makes the principal worse off. We also consider a variation of the model in
which there is no learning. The model is then stationary, with each failure leading to
a continuation game identical to the original game, but with non-Markov equilibria still
giving rise to payoffs that are unattainable under Markov equilibria. We next consider
2Bergemann, Hege and Peng [3] present an alternative model of sequential investment in a venture
capital project, without an agency problem, which they then use as a foundation for an empirical analysis
of venture capital projects.
3Verifying these statements would involve arguments similar to those we have used, but this is not
a direct translation. We suspect the corresponding limiting statement regarding uniqueness of perfect
Bayesian equilibrium outcomes does not hold in their paper; as in our paper, one might be able to leverage
the multiplicity of equilibria in the discrete-time game to construct non-Markov equilibrium outcomes
that are distinct in the limit.
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a model in which the principal has commitment power, identifying circumstances under
which the ability to commit does and does not allow the principal to garner higher payoffs.
1.3 Applications
We view this model as potentially useful in examining a number of applications. The
leading one is the case of a venture capitalist who must advance funds to an entrepreneur
who is conducting experiments potentially capable of yielding a valuable innovation. A
large empirical literature has studied venture capital. This literature makes it clear that
actual venture capital contracts are more complicated than those captured by our model,
but we also find that the structural features, methodological issues, and equilibrium char-
acteristics of our model appear prominently in this literature.
The three basic structural elements of our model are moral hazard, learning, and the
absence of commitment. The first two appear prominently in Hall’s [16] summary of the
venture capital literature, that emphasizes the importance of (i) the venture capitalist’s
inability to perfectly monitor the hidden actions of the agent, giving rise to moral hazard
and (ii) learning over time about the potential of the project.4 Kaplan and Strömberg
[20, Section 4.1, pp. 295–299] use Holmström’s principal-agent model (as do we) as
the point of departure for assessing the financing provisions of venture capital contracts,
arguing (p. 296) that their analysis is “largely consistent with both the assumptions
and predictions of the classical principal-agent approach.” Kaplan and Strömberg [20, p.
313] also report that venture capital contracts are frequently renegotiated, reflecting the
principal’s inability to commit.
Hall [16] identifies another basic feature of the venture capital market as rates of return
for the venture capitalist that exceed those normally used for conventional investment.
The latter feature, which distinguishes our analysis from Bergemann and Hege [2] (whose
principal invariably earns a zero payoff, while our principal’s payoff may be positive), is
well-documented in the empirical literature (see, for instance, Blass and Yosha [7]). This
reflects the fact that funding for project development is scarce: technology managers often
report that they have more projects they would like to undertake than funds to spend on
them.5
4In the words of Hall [16, p. 411], “An important characteristic of uncertainty for the financing of
investment in innovation is the fact that as investments are made over time, new information arrives
which reduces or changes the uncertainty. The consequence of this fact is that the decision to invest in
any particular project is not a once and for all decision, but has to be reassessed throughout the life of the
project. In addition to making such investment a real option, the sequence of decisions complicates the
analysis by introducing dynamic elements into the interaction of the financier (either within or without
the firm) and the innovator.”
5See Peeters and van Pottelsberghe [24]; Jovanovic and Szentes [19] stress the scarcity of venture
capital.
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The methodological difficulties in our analysis arise to a large extent out of the possi-
bility that the unobservability of the agent’s actions can cause the beliefs of the principal
and agent to differ. Hall [16] points to this asymmetric information as another fundamen-
tal theme of the principal-agent literature, while Cornelli and Yosha [10, p. 4] note that,
“At the time of initial venture capital financing, the entrepreneur and the financier are
often equally informed regarding the project’s chances of success, and the true quality is
gradually revealed to both. The main conflict of interest is the asymmetry of information
about future actions of the entrepreneur.”
Finally, our finding that equilibrium effort is front-loaded resonates with the empirical
literature. The common characteristic of our efficient equilibria is an initial (or front-
loaded) sequence of funding and effort followed by premature (from the agent’s point of
view) downsizing or termination of investment. It is well recognized in the theoretical
and empirical literature that venture capital contacts typically provide funding in stages,
with new funding following the arrival of new information (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer [1],
Cornelli and Yosha [10], Gompers [14], Gompers and Lerner [15] and Hall [16]). Moreover,
Admati and Pfleiderer [1] characterize venture capital as a device to force the termination
of projects entrepreneurs would otherwise prefer to continue, while Gompers [14, p.2]
notes that venture capitalists maintain “the option to periodically abandon projects.”
Moreover, the empirical literature lends support to the mechanisms behind the equi-
librium features in our paper. While one can conceive of alternative explanations for ter-
mination or downsizing, the role of the dynamic agency cost seems to be well-recognized
in the literature: Cornelli and Yosha [10, p.1 ] explain that “the option to abandon is
essential because an entrepreneur will almost never quit a failing project as long as oth-
ers are providing capital” and find that investors often wish to downscale or terminate
projects that entrepreneurs are anxious to continue. The role of termination or downsizing
in mitigating this cost is also stressed by the literature: Sahlman [27, p. 507] states that
“The credible threat to abandon a venture, even when the firm might be economically vi-
able, is the key to the relationship between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist....”
Downsizing, which has generally attracted less attention than termination, is studied by
Denis and Shome [11]. These features point to the (constrained efficient) non-Markov
equilibrium as a more realistic description of actual relationships than the Markov equi-
libria usually considered in the theoretical literature. Our analysis establishes that such
downsizing or termination requires no commitment power, lending support to Sahlman’s
[27] statement above that such threats can be credible—though as we show, credibility
considerations may ensure that downsizing (rather than termination) is the only option
in the absence of commitment.
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1.4 Related Literature
As we explain in more detail in Section 2, our model combines a standard hidden-
action principal agent model (as introduced by Holmström [18]) with a standard bandit
model of learning (as introduced in economics by Rothschild [26]). Each of these models
in isolation is canonical and has been the subject of a large literature.6 Their interaction
leads to interesting effects that are explored in this paper.
Other papers (in addition to Bergemann and Hege [2]) have also examined repeated-
principal agent problems. Gerardi and Maestri [13] examine a model in which a principal
must make a choice whose payoff depends on the realization of an unknown state, and who
hires an agent to exert costly but unobservable effort in order to generate a signal that
is informative about the state. In contrast to our model, the principal need not provide
funding to the agent in order for the latter to exert effort, the length of the relationship
is fixed, the outcome of the agent’s experiments is unobservable, and the principal can
ultimately observe and condition payments on the state.
Mason and Välimäki [23] examine a model in which the probability of a success is
known and the principal need not advance the cost of experimentation to the agent.
The agent has a convex cost of effort, creating an incentive to smooth effort over time.
The principal makes a single payment to the agent, upon successful completion of the
project. If the principal is unable to commit, then the problem and the agent’s payment
are stationary. If able to commit, the principal offers a payment schedule that declines
over time in order to counteract the agent’s effort-smoothing incentive to push effort into
the future.
2 The Model
2.1 The Agency Relationship
2.1.1 Actions
We consider a long-term interaction between a principal (she) and an agent (he). The
agent has access to a project that is either good or bad. The project’s type is unknown,
with principal and agent initially assigning probability q ∈ [0, 1) to the event that it is
good. The case q = 1 requires minor adjustments in the analysis, and is summarized in
Section 4.2.
The game starts at time t = 0 and takes place in continuous time. At time t, the
principal makes a (possibly history-dependent) offer st to the agent, where st ∈ [0, 1]
6See Bolton and Dewatripont [8] and Martimort and Laffont [22] for introductions to the principal-
agent literature, and Berry and Fristedt [5] for a survey of bandit models of learning.
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identifies the principal’s share of the proceeds from the project.7 Whenever the principal
makes an offer to the agent, she cannot make another offer until dt > 0 units of time
have passed. This inertia is essential to the rigorous analysis of the model, as explained
in Section 1.2. We present a formal description of the game with inertia in Appendix A.2.
What follows is a heuristic description, with emphasis on the limiting case as dt→ 0.
Whenever an offer is made, the principal advances the amount cdt to the agent, and
the agent immediately decides whether to conduct an experiment, at cost cdt, or to shirk.
If the experiment is conducted and the project is bad, the result is inevitably a failure,
yielding no payoffs but leaving open the possibility of conducting further experiments. If
the project is good, the experiment yields a success with probability pdt and a failure with
probability 1 − pdt, where p > 0. Alternatively, if the agent shirks, there is no success,
and the agent expropriates the advance cdt.
The game ends at time t if and only if there is a success at that time. A success
constitutes a breakthrough that generates a surplus of π, representing the future value
of a successful project and obviating the need for further experimentation. The principal
receives payoff πst from a success and the agent retains π(1−st). The principal and agent
discount at the common rate r. There is no commitment on either side.
In the baseline model, the principal cannot observe the agent’s action, observing only
a success (if the agent experiments and draws a favorable outcome) or failure (otherwise).8
We investigate the case of observable effort and the case of commitment by the principal
in Sections 4.1 and 4.3.
We have described our principal-agent model as one in which the agent can divert
cash that is being advanced to finance the project. In doing so, we follow Biais, Mariotti,
Plantin and Rochet [6], among many others. However, we could equivalently describe
the model as the simplest case—two actions and two outcomes—of the canonical hidden-
action model (Holmström [18]). Think of the agent as either exerting low effort, which
allows the agent to derive utility c from leisure, or high effort, which precludes such utility.
There are two outcomes y and y < y. Low effort always leads to outcome y while high
effort yields outcome y with probability p. The principal observes only outcomes, and can
attach payment t ∈ R+ to outcome y and payment t ∈ R+ to outcome y. The principal’s
payoff is the outcome minus the transfer, while the agent’s payoff is the transfer plus
the value of leisure. We then need only note that the optimal contract necessarily sets
t = 0, and then set y = π − c, y = −c, and t = π(1 − s) to render the models precisely
equivalent.9
We place our principal-agent model in the simplest case of the canonical bandit model
of learning—there are two arms, one of which is constant, and two signals, one of which is
7The restriction to the unit interval is without loss.
8This is the counterpart of Bergemann and Hege’s [2] “arm’s length” financing.
9It is then a simple change of reference point to view the agent as deriving no utility from low effort
and incurring cost c of high effort.
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fully revealing: a success cannot obtain when the project is bad. We could alternatively
have worked with a “bad news” model, in which failures can only obtain when the project
is bad. The mathematical difficulties in going beyond the good news or bad news bandit
model when examining strategic interactions are well-known, prompting the overwhelming
concentration in the literature on such models (though see Keller and Rady [21] for an
exception).
2.1.2 Strategies and Equilibrium
Appendix A.2 provides the formal definitions of strategies and outcomes. Intuitively,
the principal’s behavior strategy σP specifies at every instant, as a function of all the
public information hPt (namely all the past offers), a choice of either an offer to make
or to delay making an offer. Implicitly, we restrict attention to the case in which all
experiments have been unsuccessful, as the game ends otherwise. The prospect that the
principal might delay an offer is first encountered in Section 3.1.2, where we explain how
this is a convenient device for modeling the prospect that the project might be downsized.
A behavior strategy for the agent σA maps all information ht, both public (past offers
and the current offer to which the agent is responding) and private (past effort choices),
into a decision to work or shirk, given the outstanding offer by the principal.
We examine weak perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game. In addition, because ac-
tions by the agent are not observed and the principal does not know the state, it is natural
to impose the “no signaling what you don’t know” requirement on posterior beliefs after
histories ht (resp. h
P
t for the principal) that have probability zero under σ = (σ
P , σA). In
particular, consider a history ht for the agent that arises with zero probability, either be-
cause the principal has made an out-of-equilibrium offer or the agent an out-of-equilibrium
effort choice. There is some strategy profile (σ′P , σ′A) under which this history would be
on the equilibrium path, and we assume the agent holds the belief that he would derive
under Bayes’ rule given the strategy profile (σ′P , σ′A). Indeed, there will be many such
strategy profiles consistent with the agent’s history, but all of them feature the same
sequence of effort choices on the part of the agent (namely, the effort choices the agent
actually made), and so all give rise to the same belief. Similarly, given a history hPt for
the principal that arises with zero probability (because the principal made an out-of-
equilibrium offer), the principal holds the belief that would be derived from Bayes’ rule
under the probability distribution induced by any strategy profile (σ′P , σA) under which
this history would be on the equilibrium path. Note that we hold σA fixed at the agent’s
equilibrium strategy here, since the principal can observe nothing that is inconsistent with
the agent’s equilibrium strategy. Again, any such (σ′P , σA) specifies the same sequence of
offers from the principal and the same response from the agent, and hence the same belief.
“Equilibrium” henceforth refers to a weak perfect Bayesian Equilibrium satisfying these
requirements. A class of equilibria of particular interest are recursive Markov equilibria,
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discussed next.
2.2 What is Wrong with Markov Equilibrium?
Our game displays both incomplete information and hidden actions. The agent knows
all actions taken. Therefore, his belief is simply a number qA ∈ [0, 1], namely the subjec-
tive probability that he attaches to the project being good. By definition of an equilibrium,
this is a function of his history of experiments only. It is payoff-relevant, as it affects the
expected value of following different courses of action. Therefore, any reasonable defi-
nition of Markov equilibrium must include qA as a state variable. This posterior belief
is continually revised throughout the course of play, with each failure being bad news,
leading to a more pessimistic posterior expectation that the project is good.
The agent’s hidden action gives rise to hidden information: if the agent deviates, he
will update his belief unbeknownst to the principal, and this will affect his future incentives
to work, given the future equilibrium offers, and hence his payoff from deviating. In turn,
the principal must compute this payoff in order to determine which offers will induce
the agent to work. Therefore, the principal’s belief about the agent’s belief, qP ∈ ∆ [0, 1]
is payoff-relevant. To be clear, qP is a distribution over the agent’s belief: if the agent
randomizes his effort decision, the principal will have uncertainty regarding the agent’s
posterior belief, as she does not know the realized effort choice. Fortunately, her belief qP
is commonly known.
The natural state variable for a Markov equilibrium is thus the pair (qA, qP ). If the
agent’s equilibrium strategy were pure, then as long as the agent does not deviate, those
two beliefs would coincide, and we could use the single belief qA as a state variable. This
is the approach followed by Bergemann and Hege [2]. Unfortunately, two difficulties arise.
First, when the agent evaluates the benefit of deviating, he must consider how the game
will evolve after such a deviation, from which point the beliefs qA and qP will differ. More
importantly, there is typically no equilibrium in which the agent’s strategy is pure. Here
is why.
Expectations about the agent’s action affect his continuation payoff, as they affect the
principal’s posterior belief. Hence, we can define a share sS for which the agent would be
indifferent between working and shirking if he is expected to shirk; and a share sW for
which he is indifferent if he is expected to work. If there was no learning (q̄ = 1), these
shares would coincide, as the agent’s action would not affect the principal’s posterior
belief and hence continuation payoffs. But if q̄ < 1 they do not coincide. This gives
rise to two possibilities that both can arise depending on the parameters. If sS < sW ,
there are multiple equilibria: for each share s̄ in the interval [sS, sW ], we can construct an
equilibrium in which the agent shirks if s > s̄, and works if s ≤ s̄. Given that sS < sW ,
these beliefs are consistent with the agent’s incentives. On the other hand, if sS > sW ,
then there is no pure best-reply for the agent if a share s in the interval (sS, sW ) is
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offered!10 If it were optimal to shirk and the principal would expect it, then the agent
would not find it optimal to shirk after all (because s < sS). Similarly, if it were optimal
to work and the principal would expect it, then working could not be optimal after all,
because s > sW . As a result, whenever these thresholds are ordered in this way, as does
occur for a wide range of parameters, then the agent must randomize between shirking
and working.
Once the agent randomizes, qP is no longer equal to qA, as the principal is uncertain
about the agent’s realized action. The analysis thus cannot ignore states for which qP is
non-degenerate (and so differs from qA).
Unfortunately, working with the larger state (qA, qP ) is still not enough. Markov
equilibria—even on this larger state space—fail to exist. The reason is closely related to
the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria. If a share s ∈ (sS, sW ) is offered, the agent
must randomize over effort choices, which means that he must be indifferent between two
continuation games, one following work and one following shirk. This indifference requires
strategies in these continuations to be “fine-tuned,” and this fine-tuning depends on the
exact share s that was offered; this share, however, is not encoded in the later values of
the pair (qA, qP ).
This is a common feature of extensive-form games of incomplete information (see for
instance Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole [12] and Hellwig [17]). To restore existence while
straying as little as possible from Markov equilibrium, Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole [12]
introduce the concept of weak Markov equilibrium, afterwards used extensively in the
literature. This concept allows behavior to depend not only on the current belief, but
also on the preceding offer. Unfortunately, this does not suffice here, for reasons that are
subtle. The fine-tuning that is mentioned in the previous paragraph cannot be achieved
right after the offer s is made. As it turns out, it requires strategies to exhibit arbitrarily
long memory of the exact offer that prompted the initial mixing.
This issue is discussed in detail in Appendix A, where we also define a solution con-
cept, recursive Markov equilibrium, that is analogous to weak Markov equilibrium and is
appropriate for our game. This concept coincides with Markov equilibrium (with generic
state (qA, qP )) whenever it exists, or with weak Markov equilibrium whenever the latter
exists. Roughly speaking, a recursive Markov equilibrium requires that (i) play coincides
with a Markov equilibrium whenever such an equilibrium exists (which it does for low
enough beliefs, as we prove), and (ii) if the state does not change from one period to the
next, then neither do equilibrium actions.
As we show, recursive Markov equilibria always exist in our game. Moreover, as the
minimum length of time between two consecutive offers vanishes (i.e., as dt → 0), all
weak Markov equilibria yield the same outcome, and the belief of the principal converges
to the belief of the agent, so that, in the limit, we can describe strategies as if there was a
10Such offers do not appear along the equilibrium path, but nonetheless checking the optimality of an
offer outside the interval requires knowing the payoff that would result from an offer within it.
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single state variable q = qA = qP . Hence, considering this limit yields sharp predictions,
as well as particularly tractable solutions.
As shown in Appendix A.9, cases in which sW < sS arise and cases in which sW > sS
can also arise when the agent makes the offers instead of the principal, as in Bergemann
and Hege [2]. Hence, Markov equilibria need not exist in their model; and when they
do, they are not unique. Nevertheless, the patterns that emerge from their computations
bear strong similarities with ours, and we suspect that, if one were to (i) study the
recursive Markov equilibria of their game, and (ii) take the continuous-time limit of the
set of equilibrium outcomes, one would obtain qualitatively similar results. Given these
similarities, we view their results as strongly suggestive of what is likely to come out of
such an analysis, and will therefore use their predictions to speculate about how bargaining
power affects equilibrium play.
2.3 The First-Best Policy
Suppose there is no agency problem—either the principal can conduct the experiments
(or equivalently the agent can fund the experiments), or there is no monitoring problem
and hence the agent necessarily experiments whenever asked to do so.
The principal will experiment until either achieving a success, or being rendered suffi-
ciently pessimistic by a string of failures as to deem further experimentation unprofitable.
The optimal policy, then, is to choose an optimal stopping time, given the initial belief.
That is, the principal chooses T ≥ 0 so as to maximize the normalized expected value of
the project, given by








where r is the discount rate, υ is the random time at which a success occurs, and 1E is
the indicator of the event E.














0 pqυdυ (pqtπ − c) dt.
From this formula, it is clear that it is optimal to pick T ≥ t if and only if pqtπ − c > 0.





The optimal stopping time T then solves qT = c/pπ.
12
Appendix B develops an expression for the optimal stopping time that immediately
yields some intuitive comparative statics. The first-best policy operates the project longer
when the prior probability q̄ is larger (because it then takes longer to become so pessimistic
as to terminate), when (holding p fixed) the benefit-cost ratio pπ/c is larger (because more
pessimism is then required before abandoning the project), and when (holding pπ/c fixed)
the success probability p is smaller (because consistent failure is then less informative).
3 Characterization of Equilibria
This section describes the set of equilibrium outcomes, characterizing both behavior
and payoffs, in the limit as dt→ 0. This is the limit identified in Section 2.1. We explain
the intuition behind these outcomes. Our intention is that this description, including
some heuristic derivations, should be sufficiently compelling that most readers need not
delve into the technical details behind this description. The formal arguments supporting
this section’s results require a characterization of equilibrium behavior and payoffs for the
game with inertia and a demonstration that the behavior and payoffs described here are
the unique limits (as inertia dt vanishes) of such equilibria. This is the sense in which we
use “uniqueness” in what follows. See Appendix A for details.
3.1 Recursive Markov Equilibria
3.1.1 No Delay
We begin by examining equilibria in which the principal never delays making an offer,
or equivalently in which the project is never downsized, and the agent is always indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the equilibrium offer.
Let qt be the common (on path) belief at time t. This belief will be continually revised
downward (in the absence of a game-ending success), until the expected value of continued
experimentation hits zero. At the last instant, the interaction is a static principal-agent
problem. The agent can earn cdt from this final encounter by shirking, and can earn
(1 − s)pqπdt by working. The principal will set the share s so that the agent’s incentive
constraint binds, or cdt = (1− s)pqπdt. Using this relationship, the principal’s payoff in
this final encounter will then satisfy
(spqπ − c)dt = (pqπ − 2c)dt,
and the principal will accordingly abandon experimentation at the value q at which this






This failure boundary highlights the cost of agency. The first-best policy derived in
Section 2.3 experiments until the posterior drops to c/pπ, while the agency cost forces
experimentation to cease at 2c/pπ. In the absence of agency, experimentation continues
until the expected surplus pqπ just suffices to cover the experimentation cost c. In the
presence of agency, the principal must not only pay the cost of the experiment c, but must
also provide the agent with a rent of at least c, to ensure the agent does not shirk and ap-
propriate the experimental funding. This effectively doubles the cost of experimentation,
in the process doubling the termination boundary.
Now consider behavior away from the failure boundary. The belief qt is the state
variable in a recursive Markov equilibrium, and equilibrium behavior will depend only on
this belief (because we are working in the limit as dt → 0). Let v(q) and w(q) denote
the “ex post” equilibrium payoffs of the principal and the agent, respectively, given that
the current belief is q and that the principal has not yet made an offer to the agent. By
ex post, we refer to the payoffs after the requisite waiting time dt has passed and the
principal is on the verge of making the next offer. Let s(q) denote the offer made by the
principal at belief q, leading to a payoff πs(q) for the principal and π(1 − s(q)) for the
agent if the project is successful.
The principal’s payoff v(q) follows a differential equation. To interpret this equation,
let us first write the corresponding difference equation for a given dt > 0 (up to second
order terms):
v(qt) = (pqtπs(qt)− c)dt+ (1− rdt)(1− pqtdt)v(qt+dt).
The first term on the right is the expected payoff in the current period, consisting of the
probability of a success pqt multiplied by the payoff πs(qt) in the event of a success, minus
the cost of the advance c, all scaled by the period length dt. The second term is the
continuation value to the principal in the next period v(qt+dt), evaluated at next period’s
belief qt+dt and multiplied by the discount factor 1− rdt and the probability 1− pqtdt of
reaching the next period via a failure.
Taking the limit dt → 0, we get the differential equation corresponding to the fric-
tionless limit,
(r + pq)v(q) = pqπs(q)− c− pq(1− q)v′(q). (2)
The left side is the annuity on the project, given the effective discount factor (r+pq). This
must equal the sum of the flow payoff, pqπs(q)− c, and the capital loss, v′(q)q̇, imposed
by the deterioration of the posterior belief induced by a failure. To see how q̇ appears in





from which it follows that, in the limit,
q̇t = −pqt(1− qt). (4)
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Similarly, the payoff to the agent, w(qt), must solve, to the second order,
w(qt) = pqtπ(1− s(qt))dt + (1− rdt)(1− pqtdt)w(qt+dt)
= cdt + (1− rdt)(w(qt+dt) + x(qt)dt). (5)
The first equality gives the agent’s equilibrium value as the sum of the agent’s current-
period payoff pqtπ(1 − s(qt))dt and the agent’s continuation payoff w(qt+dt), discounted
and weighted by the probability the game does not end. The second equality is the agent’s
incentive constraint. The agent must find the equilibrium payoff at least as attractive as
the alternative of shirking. The payoff from shirking includes the appropriation of the
experimentation cost cdt, plus the discounted continuation payoff w(qt+dt), which is now
received with certainty and is augmented by x(qt), defined to be the marginal gain from
t+dt onward from shirking at time t unbeknownst to the principal. The agent’s incentive
constraint must bind in a recursive Markov equilibrium, since otherwise the principal
could increase her share without affecting the agent’s effort.
To evaluate x(qt), note that, when shirking, the agent holds an unchanged posterior
belief, qt, while the principal wrongly updates to qt+dt < qt. If the equilibrium expectation
is that the agent works in all subsequent periods, then he will do so as well if he is more
optimistic. Furthermore, the agent’s value (when he always works) arises out of the
induced probability of a success in the subsequent periods. A success in a subsequent
period occurs with a probability that is proportional to his current belief. As a result, the








or, taking the limit dt→ 0 and using (4),
x(qt) = p(1− qt)w(qt).
Using this expression and again taking the limit dt→ 0, the agent’s payoff satisfies
0 = pqπ(1− s(q))− pq(1− q)w′(q)− (r + pq)w(q)
= c− pq(1− q)w′(q)− (r + pq)w(q) + pw(q). (7)
The term pw(q) in (7) reflects the future benefit from shirking now. This gives rise to
what we call a dynamic agency cost. One virtue of shirking is that it ensures the game
continues, rather than risking a game-ending success. The larger the agent’s continuation
value w(q), the larger the temptation to shirk, and hence the more expensive will the
principal find it to induce effort.
This gives us three differential equations (equation (2) and the two equalities in (7)) in
three unknown functions (v, w and s). We have already identified the relevant boundary
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condition, namely that experimentation ceases when the posterior q drops to q. We can
accordingly solve for the candidate equilibrium.








Noting that ψ = pπ/c− 2, we can interpret ψ as the benefit-cost ratio of the experiment,
or equivalently as a measure of the size of the potential surplus. We accordingly interpret
high values of ψ as identifying high-surplus projects and low values off ψ as identifying
low-surplus projects. We assume that ψ is positive, since otherwise q = 2/(2 + ψ) is
greater than 1, and hence no experimentation takes place no matter what the prior belief.
Notice next that σ is larger as r is smaller, and hence the players are more patient. We
thus refer to large values of σ as identifying “patient projects” and low values of σ as
identifying impatient projects.
Using this notation, we can use the second equation from (7) to solve for w, using as
















Figure 2 (below) illustrates this solution.
It is a natural expectation that w(q) should increase in q, since the agent seemingly
always has the option of shirking and the payoff from doing so increases with the time
until experimentation stops. Figure 2 shows that w(q) may decrease in q for large values
of q. To see how this might happen, fix a positive period-of-inertia length dt, so that
the principal will make a finite number of offers before terminating experimentation, and
consider what happens to the agent’s value if the prior probability q is increased just
enough to ensure that the maximum number of experiments has increased by one. From
the incentive constraint (5) and (6) we see that this extra experimentation opportunity
(i) gives the agent a chance to expropriate the cost of experimentation c (which the agent
will not do in equilibrium, but nonetheless is indifferent between doing so and not), (ii)
delays the agent’s current value by one period and hence discounts it, and (iii) increases
this current value by a factor of the form qt/qt+dt, reflecting the agent’s more optimistic
prior. The first and third of these are benefits, the second is a cost. The benefits will
often outweigh the costs, for all priors, and W will then be increasing in q. However, the
factor qt/qt+dt is smallest for large q, and hence if w is ever to be decreasing, it will be so
for large q, as in Figure 2.
We can use the first equation from (7) to solve for s(q), and then solve (2) for the
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This seemingly complicated expression is actually straightforward to manipulate. For
instance, a simple Taylor expansion reveals that v is approximately proportional to (q−q)2
in the neighborhood of q, while w is approximately proportional to (q− q). Both parties’
payoffs thus tend to zero as q approaches q, since the net surplus pqπ−2c declines to zero.
The principal’s payoff tends to zero faster, as there are two forces behind this disappearing
payoff: the remaining time until experimentation stops for good vanishes, and the mark-
up she gets from success does so as well. The agent’s mark-up, on the other hand, does
not disappear, as shirking yields a benefit that is independent of q, and hence the agent’s
payoff is proportional to the remaining amount of experimentation time.
These strategies constitute an equilibrium if and only if the principal’s participation
constraint v(q) ≥ 0 is satisfied for q ∈ [q, q]. (The agent’s incentive constraint implies the








which is positive if and only if ψ > σ. This is the first indication that our candidate
no-delay strategies will not always constitute an equilibrium.













When q = q = 1, the project is known to be good, and there is no learning. Our
candidate strategies will then operate the project as long as it takes to obtain a success.
The first term on the right in (11) is the value of the surplus, calculated by dividing the
(potentially perpetually received) flow value pπ− c by the effective discount rate of r+ p,
with r capturing the discounting and p capturing the hazard of a flow-ending success. The
second term in (11) is the agent’s equilibrium payoff. Since the agent can always shirk,
ensuring that the project literally endures forever, the agent’s payoff is the flow value c
of expropriating the experimental advance divided by the discount rate r.
As the players become more patient (r decreases), the agent’s equilibrium payoff in-
creases without bound, as the discounted value of the payoff stream c becomes arbitrarily
valuable. In contrast, the presence of p in the effective discount rate r + p, capturing the
event that a success ends the game, ensures that the value of the surplus cannot similarly
increase without bound, no matter how patient the players. But then the principal’s pay-
off (given q = 1), given by the difference between the value of the surplus and the agent’s
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payoff, can be positive only if the players are not too patient. The players are sufficiently
impatient that v(1) > 0 when ψ > σ, and too patient for v(1) > 0 when ψ < σ. We say
that we are dealing with impatient players (or an impatient project or simply impatience),
in the former case, and patient players in the latter case.
We next examine the principal’s payoff near q. We have noted that v(q) = v′(q) = 0,
so everything here hinges on the second derivative v′′(q). We can use the agent’s incentive
constraint (7) to eliminate the share s from (2) and then solve for
v′ =
pqπ − 2c− pw − (r + pq)v
pq(1− q)
.
With some fortuitous foresight, we first investigate the derivative v′′(q) for the case in
which ψ = 2. This case is particularly simple, as ψ = 2 implies q = 1/2, and hence
pq(1− q) is maximized at q. Marginal variations in q will thus have no effect on pq(1− q),
and we can take this product to be a constant. Using v′(q) = 0 and calculating that
w′(q) = c/(pq(1− q)), we have




Hence, as q increases above q, v′ tends to increase in response to the increased value
of the surplus (captured by pπ), but to decrease in response to the agent’s larger payoff
(−pw′(q)). To see which force dominates, multiply by pq(1−q) and then use the definition
of ψ to obtain







Hence, at ψ = 2, the surplus-increasing and agent-payoff-increasing effects of an increase
in q precisely balance, and v′′(q) = 0. It is intuitive that larger values of ψ enhance the
surplus effect, and hence v′′(q) > 0 for ψ > 2.11 In this case, v(q) > 0 for values of q near
q. We refer to these as high-surplus projects. Alternatively, smaller values of ψ attenuate
the surplus effect, and hence v′′(q) < 0 for ψ < 2. In this case, v(q) < 0 for values of q
near q. We refer to these as low-surplus projects.
This gives us information about the endpoints of the interval [q, 1] of possible pos-
teriors. It is a straightforward calculation that v admits at most one inflection point,
so that it is positive everywhere if it is positive at 1 and increasing at q = q. We can
then summarize our results as follows, with Lemma 9 in Appendix A.6.3 providing the
corresponding formal argument:
- v is positive for values of q > q close to q if ψ > 2, and negative if ψ < 2.
11Once ψ edges over 2, we can no longer take pq(1 − q) to be approximately constant in q, yielding a







- v(1) is positive if ψ > σ and negative if ψ < σ.
- Hence, if ψ > 2 and ψ > σ, then v(q) ≥ 0 for all q ∈ [q, 1].
The key implication is that our candidate equilibrium, in which the project is never
downsized, is indeed an equilibrium only in the case of a high-surplus (ψ > 2), impatient
(ψ > σ) project. In all other cases, the principal’s payoff falls below zero for some beliefs.
3.1.2 Delay
If either ψ < 2 or ψ < σ, then the strategy profiles developed in the preceding
subsection cannot constitute an equilibrium, as they yield a negative principal payoff for
some beliefs. Whether it occurs at high or low beliefs, this negative payoff reflects the
dynamic agency cost. The agent’s continuation value is sufficiently lucrative, and hence
shirking in order to ensure the continuation value is realized is sufficiently attractive, that
the principal can induce the agent to work only at such expense as to render the principal’s
payoff negative. Equilibrium then requires that the principal make continuing the project
less attractive for the agent, making it less attractive to shirk and hence reducing the cost
to the principal of providing incentives.
We think of the principal as downsizing the project in order to reduce its attractiveness.
In the underlying game with inertial periods of length dt between offers, we capture this
downsizing by having the principal delay by more than the required time dt between
offers. This slows the rate of experimentation per unit of time, and in the frictionless
limit appears as if the project is operated on a smaller scale.
One way of capturing this behavior in a stationary limiting strategy is to require the
principal to undertake a series of independent randomizations between making an offer or
not. Conditional on not making an offer at time t, the principal’s belief does not change,
so that she randomizes at time t+dt in the same way as at time t. The result is a reduced
rate of experimentation per unit of time that effectively operates the project on a smaller
scale. However, as is well known, such independent randomizations cannot be formally
defined in the limit dt → 0. Instead, there exists a payoff-equivalent way to describe
them that can be formally formulated. To motivate it, suppose that the principal makes
a constant offer s with probability β over each interval of length dt. This means that
the total discounted present value of payoffs is proportional to βs/r, as randomization
effectively scales the payoff flows by a factor of β. This not only directly captures the idea
that the project is downsized by factor β, but leads nicely to the next observation, namely
that this is exactly the same value that would be obtained absent any randomization if
the discount rate were set to r/β ≥ r rather than r. Accordingly, we will not have the
principal randomize, but control the rate of arrival of offers, or equivalently the discount
rate, which is well-defined and payoff-equivalent. Letting λ = 1/β, we replace the discount
factor r with an effective discount factor rλ(q), where λ is controlled by the principal.
19
Because β ≤ 1, we have λ(q) ≥ 1, with λ(q) = 1 whenever there is no delay (as is
the case throughout Section 3.1.1), and λ(q) > 1 indicating delay. The principal can
obviously choose different amounts of delay for different posteriors, making λ a function
of q, but the lack of commitment only allows her to choose λ > 1 when she is indifferent
between delaying or not. Given that we have built the representation of this behavior
into the discount factor, we will refer to the behavior as delay, remembering that it has
an equivalent interpretation as downsizing.12
We must now rework the system of differential equations from Section 3.1.1 to incor-
porate delay. It can be optimal for the principal to delay only if the principal is indifferent
between receiving the resulting payoff later rather than sooner. This in turn will be the
case only if the principal’s payoff is identically zero, so whenever there is delay we have
v = v′ = 0. In turn, the principal’s payoff is zero at qt and at qt+dt only if her flow payoff
at qt is zero, which implies
pqs(q)π = c, (12)
and hence fixes the share s(q). To reformulate equation (7), identifying the agent’s payoff,
let w(qt) identify the agent’s payoff at posterior qt. We are again working with ex post
valuations, so that w(qt) is the agent’s value when the principal is about to make an offer,
given posterior qt, and given that the inertial period dt as well as any extra delay has
occurred. The discount rate r must then be replaced by rλ(q). Combining the second





This gives w′(q) = π which we can insert into the first equality of (7) (replacing r with
rλ(q)) to obtain
(rλ(q) + pq)w(q) = pq2π − c.
We can then solve for the delay
λ(q) =
(2q − 1)σ
q(ψ + 2)− 2
, (14)
which is strictly larger than one if and only if
q(2σ − ψ − 2) > σ − 2. (15)
12Bergemann and Hege [2] allow the principal to directly choose the scale of funding for an experiment
from an interval [0, c] in each period, rather than simply choosing to fund the project or not. Lower levels
of funding give rise to lower probabilities p of success. Lower values of c then have a natural interpretation
as downsizing the experimentation. This convention gives rise to more complicated belief updating that
becomes intractable when specifying out-of-equilibrium behavior.
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We have thus solved for the values of both players’ payoffs (given by v(q) = 0 and (13)),
and for the delay over any interval of time in which there is delay (given by (14)).
From (15), note that the delay λ strictly exceeds 1 at q = 1 if and only if ψ < σ and
at q = 2/(2 + ψ) if and only if ψ < 2. In fact, since the left side is linear in q, we have
λ(q) ≥ 1 for all q ∈ [q, 1] if ψ < σ and ψ < 2. Conversely, there can be no delay if ψ > σ
and ψ > 2. This fits the conditions derived in Section 3.1.1.
3.1.3 Recursive Markov Equilibrium Outcomes: Summary
We now have descriptions of two regimes of behavior, one without delay and one with
delay. We must patch these together to construct equilibria. If ψ > σ and ψ > 2, then
from (15) there is no delay at q = 1 and no delay at q = 2/(2 + ψ). Further, since the
left side of (15) is linear in q, we have no delay for any q ∈ [q, 1], matching the no-delay
conditions derived in Section 3.1.1.
If ψ < 2 (but ψ > σ) it is natural to expect delay for low beliefs, with this delay
disappearing as we reach the point at which equation (14) exactly gives no delay. That
is, delay should disappear for beliefs above
q∗∗ :=
2− σ
2 + ψ − 2σ
.
Alternatively, if ψ < σ (but ψ > 2), we should expect delay to appear once the belief
is sufficiently high for the function v defined by (2), which is positive for low q, to hit 0
(which it must, under these conditions). Because v has a unique inflection point, there is
a unique value q∗ ∈ (q, 1) that solves v(q∗) = 0.
We can summarize this with (with details in Appendix A.8):
Proposition 1 Depending on the parameters of the problem, we have four types of re-
cursive Markov equilibria, distinguished by their use of delay, summarized by:
High Surplus Low Surplus
ψ > 2 ψ < 2
Impatience, ψ > σ No delay Delay for low beliefs
(q < q∗∗)
Patience, ψ < σ Delay for high beliefs Delay for all beliefs
(q > q∗)
We can provide a more detailed description of these equilibria, with Appendix A.8
providing the technical arguments:
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High Surplus, Impatience (ψ > 2 and ψ > σ): No Delay. In this case, there is
no delay until the belief reaches q, in case of repeated failures. At this stage, the project
is abandoned. The relatively impatient agent does not value his future rents too highly,
which makes it relatively inexpensive to induce him to work. Since the project produces
a relatively high surplus, the principal’s payoff from doing so is positive throughout.
Formally, this is the case in which w and v are given by (8) and (9) and are both positive
over the entire interval [q, 1].
High Surplus, Patience (ψ > 2 and ψ < σ): Delay for High Beliefs. In this
case, the recursive Markov equilibrium is characterized by some belief q∗ ∈ (q, 1). For
higher beliefs, there is delay and the principal’s payoff is zero. As the belief reaches q∗,
delay disappears (taking a discontinuous drop in the process), and no further delay occurs
until the project is abandoned (in the absence of an intervening success) when the belief
reaches q.
When beliefs are high, the agent expects a long-lasting relationship, which his patience
renders quite lucrative, and effort is accordingly prohibitively expensive. Equilibrium
requires delay in order to reduce the agent’s continuation payoff and hence current cost.
As the posterior approaches q, the likely length of the agent’s future rent stream declines,
as does its value and hence the agent’s current incentive cost. This eventually brings the
relationship to a point where the principal can secure a positive payoff without delay.
Low Surplus, Impatience (ψ < 2 and ψ > σ): Delay for Low Beliefs. When
beliefs are higher than q∗∗, there is no delay. When the belief reaches q∗∗, delay appears
(with delay being continuous at q∗∗).
To understand why the dynamics are reversed, compared to the previous case, note
that it is now not too costly to induce the agent to work when beliefs are high, since the
impatient agent discounts the future heavily and does not anticipate a lucrative contin-
uation payoff, and the principal here has no need to delay. However, when the principal
becomes sufficiently pessimistic (q becomes sufficiently low), the low surplus generated by
the project still makes it too costly to induce effort. The principal must then resort to
delay in order to reduce the agent’s cost and render her payoff nonnegative.
Low Surplus, Patience (ψ < 2 and ψ < σ): Perpetual Delay. In this case, the
recursive Markov equilibrium involves delay for all values of q ∈ [q, 1]. The agent’s
patience makes him relatively costly, and the low surplus generated by the project makes
it relatively unprofitable, so that there is no belief at which the principal can generate a
nonnegative payoff without delay. Formally, λ, as given by (14), is larger than one over
[q, 1].
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3.1.4 Recursive Markov Equilibrium Outcomes: Lessons
What have we learned from studying recursive Markov equilibria? First, the dynamic
agency cost is a formidable force. A single encounter between the principal and agent
would be profitable for the principal whenever q > q. The dynamic agency cost increases
the incentive cost of the agent to such an extent that only in the event of a high surplus,
impatient project can the principal secure a positive payoff, no matter what the posterior
belief, without resorting to cost-reducing delay.
Second, and consequently, a project that is more likely to be good is not necessarily
better for the principal. This is obviously the case for a high surplus, patient project,
where the principal is doomed to a zero payoff for high beliefs but earns a positive payoff
when less optimistic. In this case, the lucrative future payoffs anticipated by an optimistic
agent make it particularly expensive for the principal to induce current effort, while a more
pessimistic agent anticipates a less attractive future (even though still patient), and can
be induced to work at a sufficiently lower cost as to allow the principal a positive payoff.
Moreover, even when the principal’s payoff is positive, it need not be increasing in the
probability the project is good. Figure 1 illustrates two cases (both high surplus projects)
where this does not happen. A higher probability that the project is good gives rise to a
higher surplus, but also makes creating incentives for the agent to work more expensive
(because the agent anticipates a more lucrative future). The latter effect may overwhelm
the former, and hence the principal may thus prefer to be pessimistic about the project.
Alternatively, the principal may find a project with lower surplus more attractive than
a higher-surplus project, especially (but not only) if the former is coupled with a less
patient agent. The larger surplus may increase the cost of inducing the agent to work so
much as to reduce the principal’s expected payoff.
Third, low surplus projects lead to delay for low posterior beliefs. Do we reach the
terminal belief q in finite time, or does delay increase sufficiently fast, in terms of dis-
counting, that the event that the belief reaches q is essentially discounted into irrelevance?
If the latter is the case, we would never observe a project being abandoned, but would
instead see them wither away, limping along at continuing but negligible funding.
It is straightforward to verify that for low surplus projects, not only does λ(q) diverge






That is, the event that the project is abandoned is entirely discounted away in those cases
in which there is delay for low beliefs. This means that, in real time, the belief q is only
reached asymptotically, so that the project is never really abandoned. Rather, the pace
of experimentation slows sufficiently fast that this belief is never reached. An analogous
feature appears in models of strategic experimentation (see, for example, Bolton and
Harris [9, p. 363] and Keller and Rady [21, p. 290]).
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Figure 1: The principal’s payoff (vertical axis) from the recursive Markov equilibrium, as
a function of the probability q that the project is good (horizontal axis). The parameters
are c/r = 1 for all curves. For the dotted curve, (ψ, σ) = (3, 27/10), giving a high surplus,
impatient project, with no delay and the principal’s value positive throughout. For the
dashed curve, (ψ, σ) = (3/2, 5/4), giving a low surplus, impatient project, with delay and a
zero principal value below the value q∗∗ = 0.75. For the solid curve, (ψ, σ) = (3, 4), giving
a high surplus, patient project, with delay and a zero principal value for q > q∗ ≈ .94.
We omit the case of a low surplus, patient project, where the principal’s payoff is 0 for all
q.
3.2 Non-Markov Equilibria
We now characterize the set of all equilibrium payoffs of the game. That is, we drop
the restriction to recursive Markov equilibrium, though we maintain the assumption that
equilibrium actions are pure on the equilibrium path.
This requires, as usual, to first understand how severely players might be credibly
punished for a deviation, and thus, what each player’s lowest equilibrium payoff is.
Here again, the limiting behavior as dt → 0 admits an intuitive description, except
for one boundary condition, which requires a fine analysis of the game with inertia (see
Lemma 3).
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3.2.1 Lowest Equilibrium Payoffs
Low-Surplus Projects (ψ < 2). We first discuss the relatively straightforward case of
a low-surplus project. In the corresponding unique recursive Markov equilibrium, there
is delay for all beliefs that are low enough (i.e., for all values of q ∈ I), where
I =
{
[q, q∗∗] Impatient project,
[q, 1] Patient project.
For these values of q, the principal’s equilibrium payoff is zero. This implies that, for these
beliefs, there exists a trivial non-Markov equilibrium in which the principal offers no fund-
ing on the equilibrium path, and so both players get a zero payoff; if the principal deviates
and makes an offer, players revert to the strategies of the recursive Markov equilibrium,
and so the principal has no incentive to deviate. Let us refer to this equilibrium as the
“full-stop equilibrium.” This implies that, at least for q in I, there exists an equilibrium
that drives down the agent’s payoff to 0.
We claim that zero is also the agent’s lowest equilibrium payoff for beliefs q > q∗∗, in
case I = [q, q∗∗]. For each q ∈ (q, q∗∗], we construct a family of candidate non-Markov
“no-delay” equilibria. Each member of this family corresponds to a different initial prior
q̂ > q, and the candidate equilibrium path calls for no delay from the prior q̂ until the
posterior falls to q (with the agent indifferent between working and shirking throughout),
at which point there is a switch to the full-stop equilibrium. We thus have one such
candidate equilibrium for each pair q, q̂ (with q̂ > q ∈ (q, q∗∗]). We can construct an
equilibrium with such an outcome if and only if the principal’s payoff is nonnegative
along the equilibrium path. For any q ∈ (q, q∗∗], the principal’s payoffs will be positive
throughout the path if q̂ is sufficiently close to q. However, if q̂ is too much larger than
q, the principal’s payoff will typically become negative. Let q̂(q) be the smallest q̂ > q
with the property that our the candidate equilibrium gives the principal a zero payoff at
q̂(q) (if there exists such a q̂ ≤ 1, and otherwise q̂(q) = 1). Note that it must be that
limq→q q̂(q) = q, since otherwise the payoff function v(q) defined by (9) would not be
negative for values of q close enough to q (which it is, because ψ < 2). Let Î := I ∪ q̂(I)
be the union of I and the image q̂(I) of I under the map q̂. Then Î is an interval and it
has length strictly greater than I.
It then suffices to argue that 1 ∈ Î. It is in turn sufficient to show that q̂(q∗∗) = 1.
The fact that q∗∗ < 1 indicates that the recursive Markov equilibrium featuring no delay
until the posterior drops to q∗∗ (with the agent’s incentive constraint binding throughout),
and then featuring delay for all subsequent posteriors, gives the principal a nonnegative
payoff for all q ∈ [q∗∗, 1]. Our equilibrium differs from the recursive Markov equilibrium
in terminating with a full stop at q∗∗ instead of continuing (with delay) until the posterior
hits q. This structural difference potentially has two effects on the principal’s payoff.
First, the principal loses the continuation payoff that follows posterior q∗∗ in the recursive
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Markov regime. This payoff is zero, since delay follows q∗∗, and hence this has no effect
on the principal’s payoff. Second, the agent also loses the continuation payoff following
q∗∗, which in the agent’s case is positive. This reduces the agent’s continuation payoff
at every higher posterior. However, reducing the agent’s continuation payoff reduces the
payoff to shirking, and in a no-delay outcome in which the agent’s incentive constraint
binds, this reduction also reduces the share the principal has to offer the agent, increasing
the principal’s payoff. (See Appendix A.6.2 for details.) Hence, the principal’s payoff in
the candidate equilibrium is surely nonnegative, or q̂(q∗∗) = 1.
We have established:13
Lemma 1 Fix ψ < 2. For every q > q, there exists an equilibrium for which the principal
and the agent’s payoffs converge to 0 as dt→ 0.14
High-Surplus Projects (ψ> 2). This case is considerably more involved, as the unique
recursive Markov equilibrium features no delay for initial beliefs that are close enough to
q, i.e. for all beliefs in J , where
J =
{
[q, 1] Impatient project,
[q, q∗) Patient project.
We must consider the principal and the agent in turn.
Because the principal’s payoff in the recursive Markov equilibrium is not zero, we
can no longer construct a full-stop equilibrium. Can we find some other non-Markov
equilibrium in which the principal’s payoff would be zero, so that we can replicate the
arguments from the previous case? The answer is no: there is no equilibrium that gives the
principal a payoff lower than the recursive Markov equilibrium, at least as dt → 0. (For
fixed dt > 0, her payoff can be driven slightly below the recursive Markov equilibrium, by
a vanishing margin that nonetheless plays a key role in the analysis below.) Intuitively,
by successively making the offers associated with the recursive Markov equilibrium, the
principal can secure this payoff. The details behind this intuition are non-trivial, because
the principal cannot commit to this sequence of offers, and the agent’s behavior, given
such an offer, depends on his beliefs regarding future offers. So we must show that there
are no beliefs he could entertain about future offers that could deter the principal from
making such an offer. Appendix A.7.2 establishes that the limit inferior (as dt → 0) of
13For any q, the lowest principal and agent payoffs converge pointwise to zero as dt → 0, but we can
obtain zero payoffs for fixed dt > 0 only on some interval of the form (q, 1) with q > q. In particular, if
qt+dt < q < q (see (3) for qt+dt), then the agent’s payoff given q is at least cdt.
14More formally, for all q > q, and all ε > 0, there exists dt > 0 such that both the principal’s and the
agent’s lowest equilibrium payoff is below ε on (q, 1) whenever the interval between consecutive offers is
no larger than dt. For high-surplus, patient projects, for q ≥ q∗, the same arguments as above yield that
there is a worst equilibrium with a zero payoff for both players.
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the principal’s equilibrium payoff over all equilibria is the limit payoff from the recursive
Markov equilibrium in that case:
Lemma 2 Fix ψ > 2. For all q ∈ I, the principal’s lowest equilibrium payoff converges
to the recursive Markov (no-delay) equilibrium payoff, as dt→ 0.
Having determined the principal’s lowest equilibrium payoff, we now turn to the agent’s
lowest equilibrium payoff. In such an equilibrium, it must be the case that the principal
is getting her lowest equilibrium payoff herself (otherwise, we could simply increase delay,
and threaten the principal with reversion to the recursive Markov equilibrium in case she
deviates; this would yield a new equilibrium, with a lower payoff to the agent). Also, in
such an equilibrium, the agent must be indifferent between accepting or rejecting offers
(otherwise, by lowering the offer, we could construct an equilibrium with a lower payoff
to the agent).
Therefore, we must identify the smallest payoff that the agent can get, subject to the
principal getting her lowest equilibrium payoff, and the agent being indifferent between
accepting and rejecting offers. This problem looks complicated but turns out to be re-
markably tractable, as explained below and summarized in Lemma 3. In short, there
exists such a smallest payoff. It is strictly below the agent’s payoff from the recursive
Markov equilibrium, but it is positive.
To derive this result, let us denote here by vM , wM the payoff functions in the recursive
Markov equilibrium, and by sM the corresponding share (each as a function of q). Our
purpose, then, is to identify all other solutions (v, w, s, λ) to the differential equations
characterizing such an equilibrium, insisting on v = vM throughout, with a particular
interest in the solution giving the lowest possible value of w(q). Rewriting the differential
equations (2) and (7) in terms of (vM , w, s, λ), and taking into account the delay λ (we
drop the argument of λ in what follows), we get




0 = qpπ(1− s)− pq(1− q)w′(q)− (rλ+ qp)w(q) (17)
= c− rλw(q)− pq(1− q)w′(q) + p(1− q)w(q). (18)
Since sM solves (16) for λ = 1, any alternative solution (w, s, λ) with λ > 1 must satisfy
(by subtracting (16) for (sM , 1) from (16) for (s, λ))
(λ− 1)vM(q) = qpπ(s− sM).
Therefore, as is intuitive, s > sM if and only if λ > 1: delay enables the principal to
increase her share. We can solve (17)–(18) for the agent’s payoff given the share s and
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then substitute into the (16) to get
rλ =
qpπ − 2c− pq(1− q)v′M(q)− pw(q)
vM (q)
− pq.
Inserting into (18) and rearranging yields
q (1− q) vM (q)w
′ (q) = w2 (q)+
(
vM (q) + q (1− q) v
′
M (q) +








Because a particular solution to this Riccati equation (namely wM) is known, the equation
can be solved.15 Here, this gives that the general solution is













ξ (q) . (21)
The factor q (1− q) suggests working with the log-likelihood ratio l = ln q
1−q
. Considering




= 0, for otherwise w′ (l) = w′M (l), and we get
back the known solution w = wM . This gives the necessary boundary condition. We then
obtain

















where l (and υ) are log likelihood ratios, and where










To be clear, the Riccati equation admits two (and only two) solutions: wM and w as given
in (22). Let us study this latter function in more detail. We now use the expansions
vM (q) =






















15It is well-known that, given a Riccati equation
w′ (q) = Q0 (q) +Q1 (q)w (q) +Q2 (q)w
2 (q) ,
for which a particular solution wM is known, the general solution is w (q) = wM (q) + g
−1 (q) , where g
solves
g′ (q) + (Q1 (q) + 2Q2 (q)wM (q)) g (q) = −Q2 (q) .
We obtain (20)–(21) by applying this formula, and then changing variables to ξ (q) := vM (q) g (q).
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This confirms an earlier observation: as the belief gets close to q, payoffs go to zero, but
they do so for two reasons for the principal: the maximum duration of future interactions
vanishes (a fact that also applies to the agent), and the mark-up goes to zero. Hence, the
principal’s payoff is of the second order, while the agent’s is only of the first. Expanding

















. Again, the factor (ψ−2) should not come
as a surprise: as ψ → 2, the profit of the principal decreases, allowing her to credibly
delay funding, and reduce the agent’s payoff to compensate for this delay (so that her
profit remains constant); when ψ = 2, her profit is literally zero, and she can drive the
agent’s payoff to zero as well.
This derivation is suggestive of what happens in the game with inertia, as the inertial
friction vanishes, but it remains to prove that the candidate equilibrium w < wM is
selected (rather than wM).
17 Appendix C.1 proves:
Lemma 3 When ψ > 2 and q ∈ I, the infimum over the agent’s equilibrium payoffs
converges (pointwise) to w, as given by (22), as dt→ 0.
This solution satisfies w(q) < wM(q) for all relevant q < 1: the agent can get a
lower payoff than in the recursive Markov equilibrium. Note that, since the principal also
obtains her lowest equilibrium payoff, it makes sense to refer to this payoff as the worst
equilibrium payoff in this case as well.
Two features of this solution are noteworthy. First, it is straightforward to verify that
for a high-surplus, patient project, i.e. when this derivation only holds for beliefs below
q∗, the delay associated with this worst equilibrium grows without bound as q ↑ q∗, and
so the agent’s lowest payoff tends to 0 (as does the principal’s, by definition of q∗). This
means that the worst equilibrium payoff is continuous at q∗, since we already know that
it gives both players a payoff of 0 above q∗.
16A simple expansion reveals that h (l) = 8
ψ−2
1
(l−l) +O(1), and defining y(l) := ξ(q),









which, together with y (l) = 0, implies that y (l) = −ψ−2
ψ+6 (l− l)+O (l − l)
2
. Using the expansion for vM ,
it follows thatvM (l)
y(l) = −
ψ+6
2(ψ+2)σ (l − l) +O (l − l)
2
, and the result follows from using w′M (l) = σ
−1.
17This relies critically on the multiplicity of recursive Markov equilibrium payoffs in the game with
dt > 0, and in particular, the existence of equilibria with slightly lower payoffs. While this multiplicity
disappears as dt→ 0, it is precisely what allows delay to build up as we consider higher beliefs, in a way
to generate a non-Markov equilibrium whose payoff converges to this lower value w.
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Figure 2: Functions wM (agent’s recursive Markov equilibrium payoff, upper curve) and w
(agent’s lowest equilibrium payoff, lower curve), for ψ = 3, σ = 2 (high surplus, impatient
project).
Second, for a high-surplus, impatient project, as q ↑ 1, the solution w(q) given by
Lemma 3 tends to one of two values, depending on parameters. These limiting values are
exactly those obtained for the model in case information is complete: q̄ = 1. That is, the
set of equilibrium payoffs for uncertain projects converges to the equilibrium payoff set
for q̄ = 1, discussed in Section 4.2.
Figure 2 shows wM and w for the case ψ = 3, σ = 2.
3.2.2 The Entire Set of (Limit) Equilibrium Payoffs
The previous section determined the worst equilibrium payoff (v, w) for both the prin-
cipal and the agent, given any prior q. As mentioned, this worst equilibrium payoff is
achieved simultaneously for both parties. When this lowest payoff to the principal is
positive, it is higher than her “minmax” payoff: if the agent never worked, the principal
could secure no more than zero. Nevertheless, unlike in repeated games, this lower min-
max payoff cannot be approached in an equilibrium: because of the sequential nature of
the extensive-form, the principal can take advantage of the sequential rationality of the
agent’s strategy to secure v.
It remains to describe the entire set of equilibrium payoffs. This description relies on
the following two observations.
First, for a given promised payoff w of the agent, the highest equilibrium payoff to
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the principal that is consistent with the agent getting w, if any, is obtained by front-
loading effort as much as possible. That is, equilibrium must involve no delay for some
time, and then revert to as much delay as is consistent with equilibrium. Hence, play
switches from no delay to the worst equilibrium. Depending on the worst equilibrium,
this might mean full stop (for instance, if ψ < 2, but also if ψ > 2 and the belief at which
the switch occurs, which is determined by w, exceeds q∗), or it might mean reverting to
experimentation with delay (in the remaining cases). The initial phase in which there
is no delay might be nonempty even if the recursive Markov equilibrium requires delay
throughout. In fact, if reversion occurs sufficiently early (w is sufficiently close to w), it is
always possible to start with no delay, no matter the parameters. Appendix C.2 proves:
Proposition 2 Fix q < 1 and w. The highest equilibrium payoff available to the principal
and consistent with the agent receiving payoff w, if any, is a non-Markov equilibrium
involving no delay until making a switch to the worst equilibrium for some belief q > q.
As a function of the agent’s payoff, the upper boundary of the payoff set, which gives
the corresponding maximum payoff to the principal, is a single-peaked function of the
agent’s payoff. Given the prior belief, this boundary starts at the payoff (v, w), and
initially slopes upward in w as we increase the duration of the initial no-delay phase. To
identify the other extreme point, consider first the case in which (v, w) = (0, 0). This
is precisely the case in which, if there were no delay throughout (until the belief reaches
q), the principal’s payoff would be negative. Hence, this no-delay phase must stop before
the posterior belief reaches q, and its duration is just long enough for the principal’s
(ex ante) payoff to be zero. The boundary thus comes down to a zero payoff to the
principal, and her maximum payoff is achieved by some intermediate duration. Consider
now the case in which v > 0 (and so also w > 0). This occurs precisely when no delay
throughout (i.e., until the posterior reaches q) is consistent with the principal getting a
positive payoff; indeed, she then gets precisely v, by Lemma 2. This means that, in this
case as well, the boundary comes down eventually, with the other extreme point yielding
the same minimum payoff to the principal, who achieves her maximum payoff for some
intermediate duration in this case as well.
The second observation is that payoffs below this upper boundary, but consistent with
the principal getting at least her lowest equilibrium payoff, can be achieved in a very
simple manner. Because introducing delay at the beginning of the game is equivalent to
averaging the payoff obtained after this initial delay with a zero payoff vector, varying the
length of this initial delay, and hence the selected payoff vector on this upper boundary,
achieves any desired payoff. This provides us with the structure of a class of equilibrium
outcomes that is sufficient to span all equilibrium payoffs. The following summary is then
immediate:
Proposition 3 Any equilibrium payoff can be achieved with an equilibrium whose out-
come features:
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1. An initial phase, during which the principal makes no offer;
2. An intermediate phase, featuring no delay;
3. A final phase, in which play reverts to the worst equilibrium.
Of course, any one or two of these phases may be empty in some equilibria. Observ-
able deviations (i.e. deviations by the principal) trigger reversion to the worst equilibrium,
while unobservable deviations (by the agent) are followed by optimal play given the prin-
cipal’s strategy.
In the process of our discussion, we have also argued that the favorite equilibrium of the
principal involves an initial phase of no delay that does not extend to the end of the game.
If (v, w) = 0, the switching belief can be solved in closed-form. Not surprisingly, it does
not coincide with the switching belief for the only recursive Markov equilibrium in which
we start with no delay, and then switch to some delay (indeed, in this recursive Markov
equilibrium, we revert to some delay, while in the best equilibrium for the principal,
reversion is to the full-stop equilibrium). In fact, it follows from this discussion that,
unless the Markov equilibrium specifies no delay until the belief reaches q, the recursive
Markov equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by some non-Markov equilibrium.
3.2.3 Non-Markov Equilibria: Lessons
What have we learned from studying non-Markov equilibria? In answering this ques-
tion we concentrate on efficient non-Markov equilibria.
First, these equilibria have a simple structure. The principal front-loads the agent’s
effort, calling for experimentation at the maximal rate until switching to the worst avail-
able continuation payoff. Second, this worst continuation involves terminating the project
in some cases (low-surplus projects), in which the principal effectively has commitment
power, but involves simply downsizing in other cases (high-surplus projects). Third, in
either case, the switch to the undesirable continuation equilibrium occurs before reaching
the second-best termination boundary q of the recursive Markov equilibria. Finally, de-
spite this inefficiently early termination or downsizing, the best non-Markov equilibria is
always better for the principal (than the recursive Markov equilibrium) and can be better
for both players.
The dynamic agency cost lurks behind all of these features. The premature switch to
the worst continuation payoff squanders surplus, but in the process reduces the cost of
providing incentives to the agent at higher posteriors. This in turn allows the principal
to operate the experimentation without delay at these higher posteriors, giving rise to a
surplus-enhancing effect sufficiently strong as to give both players a higher payoff than
the recursive Markov equilibrium.
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3.3 Summary
We can summarize the findings that have emerged from our examination of equilib-
rium. First, in addition to the standard agency cost, a dynamic agency cost arises out
of the repeated relationship. The higher the agent’s continuation payoff, the higher the
principal’s cost of inducing effort. This dynamic agency cost may make the agent so
expensive that the principal can earn a nonnegative payoff only by slowing the pace of
experimentation in order to reduce the future value of the relationship.
Recursive Markov equilibria without delay exist in some cases, but in others the dy-
namic agency cost can be effectively managed only by building in either delay for opti-
mistic beliefs, or delay for pessimistic beliefs, or both. In contrast, non-Markov equilibria
have a consistent and simple structure. The efficient non-Markov equilibria all front-load
the agent’s effort. Such an equilibrium features a initial period without delay, after which
a switch is made to the worst equilibrium possible. In some cases this worst equilib-
rium halts experimentation altogether, and in other cases it features the maximal delay
one can muster. The principal’s preferences are clear when dealing with non-Markov
equilibria—she always prefers a higher likelihood that the project is good, eliminating the
non-monotonicities of the Markov case.
The principal always reaps a higher payoff from the best non-Markov equilibrium than
from a recursive Markov equilibrium. Moreover, non-Markov equilibria may make both
agents better off than the recursive Markov equilibrium. It is not too surprising that the
principal can gain from a non-Markov equilibrium. Front-loading effort on the strength
of an impending switch to the worst (possibly null) equilibrium reduces the agent’s future
payoffs, and hence reduces the agent’s current incentive cost. But the eventual switch
appears to waste surplus, and it is less clear how this can make both players better off.
The cases in which both players benefit from such front-loading are those in which the
recursive Markov equilibrium features some delay. Front-loading effectively pushes the
agent’s effort forward, coupling more intense initial effort with the eventual switch to the
undesirable equilibrium. It can be surplus-enhancing to move effort forward, allowing
both players to benefit.
We view the non-Markov equilibria as better candidates for studying venture capital
contracts, where the literature emphasizes a sequence of full-funding stages followed by
either downsizing or (more typically) termination.
4 Comparisons
Our analysis is based on three modeling conventions: there is moral hazard in the
underlying principal-agent problem, there is learning over the course of repetitions of
this problem, and the principal cannot commit to future contract terms. This section
offers comparisons that shed light on each of these structural factors, and then turns to a
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comparison with Bergemann and Hege [2].
4.1 Observable Effort
We first compare our findings to the case in which the agent’s effort choice is observable
by the principal. The most striking point of this comparison is that the ability to observe
the agent’s effort choice can make the principal worse off.
We assume that the agent’s effort choice is unverifiable, so that it cannot be contracted
upon, since contractibility obviates the agency problem entirely and returns us to the first-
best world of Section 2.3. However, information remains symmetric, as the beliefs of the
agent and of the principal coincide at all times.
4.1.1 Markov Equilibria
We start with Markov equilibria. The state variable is the common belief that the
project is good. As before, let v(q) be the value to the principal, as a function of the
belief, and let w(q) be the agent’s value. If effort is exerted at time t, payoffs of the agent
and of the principal must be given by, to the second order,
w (qt) = pqtπ(1− s(qt))dt+ (1− rλ(qt)dt)(1− pqtdt)w (qt+dt) (23)
≥ cdt+ (1− rλ(qt)dt)w (qt) , (24)
v (qt) = (pqtπs(qt)− c)dt+ (1− rλ(qt)dt)(1− pqtdt)v (qt+dt) .
Note the difference with the observable case, apparent from the comparison of the incentive
constraint given in (24) with that of (7): if the agent deviates when effort is observable,
his continuation payoff is still given by w (qt), as the public belief has not changed.
We focus on the frictionless limit (again, the frictionless game is not well-defined, and
what follows is the description of the unique limiting equilibrium outcome as the frictions
vanish). The incentive constraint for the agent must bind in a Markov equilibrium, since
otherwise the principal could increase her share while still eliciting effort. Using this
equality and taking the limit dt→ 0 in the preceding expressions, we obtain
0 = pqπ(1− s(q))− (rλ(q) + pq)w(q)− pq(1− q)w′(q) = c− rλ(q)w(q), (25)
and
0 = pqπs(q)− c− (rλ(q) + pq)v(q)− pq(1− q)v′(q). (26)
As before, it must be that q ≥ q = 2c/(pπ), for otherwise it is not possible to give at
least a flow payoff of c to the agent (to create incentives), while securing a return c to the
principal (to cover the principal’s cost). We assume throughout that q < 1 .
As in the case with unobservable effort, we have two types of behavior from which to
construct Markov equilibria:
34
- The principal earns a positive payoff (v(q) > 0), in which case there must be no
delay (λ(q) = 1).
- The principal delays funding (λ(q) > 1), in which case the principal’s payoff must
be zero (v(q) = 0).
Suppose first that that there is no delay, so that λ(q) = 1 identically over some interval.
Then we must have w(q) = c/r, since it is always a best response for the agent to shirk to
collect a payoff of c, and the attendant absence of belief revision ensures that the agent
can do so forever. We can then solve for s (q) from (25), and plugging into (26) gives that
pqπ − (2 + pq)c− (r + pq)v(q)− pq(1− q)v′(q) = 0,
which gives as general solution
v(q) =
[














for some constant K. Considering any maximum interval over which there is no delay, the
payoff v must be zero at its lower end (either experimentation stops altogether, or delay
starts there), so that v must be increasing for low enough beliefs within this interval. Yet
v′ > 0 only if K < 0, in which case v is convex, and so it is increasing and strictly positive
for all higher beliefs. Therefore, the interval over which λ = 1 and hence there is no delay
is either empty or of the type [q∗, 1]. We can rule out the case q∗ = q, because solving for
K from v(q) = 0 gives v′(q) < 0. Therefore, it must be the case that v = 0 and there is





Alternatively, suppose that v = 0 identically over some interval. Then also v′ = 0,
and so, from (26), s (q) = c/(pqπ). From (25), λ (q) = c/w(q), and so, also from (25),
pqw(q) = pqπ − 2c− pq(1− q)w′(q),



















It remains to determine q∗. Using value matching for the principal’s payoff at q∗ to solve









where W−1 is the negative branch of the Lambert function.
18 It is then immediate that
q∗ < 1 if and only if ψ > σ. The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Appendix D presents the foundations for this result, including an analysis for the case in
which dt > 0 and a consideration of the limit dt→ 0.





, equilibrium behavior features delay, with the agent’s payoff given by (28)
and zero payoff for the principal. When q ∈ [q∗, 1], the equilibrium behavior features no
delay, with the principal’s payoff given by (27) and positive for all q > q∗.
[4.1] If ψ > σ (an impatient project), then q∗ is given by (29).
[4.2] If ψ < σ (a patient project), q∗ = 1, and hence there is delay for all posterior
beliefs.
4.1.2 Non-Markov Equilibria
Because the principal’s payoff in the Markov equilibrium is 0 for any belief q ∈ [q, q∗],
she is willing to terminate experimentation at such a belief, giving the agent a zero payoff
as well. This is the analogue of the familiar “full-stop” equilibrium in the unobservable
effort case. If both players expect that the project will be stopped at some belief q on the
equilibrium path, there will be an equilibrium outcome featuring delay, and hence a zero
principal’s payoff, for all beliefs in some interval above this threshold, which allows us to
“roll back” and conclude that, for all beliefs, there exists a full-stop equilibrium in which
the project is immediately stopped. Therefore, the lowest equilibrium payoffs are (0, 0).
The principal’s best equilibrium payoff is now clear. Unlike in the unobservable case,
there is no rent that the agent can secure by diverting the funds: any such deviation is
immediately punished, as the project is stopped. Therefore, it is best for the principal
that experimentation takes place for all beliefs above q, without any delay, while keeping
the agent at his lowest equilibrium payoff, i.e. 0. That is, λ(q) = 1 for all q ≥ q, and
literally (in the limit) s (q) = 1 as well, with v solving, for q ≥ q,
(r + pq)v(q) = pqπ − pq(1− q)v′(q),

















We summarize this discussion in the following proposition. Appendix D again presents
foundations.
18The positive branch only admits a solution to the equation that is below q.
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Proposition 5 The lowest equilibrium payoff of the agent is zero for all beliefs. The best
equilibrium for the principal involves experimentation without delay until q = q, and the
principal pays no more than the cost of experimentation. This maximum payoff is given
by (30).
The surplus from this efficient equilibrium can be divided arbitrarily. Because the
agent’s effort is observed and the principal’s lowest equilibrium payoff is zero, we can
ensure that the agent rejects any out-of-equilibrium offers by assuming that acceptance
leads to termination. As a result, we can construct equilibria in which the agent receives
an arbitrarily large share of the surplus, with any attempt by the principal to induce
effort more cheaply leading to termination. In this way, it is possible to specify that the
entire surplus goes to the agent in equilibrium. This gives the entire Pareto-frontier of
equilibrium payoffs, and the convex hull of this frontier along with the zero payoff vector
gives the entire equilibrium payoff set.
4.1.3 Comparison
One’s natural inclination is to think that it can only help the principal to observe the
agent’s effort. Indeed, one typically thinks of principal-agent problems as trivial when
effort can be observed. In this case, the principal may prefer to not observe effort. We
see this immediately in the ability to construct non-Markov equilibria that divide the
surplus arbitrarily. The ability to observe the agent’s effort may then be coupled with
an equilibrium in which the principal earns nothing, with the principal’s payoff bounded
away from zero when effort cannot be observed.
This comparison does not depend on constructing non-Markov equilibria. For patient
projects, the principal’s Markov equilibrium payoff under observable effort is zero, while
there are Markov equilibria (for high surplus projects) under unobservable effort featuring
a positive principal payoff. For impatient projects, the principal’s Markov equilibrium
payoff under observable effort is zero for pessimistic expectations, while it is positive for
a high surplus project with unobservable effort. In each case, the observability is harmful
for the principal.
4.2 Good Projects: q̄ = 1
Now suppose there is no learning. We continue to assume the interaction is repeated,
since otherwise we have the standard principal-agent problem of Holmström [18], but we
take q = 1, so that the project is known to be good. Appendix E provides the detailed
calculations behind the following discussion.
We first consider Markov equilibria. When q = 1, a Markov equilibrium generates a
stationary outcome. The same actions are repeated indefinitely, until the game is halted
by a success. We find two types of Markov equilibria. For impatient projects, identified
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by ψ > σ, the only Markov equilibrium features no delay until a success is obtained. For
patient projects, the Markov equilibrium entails continual delay, with experimentation
proceeding but at an attenuated pace, again until a success occurs. The principal earns
a positive payoff in the former case, and a zero payoff in the latter.
When q = 1, the project is inherently stationary—a failure leaves the players facing
precisely the situation with which they started. One might then expect that the set of
equilibrium payoffs is exhausted by considering equilibria with stationary outcomes, even
if these outcomes are enforced by punishing with nonstationary continuation equilibria.
To determine whether this is the case here, we must split the class of impatient projects
into two categories. We say that a project is very impatient if
ψ < 2σ + σ2.
In this case, the Markov equilibrium is the unique equilibrium, whether Markov or not.
However, if we have a moderately impatient project, or
σ < ψ < 2σ + σ2,
then there are non-Markov equilibria with stationary outcomes that give the principal
a higher payoff than the Markov equilibrium, and there are non-Markov equilibria with
nonstationary outcomes that give yet higher payoffs. For patient projects, or ψ < σ, there
are equilibria with nonstationary outcomes that give both players a higher payoff than the
Markov equilibrium.
As is the case when q < 1, a simple class of equilibria spans the boundary of the set of
all (weak perfect Bayesian) equilibrium payoffs. An equilibrium in this class features no
delay for some initial segment of time, after which play switches to the worst equilibrium.
This worst equilibrium is the full-stop equilibrium in the case of patient projects, and
is an equilibrium featuring delay and relatively low payoffs in the case of a moderately
impatient (but not very impatient) project. This is a stark illustration of the front-
loading observed in the case of projects not known to be good. When q < 1, the extremal
equilibria feature no delay until the posterior probability q has deteriorated sufficiently, at
which point a switch occurs to the worst equilibrium. When q = 1, play occurs without
delay and without belief revision, until switching to the worst equilibrium.
The benefits of the looming switch to the worst equilibrium are reaped up front by
the principal in the form of lower incentive costs. It is then no surprise that there exist
nonstationary equilibria of this type that provide higher payoffs to the principal than the
Markov equilibrium. How can making the agent cheaper by reducing his continuation
payoffs make the agent better off? The key here is that the Markov equilibrium of
a patient project features perpetual delay. The nonstationarity front-loads the agent’s
effort, coupling a period without delay with an eventual termination of experimentation.
This allows efficiency gains from which both players can benefit.
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4.3 Commitment
Suppose the principal could commit to her future behavior, i.e., could announce at
the beginning of the game a binding sequence of offers to be made to the agent.
Arguments analogous to those establishing Proposition 2 can be used to show (with
the proof in Appendix F.1):
Proposition 6 Fix q < 1 and w. The highest equilibrium payoff (with commitment)
available to the principal and consistent with the agent receiving payoff w, if any, involves
no delay, until terminating experimentation at some belief q > q.
In the case of a low-surplus project, there exists an equilibrium without commitment
providing a zero payoff to the principal, and hence there exists a full-stop equilibrium.
This gives us the ability to construct equilibria consisting of no delay until the posterior
belief reaches an arbitrarily chosen threshold, at which point experimentation ceases. But
then there exist equilibria in which this threshold duplicates the posterior at which the
commitment solution ceases experimentation. As a result, commitment does not increase
the maximum value to the principal—anything the principal can do with commitment,
the principal can also do without.
In the case of high-surplus projects, commitment is valuable. The principal’s maximal
no-commitment payoff is achieved by eliciting no delay until a threshold value of q is
reached at which point the players switch to the worst equilibrium. The latter still exhibits
effort from the agent, albeit with delay, and the principal would fare better ex ante from
the commitment to terminate experimentation altogether.
4.4 Powerless Principals
Finally, we compare our equilibria to the outcome described in Bergemann and Hege
[2] (cf. Section 1.2). The principal has all of the bargaining power in our interaction. The
primary modeling difference between our analysis and that of Bergemann and Hege [2] is
that their agent has all of the bargaining power, making an offer to the principal in each
period. How do the two outcomes compare? Perhaps the most striking result is the there
are cases in which the agent may prefer the principal have the bargaining power.
We compare “recursive Markov” equilibria. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the outcomes for
the two models. The qualitative features of these diagrams are similar, though the details
differ. The principal earns a zero payoff in any recursive Markov equilibrium in which the
agent makes offers, and so the principal can only gain from having the bargaining power.
When σ is relatively small, there are values of ψ > σ and ψ > 2 for which there is never
delay (Case 1) when the principal makes offers but delay for low beliefs (Case 3) when the
agent makes offers. For relatively low beliefs, the equilibrium when the principal makes
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Figure 3: Illustration of Markov equilibria for the model considered in this paper, in which
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σ = 2− 2p
Figure 4: Illustration of the outcomes described by Bergemann and Hege [2], in their
model in which the agent makes offers. To represent the function σ = 2 − 2p, we fix
π/c =: Π and then use the definitions σ = p/r and ψ = pΠ − 2 to write σ = 2 − 2p as
σ = 2 − 2(ψ + 2)/Π. A straightforward calculation shows that the lines delineating the
regions intersect at a value ψ = σ > 2.
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captures some of this surplus. When the agent makes offers, delay reduces the surplus,
but all of it goes to the agent. We have noted that when the principal makes offers, the
proportion of the surplus going to the agent approaches one as q gets small. For relatively
small values of q, the agent will then prefer that the principal has the bargaining power,
allowing the agent to capture virtually all of a larger surplus.19
5 Summary
This paper makes three contributions: we develop techniques to work with repeated
principal-agent problems in continuous time, we characterize the set of equilibria, and we
explore the implications of institutional arrangements such as alternative allocations of
the bargaining power. We concentrate here on the latter two contributions.
Our basic finding in Section 3 was that Markov and non-Markov equilibria differ sig-
nificantly in both structure and payoffs. In terms of structure, the non-Markov equilibria
that span the set of equilibrium payoffs share a simple common form, front-loading the
agent’s effort into a period of relentless experimentation followed by a switch to reduced
or abandoned effort. This contrasts with Markov equilibria, which may call for either
front-loaded or back-loaded effort.
Front-loading again plays a key role in the comparisons offered in Section 4. A prin-
cipal endowed with commitment power would front-load effort, using her commitment
in the case of a high-surplus project to increase her payoffs by accentuating this front-
loading. When effort is observable, Markov equilibria either feature front-loading (impa-
tient projects) or perpetual delay, while non-Markov equilibria eliminate delay entirely
and achieve the first-best outcome. The principal may prefer (i.e., may earn a higher
equilibrium payoff) being unable to observe the agent’s effort, even if one restricts the
ability to fortuitously select equilibria by concentrating on Markov equilibria. Similarly,
the agent may be better off when the principal makes the offers (as here) than when the
agent does.
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A Online Appendix: Foundations
This section develops the foundations for results presented in Section 3. We assume
there is a length of time ∆ > 0 such that if the principal has made an offer to the agent
at time t, the principal cannot make another offer until time t+∆ (though the principal
could wait longer to make the next offer). We characterize the set of equilibria for ∆ > 0
and then examine the limit as ∆ → 0. The cost to be advanced to the agent is given
by c∆ and the probability that a good project is a success is given by p∆. The discount
factor is δ = e−r∆.
A.1 Outline
Section A.3 opens with a basic observation. Whether an agent facing an offer prefers
to work or shirk depends not only on the usual suspects, such as the offer and the players’
beliefs, but also on whether the agent is expected to work or shirk. We will find cases
in which the agent will find it optimal to work if expected to do so, and to shirk if so
expected. This will give rise to multiple equilibria. We will also find cases in which the
agent will prefer to work if expected to shirk, and to shirk if expected to work. This will
force us to work with mixed strategies (though we eventually show that these mixtures
occur only off the equilibrium path), and precludes the existence of Markov equilibria.
These observations color all of the subsequent analysis.
Section A.4 establishes some preliminary results that are important in formulating the
problem in a manageable way, simplifying the types of beliefs we must consider and iden-
tifying the continuation payoffs for histories that will appear repeatedly in the analysis.
Section A.5 introduces the solution concept of recursive Markov equilibrium, which we
conventionally refer to simply as Markov equilibrium.
Section A.6 introduces an obvious candidate for a recursive Markov equilibrium, in-
volving no delay, and establishes the conditions under which it is indeed an equilibrium.
There are other Markov no-delay equilibria, and Section A.7 characterizes the set of such
equilibria. Section A.8 characterizes the entire set of (recursive) Markov equilibria and
establishes a limiting result. As ∆ → 0, any sequence of Markov equilibria converges to
the behavior considered in Section 3. It is this limiting uniqueness result that allows us
to work in the convenient frictionless limit.
The extension of these results to non-Markov equilibria is for the most part straight-
forward, and is presented in Section 3.2, with details that are not immediate contained in
the proofs in Sections C.1 and C.2.
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A.2 Strategies
A history ht at date t is a full description of the actions of the players from time
zero up to, but not including, time t. It specifies for every t′ < t whether the principal
made no offer (wait, w), or whether an offer s ∈ [0, 1] was made, as well as the agent’s
action in that case (shirk, S, or work, W ). Formally, a history at time t is a function
ht : [0, t) → {[0, 1]×{S,W}}∪{w} such that, for all τ < t, if ht(τ) ∈ [0, 1]×{S,W}, then
ht(t
′) = w for all t′ ∈ (τ, τ +∆), t′ < t. Implicit in this description is that all experiments
were unsuccessful, as the game ends otherwise. A public history hPt is defined in the
same way, but it only specifies the actions taken by the principal (i.e., it takes values in
[0, 1]∪ {w}). The set of such functions are denoted Ht and H
P








t is said to be a continuation of h
P
t|t′).
A (behavior) strategy for the principal is a collection σP = (σPt )t∈R+ , where the σ
P
t
are probability transitions from HPt into [0, 1] × {w}, such that, for all t
′ and t with
t ∈ (t′, t′ + ∆), we have hPt (t
′) ∈ [0, 1] implies that σP (hPt ) = {w}. The strategy of
the agent σA is defined similarly (with Ht replacing H
P
t ), given an outstanding offer s.
To ensure that every pair σ of strategies uniquely determines a continuation-path, it is
furthermore necessary to (innocuously) assume that, for all t > t′ ≥ 0, if σP (hPt|t′) = w,
there exists t′′ > t′ such that σP (hPt′ |τ ) = w for all τ ∈ (t
′, t′′). See Perry and Reny [25]








) for the continuation strategy induced
by the given history.
A.3 Expectations and the Agent’s Incentives
This section identifies the source of much of the technical difficulties, arising out of the
interaction between expectations concerning the agent’s actions and the agent’s incentives





Then ϕ(q) is the posterior belief the project is good, given prior belief q and that the
agent undertook an experiment that ended in a failure. The probability of a success is
proportional to ∆, and so p should be replaced by p∆ in this expression, but we will
suppress ∆ whenever doing so causes no confusion.
In equilibrium, the principal and the agent share the same belief. Suppose we have
reached a period in which the principal and the agent both attach probability q to the
project being good. The principal offers share s. Will the agent work?
Let W (1q, q) be the expected value to the agent of a continuation equilibrium in
which the agent attaches probability q to the project being good, and the principal’s
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belief attaches a mass of probability one to belief q. If the equilibrium expectation is that
the agent will work, then the agent will do so if
pqπ(1− s) + (1− pq)δW (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)) ≥ c+ δW (1ϕ(q), q).
The left side is the value of working, including the current expected payoff pqπ(1−s) from
a success and the expected continuation payoff (1−pq)δW (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)) from a failure. The
right side is the value of shirking, including the current payoff from expropriating c and
the continuation payoff δW (1ϕ(q), q), with the agent now being more optimistic than the
principal.
Let us suppose instead that the equilibrium expectation is that the agent will shirk.
Then the incentive constraint is given by
pqπ(1− s) + (1− pq)δW (1q, ϕ(q)) ≤ c+ δW (1q, q).
In each case, a larger agent share 1− s makes it more tempting for the agent to work.
Hence, in the first case there is a cutoff sW such that the agent will work for values s < sW
and shirk for values s > sW . In the second case, there is similarly a cutoff sS.
Now let us consider three possibilities. First, it might be that for every history,
sW = sS. In this case we can restrict attention to pure-strategy equilibria. The agent
would work whenever s falls short of the value sW = sS appropriate for the history in
question, and shirk whenever s exceeds sW = sS. The principal’s strategy would similarly
be pure, solving an optimization problem subject to agent’s incentive constraint. Finally,
the Markov equilibrium would be unique in this case. The Markov assumption precludes
constructing intertemporal incentives for the agent, and the principal would invariably
extract as much surplus as possible from the agent, consistent with the agent still working,
by setting s = sW = sS.
Appendix E, examining the case in which the project is known to be good (q = 1) and
so there is no learning, finds sW = sS. It is then no surprise that pure-strategy equilibria
exist, and that Markov equilibria are unique. Similarly, we have sW = sS in the case
when actions are observable, examined in Section 4.1. The key in both cases is that the
observed action (if any) and the outcome (failure) suffice to determine subsequent beliefs.
In contrast, when q < 1 and actions are unobserved, subsequent beliefs depend on
current expectations as to the agent’s actions. Section A.6.4 shows that in this case,
sW = sS fails for almost all histories. Instead, a typical configuration is that sW > sS for
low values of q and sW < sS for large values of q (though depending on parameters the
latter interval may be empty).
Hence, and second, suppose we have a history at which sW > sS. For s ∈ (sS, sW ),
the agent’s optimal action depends on equilibrium expectations. The agent will prefer
to work if expected to work, and prefer to shirk if expected to shirk. This allows us to
construct multiple Markov equilibria, though the set of Markov equilibria converges to a
unique limiting equilibrium as ∆ → 0, described in Section 3.
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Third, suppose we have a history at which sW < sS. For s ∈ (sW , sS), the agent’s
optimal action again depends on equilibrium expectations. Here, however, the agent will
prefer to shirk if expected to work, and will prefer to work if expected to shirk. This will
preclude the construction of pure-strategy equilibria. Offers s ∈ (sS, sW ) will occur only
off the equilibrium path, so that we can still restrict attention to equilibria featuring pure
outcomes, but a complete specification of strategies (which is necessary to check that the
principal finds such offers unprofitable, verifying that such offers are indeed off-path) will
require mixing.
If the agent mixes, then not only will the principal and the agent subsequently have
different beliefs (because only the agent knows the outcome of the mixture), but the
principal’s belief will attach positive probability to multiple agent beliefs. The support of
the principal’s belief qP in any particular period will be a finite set, corresponding to the
finitely many histories of actions the agent can have taken, but the maximum number of
possible elements in this set grows with the passing of each period.
Appendix A.9 shows that cases in which sW < sS arise, and cases in which sW > sS
can arise, when the agent makes the offers instead of the principal, as in Bergemann and
Hege [2]. Hence, multiplicity and non-existence of Markov equilibria arise in that context
as well.
A.4 Preliminaries
This section collects some results that simplify the principal’s problem.
A.4.1 The Horizon is Effectively Finite
There is in principle no limit on the number of experiments the principal might induce
the agent to conduct. However, there is an upper bound on the length of equilibrium
experimentation. Appendix A.10 proves:
Lemma 4 For any prior belief q and waiting time ∆, there is a finite T (q,∆) such that
there is no equilibrium attaching positive probability to an outcome in which the principal
makes more than T (q,∆) offers to the agent.
The intuition is straightforward. Every experiment pushes the posterior probability
that the project is good downward, while costing at least c. There is then a limit on how
many failures the principal will endure before becoming so pessimistic as to be unwilling
to fund further experimentation.
The advantage of this result is that it makes available backward-induction arguments.
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A.4.2 Two Beliefs are Enough
The current state of the project is described by a private belief qA for the agent, and
a public distribution qP over beliefs for the principal. The public belief qP potentially
attaches positive probability to a finite number of posterior probabilities that the project
is good, corresponding to the finite number of work/shirk combinations that the agent
can have implemented in the preceding periods. However, we can restrict attention to
rather simple instances of the public belief, attaching positive probability to at most two
beliefs. Section A.11 proves:
Lemma 5 Let {sn}
T
n=1 be a sequence of offers, made by the principal at times {tn}
T
n=1.
Let the agent play a best response to this sequence of offers, and let qP be the induced
public belief. Then for sufficiently small ∆, after any initial subsequence of offers {sn}
t
n=1
for t ≤ T , the induced belief qP attaches positive probability to at most two beliefs, given
by q and ϕ(q) for some q.
Notice that we make no assumptions as to the nature of the offers {sn}
T
n=1, and in
particular do not require these to be part of an equilibrium outcome. We use here only
the assumptions that the agent is playing a best response, and that the principal forms
expectations correctly. We rely on Lemma 4 in restricting attention to a finite sequence
of offers, which allows a backward-induction proof.
The key to proving Lemma 5 is to show that whenever an agent holding belief qA is
willing to work, any agent holding the more optimistic belief q̃A > qA must strictly prefer
to work. A more optimistic agent views a success as being more likely, and hence has
more to gain from working, making it intuitive that an optimistic agent prefers to work
whenever a pessimistic agent does. However, the result is not completely straightforward,
since a more optimistic agent also faces a brighter future following a failure, enhancing
the value of shirking. The proof verifies that the former effect is the more powerful.
A.4.3 The Value of an Optimistic Agent
Consider a special class of candidate equilibria, those in which the agent responds to
every offer along the equilibrium path by working. In the context of such an equilibrium,
the principal’s belief after any history in which the principal has made no deviations will
be of the form 1q for some q. The agent’s belief will duplicate q if the agent has similarly
made no deviations. If the agent instead shirks at least once, then the agent will hold a
different belief, say q̃. Section A.12 proves:
Lemma 6 In any equilibrium in which the agent is willing to work along the equilibrium
path,
∀q̃ ≥ q : W (1q, q̃) =
q̃
q
W (1q, q). (32)
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The intuition for this result comes in two parts. First, the candidate equilibrium calls
for the agent to always work. An agent who is more optimistic about success than the
principal (q̃ > q) will be all the more anxious to work, as we have seen in Lemma 5, and
hence the agent’s out-of-equilibrium behavior duplicates his equilibrium behavior.
Second, the agent’s higher beliefs then simply scale up all the success probabilities
involved in the agent’s expected payoff calculation, leading to the linear relationship given
by (32).
A.4.4 The Value of a Pessimistic Agent
We might expect the principal to offer the agent the minimal amount required to
induce the agent to work. Hence, a natural candidate for equilibrium behavior is that
in which not only does the agent respond to every offer along the equilibrium path by
working, but in each case is indifferent between working and shirking. In this context, we
can identify the value of a pessimistic agent. Section A.13 proves:
Lemma 7 In any equilibrium in which the agent is expected to work and is indifferent
between working and shirking along the equilibrium path,
W (1q, ϕ(q)) = c+ δW (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)).
An agent characterized by ϕ(q) is “one failure more pessimistic” than an agent or
principal characterized by belief q or 1q. The implication is that such an agent shirks at
the next opportunity, at which point the agent and principal’s beliefs are aligned, giving
continuation value W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)).
A.5 The Equilibrium Concept: Recursive Markov Equilibria
We begin by defining an intuitive special case of the (weak perfect Bayesian satisfying
the no-signaling-what-you-don’t-know restriction) equilibrium, Markov equilibria. For a
fixed pair of strategies, we say that an offer is serious if it is prescribed by the principal’s
equilibrium strategy, and induces the agent to work with positive probability (according
to the agent’s equilibrium strategy). These are the offers that lead to a revision of the
principal’s belief.
The prescribed actions in a Markov equilibrium depend only on the posterior beliefs of
the agent and the principal, as well as the delay since the last serious offer. More precisely,
the strategy of the principal depends on the public posterior belief only—the distribution
of beliefs that she entertains about the agent’s private belief, derived via Bayes’ rule from
the public history of offers and the equilibrium strategies—and on the delay since the last
serious offer. The equilibria we consider are such that the principal makes another offer
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(accepted if the agent follows his equilibrium strategy) if and only if this delay exceeds
Λ(qP )∆ for some Λ(qP ) ≥ 1 (thus, Λ is part of the description of the strategy).
The agent’s strategy depends on this public belief, on his private belief that the project
is good (derived from the public history of offers and the agent’s private history of effort
choices), on the outstanding offer, and on the delay since the last serious offer. Public
and private beliefs coincide along the equilibrium path, but not necessarily off-path. Both
beliefs are relevant in determining the agent’s behavior and payoff—to identify the agent’s
optimal action, we must determine his payoff from deviating, at which point the beliefs
differ.
We call such equilibria Markov equilibria. One might think of restricting strategies
in a Markov equilibrium still further, allowing the principal’s actions to depend only on
the public belief qP and the agent’s actions to depend only this public belief, on his
private belief qA, and on the outstanding offer. In contrast, we have added one element
of non-stationarity—the dependence of the principal’s strategy on the delay since the last
serious offer. This is necessary if we are to think of our inertialess continuous-time game
as the limit of its counterparts with inertia. In particular, when ∆ > 0, the principal
(when able to make an offer) could conduct a private randomization between making an
offer and waiting ∆. This introduces an expected delay in the time until the principal
makes her next offer, even while her strategy depends only on the public belief. The
deterministic delay in our inertialess limit is the limiting counterpart of this expected
delay. Our restriction to equilibria featuring pure strategies on the equilibrium path thus
allows us to capture the limits of mixed equilibria from the corresponding games with
inertia.
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offers s ∈ [0, 1].
Unfortunately, Markov equilibria do not exist for all parameters, as the earlier discus-
sion in Section A.3 foreshadowed. This is a common feature of extensive-form games of
incomplete information (see for instance Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole [12] and Hellwig
[17]). The problem is that, for some “knife-edge” beliefs, there exist multiple Markov
equilibria. These beliefs, however, are endogenous, since they depend on earlier decisions
by players, and in turn these decisions depend on the specific Markov equilibrium that is
being selected at the later stage, so that the latter play must “remember” the earlier deci-
sions to select the appropriate continuation equilibrium. In bargaining games, it suffices
to include the last offer to recover existence (giving the so-called weak Markov equilibria).
Here, this is not enough.
We are accordingly led to the following recursive definition: a recursive Markov equi-
librium is a strategy profile σ such that:
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(i) If, given ht, Markov equilibria exist, then σ|ht is a Markov equilibrium.

















(and, for the principal’s strategy,
the delay since the last serious offer is the same after both histories), then

















, then σ|ht′ must be a recur-
sive Markov equilibrium.
In words, the continuation equilibrium must be Markov whenever possible; if beliefs do not
change, continuation strategies remain the same; and if beliefs do change, the continuation
strategy must be a recursive Markov equilibrium.
Recursive Markov equilibria in which there is no randomization on the equilibrium
path are well-defined because (as we show in Section A.6) Markov equilibria exist when
the public belief is low enough, from which we can work backward to construct recursive
Markov equilibria.20 By definition, recursive Markov equilibria coincide with Markov
equilibria whenever those exist, and it is not hard to see that our definition coincides with
weak Markov equilibrium in games in which those exist. We hereafter typically refer to a
recursive Markov equilibrium in which there is no randomization on the equilibrium path
simply as a Markov equilibrium. This is the class of equilibria that we shall characterize,
and whose outcomes converge to a unique limit as ∆ → 0.
A.6 A Candidate Markov Equilibrium: No Delay Principal Op-
timum
We begin by considering a candidate Markov equilibrium. The principal makes an offer
to the agent immediately upon the expiration of each waiting period ∆ since the previous
offer, until the posterior falls below a threshold (in the event of continued failure), after
which no further experimentation occurs. The agent is indifferent between working and
shirking in each period, and responds to each offer by working. We refer to this as a no-
delay equilibrium, since there is no feasible way to make offers more rapidly. Technically,
these strategies feature Λ(q) = 1 for all q. We will see in Section A.7 that there may
be multiple no-delay Markov equilibria, but that the one introduced here maximizes the
principal’s payoff over the set of such equilibria.
20The restriction to strategies in which there is no randomization on the equilibrium path ensures that
we can make the backward induction on degenerate public beliefs.
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A.6.1 The Strategies
We let q1 denote the final belief at which the principal makes a serious offer to the
agent. We then number beliefs and offers backwards from 1. From Bayes’ rule, we have
qτ−1 = ϕ(qτ ).
The principal’s offer sτ at time τ must suffice to induce effort on the part of the agent,
and hence must satisfy




W (1qτ−1, qτ−1). (34)
We assume in this candidate equilibrium that the principal invariably offers a share sτ
causing the incentive constraint (33)–(34) to hold with equality (returning to this assump-
tion in Section A.7). In the last period, facing a public and private belief concentrated
on q1 and share s1, the agent’s incentive constraint is
pq1π(1− s1) = c. (35)
Using (35) and then working backward via the equality versions of (33)–(34), we have
defined the on-path portion of our strategies for the candidate full-effort equilibrium.
A.6.2 The Costs of Agency
If our candidate strategies are to be an equilibrium, they must generate a nonnegative
payoff for the principal. The principal’s payoff in the final period (in which experimen-
tation takes place) is pq1πs1 − c. Using the incentive constraint (35), this is nonnegative
only if pq1π−2c ≥ 0. We can thus identify the failure boundary q, with the property that
the principal makes serious offers to the agent if and only if




Combining (31) with (34), we can write the agent’s incentive constraint as
pqτπ(1− sτ )− c ≥ p
qτ
qτ−1
W (1qτ−1, qτ−1). (37)
The principal’s share must at least cover the cost of her expenditure c, or pqτπsτ ≥ c.
Combining with (37), our proposed strategies are an equilibrium if and only if
pqτπ − 2c ≥ p
qτ
qτ−1
W (1qτ−1, qτ−1). (38)
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The key observation in (38) is that as the agent’s continuation value becomes more lu-
crative, it becomes more expensive to provide incentives for the agent. Experimenting
exposes the agent to the risk that the project may be a success now, eliminating future
returns. Shirking now ensures an immediate payment of c (the diverted funds) plus the
prospect of future experimentation. The more lucrative the future, the more tempting it
is to shirk, and hence the more expensive it is to induce effort. We thus have a “dynamic
agency cost.” From (36), a principal contracting with a myopic agent (i.e., an agent who
stubbornly persists in taking his future payoff to be zero) would induce full effort from the
agent until hitting the failure boundary q = 2c/pπ. The agent’s recognition of a valuable
future increases the cost of such effort, potentially making it impossible to sustain.
A.6.3 Positive Principal Payoffs?
Condition (38) may fail for some values qτ > q, in which case there is no way to satisfy
the incentive constraint given by (33) and still cover the principal’s experimentation cost.
Under these circumstances, our candidate strategies do not describe equilibrium behavior.
To identify conditions under which the principal’s payoff is positive, we can rearrange







To conserve on notation, let wτ be the agent’s payoff when facing offer τ of the candidate
equilibrium. Then let us introduce the variable ωτ := wτ/ (qτc). Using the incentive
constraint (34), the agent’s payoff in the candidate Markov equilibrium solves
ωτ+1 = 1 +Q1β
τ + δωτ ,
where β = 1−p and Q1 = (1−q1)/q1. This elementary difference equation has as solution
ωτ =







δτ−1((1− δ)(Q1β + 1)− ω1)
1− δ
.
Similarly, we can let vτ be the principal’s payoff when making offer τ of the candidate
equilibrium, define ντ := vτ/ (qτc), and obtain
ντ+1 = pπ/c− 2(1 +Q1β
τ+1) + δ[(1− p)ντ − pωτ ],















(recalling that ψ := pπ/c− 2).
The term ντ can be written as a weighted sum of δ
τ−1, βτ−1 and (δβ)τ−1. It follows
that the second difference ντ+2 + ντ − 2ντ+1 can be written as a weighted sum of δ
τ−3,
βτ−3 and (δβ)τ−3, and hence these second differences can change sign (as τ varies) at most
twice. Equivalently, in the limit as ∆ → 0 the second derivative of the function ντ can
change sign at most twice.21 It is also immediate that q1pπ − 2c = ν1 > ν0 = 0, so if we
let (noting that the set on the right may be empty, in which case we take its infimum to
be ∞)
τ̃ = inf {τ > 1 : ντ < 0} ,
then it follows that ν must be concave for some τ ∈ {0, . . . , τ̃}, unless τ̃ = ∞. It follows
that, considering increasing values of τ above τ̃ , either ν is concave throughout, or convex
and then concave, or concave, convex and then concave. Let τ̂ denote the lowest τ > τ̃
for which ντ > 0,
τ̂ = min{τ > τ̃ : ντ > 0},
if there exists such a τ , and otherwise take τ̂ to be ∞, i.e., Then ν must have been convex
for some value of k ∈ {τ̃ , . . . , τ̂}, and so above τ̂ , the sequence ν is at most first positive,
then negative. This argument establishes:
Lemma 8 The value ντ solving (40) is positive for low values of τ , then (possibly) nega-
tive, then (possibly) positive, then (possibly) negative.
Lemma 8 identifies some possibilities for vτ . We can specify more precisely the circum-
stances in which these various possibilities obtain by examining the limiting case of small
∆. Section A.14 proves:
Lemma 9
(9.1) The (pointwise) limit of ν (as ∆ → 0) has at most one inflection point, and the
limit is positive for q close to, but above q if ψ > 2 but not if ψ < 2. Hence, if ψ < 2,
qτ̃ → q.




when ψ > 2 and
σ > ψ.
(9.3) Because the second derivative of the limit of ντ at q = q is not zero, it is possible
that qτ̃ → q as ∆ → 0 (indeed, this does occur if ψ < 2), but then qτ̂ 9 q: if they exist,
the first two intervals (i.e, (q, q̃) and (q̃, q̂)) cannot both “vanish” in the limit.
Combining Lemma (9.1) and Lemma (9.2) (and recalling that σ := p/r):
21These statements follow from the observation that the function f(n) = axn+ byn+ czn, with param-
eters a, b, c, x, y, z, can have at most two zeros, which is a straightforward calculation.
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Corollary 1 For sufficiently small ∆, the no-delay principal-optimum strategies yield
positive principal payoffs, and hence potentially generate an equilibrium outcome, if ψ > 2
and ψ > σ, but do not constitute an equilibrium if either ψ < 2 or ψ < σ.
After acquiring a preliminary result in the next section, Section A.6.5 completes the
specification of the strategies, showing in the process that we indeed have an equilibrium
when ψ exceeds both 2 and σ, while Section A.8 characterizes Markov equilibria for other
parameter values.
A.6.4 The Agent’s Incentives
Let us assume that ψ > 2 and ψ > σ, so that our no-delay principal-optimum strate-
gies are a candidate for equilibrium. Define sW (q) to be the value of s that solves the
incentive constraint (34) with equality. Our candidate Markov equilibrium then calls for
the principal to offer share sW (q) in every period, with the agent working in response to
smaller values of s and shirking in response to larger values of s.
How does the agent respond to other values of s? This depends on the relative mag-
nitudes of sW and sS. Appendix A.15 proves the following:
Lemma 10 There exists a value q̃(∆) ≥ q such that
sS(q) ≤ sW (q) if q < q̃(∆),
sS(q) > sW (q) if q > q̃(∆).
The value of q̃(∆) remains bounded away from q as ∆ → 0. There exist parameter values
for which q̃(∆) < 1, and remains bounded below 1 as ∆ → 0.
A.6.5 Completing the Strategies
We now specify the strategies in our no-delay principal-optimum Markov equilibrium.
Let us start with the slightly simpler case in which, given the public history, the
principal’s belief is degenerate. Suppose the players face posterior belief qτ , where τ
additional failures would give a posterior exceeding q, while τ + 1 additional failures
would give a posterior falling short of q. The principal’s strategy is straightforward.
Facing posterior qτ , the principal makes offer s
W (qτ ). If we have s
S(qτ ) < s
W (qτ ), then
the agent’s strategy is similarly straightforward: in each period, along the equilibrium
path, the agent works if and only if s ≤ sW (qτ ).
Suppose sS(qτ ) > s
W (qτ ). Then we specify strategies as:




- The agent shirks if s ≥ sS(qτ ). Play continues with the principal offering s
W (qτ )
next period.
- If s ∈ (sW (qτ ), s
S(qτ )), the agent mixes, with probability ρ(s, qτ ) of working. The
principal then enters the next period with mass on two possible agent types. The
principal induces both types to work with each of the next z(s, qτ ) offers, for some
z(s, qτ ) ∈ {0, . . . , τ − 1}, in each case causing the subsequent period to be reached
with qP attaching positive probability to two agent beliefs. In the z(s, qτ ) + 1st
period, the principal mixes between causing only the more optimistic agent to work
and causing both to work (attaching nonzero but possibly unitary probability to the
former). If the latter is the case, only the more optimistic agent is induced to work
in period z(s, qτ ) + 2. Thereafter the principal’s belief attaches positive probability
to only a single agent belief.
The first step in showing that this is an equilibrium is to characterize the mixture
ρ(s, qτ ), the period z(s, qτ ), and the principal’s mixture in that period. Sections A.16–
A.17 prove:
Lemma 11 There exist an agent mixture ρ(s, qτ ), a period z(s, qτ ), and a nonzero mixture
with which only the optimistic agent is induced to work in period z(s, qτ )+1, such that (i)
the agent is indifferent between working and shirking in response to offer s, making the
mixture ρ(s, qτ ) a best response for the agent, (ii) the principal prefers inducing only the
optimistic agent to work in period z(s) + 1 or z(s) + 2 to doing so in any other period,
and (iii) the principal either prefers to induce this outcome in period z(s, qτ ) + 1 if the
mixture in that period is unitary, or otherwise is indifferent between doing so in period
z(s, qτ ) + 1 and z(s, qτ ) + 2.
Next, we show that the result is a Markov equilibrium. Section A.18 proves:
Lemma 12 Let the principal’s belief be given by 1q for some q. For sufficiently small ∆,
any offer s ∈ (sW (q), sS(q)) gives the principal a lower payoff than does sW (q).
Let us now describe strategies off the equilibrium path. Given Lemma 5, we consider
a public history hPt that gives rise to a pair of beliefs q and q̃ = ϕ(q), along with a
probability µ attached to q. That is, the principal attaches probability µ to the agent
having private belief q, and 1−µ to the (slightly more pessimistic) belief q̃. As in section
A.3, we can associate to the beliefs q, q̃ two thresholds sW , s̃W , and sS, s̃S. By Lemma 5,
max{s̃W , s̃S} < min{sW , sS}. The principal offers either sW or s̃W , according to which
is more profitable; if they are equally profitable, she randomizes between those two so
as to vindicate the indifference between accepting and rejecting of the agent’s type who
randomized last along the history hPt .
Given an outstanding offer, there are four possibilities, depending on s̃W ≷ s̃S, and
sW ≷ sS.
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- if s̃W < s̃S, and sW < sS:
1. if s < s̃W , then both types work;
2. if s ∈ (s̃W , s̃S), then type q̃ randomizes while type q works. The randomization
is such that the principal is indifferent between having both types and only the
optimistic type work in a later period in a way that allows her to randomize
between the two so as to make type q̃ indeed indifferent.
3. if s ∈ [s̃S, sW ], type q̃ shirks while type q works;
4. if s ∈ (sW , sS), then type q randomizes while type q̃ shirks. The randomization
is such that the principal is indifferent between having both types and only the
optimistic type work in a later period in a way that allows her to randomize
between the two so as to make type q indeed indifferent.
5. if s ≥ sS, both types shirk.
- if s̃W < s̃S, yet sW ≥ sS:
1. if s < s̃W , then both types work;
2. if s ∈ (s̃W , s̃S), then type q̃ randomizes while type q works. The randomization
is such that the principal is indifferent between having both types and only the
optimistic type work in a later period in a way that allows her to randomize
between the two so as to make type q̃ indeed indifferent.
3. if s ∈ [s̃S, sW ), type q̃ shirks while type q works;
4. if s ≥ sW , both types shirk.
- if s̃W ≥ s̃S, yet sW < sS:
1. if s < s̃W , then both types work;
2. if s ∈ [s̃W , sW ], then type q̃ shirks while type q works;
3. if s ∈ (sW , sS), then type q randomizes while type q̃ shirks. The randomization
is such that the principal is indifferent between having both types and only the
optimistic type work in a later period in a way that allows her to randomize
between the two so as to make type q indeed indifferent;
4. if s ≥ sW , then both types shirk.
- if s̃W ≥ s̃S, and sW ≥ sS:
1. if s < s̃W , then both types work;
2. if s ∈ [s̃W , sW ), then type q̃ shirks while type q works;
3. if s ≥ sW , then both types shirk.
A-14
This completes the description of equilibrium strategies. We then have to check whether
sequential rationality is satisfied off the equilibrium path. The key question here is whether
the principal would find one of s̃W or sW optimal. Section A.19 proves:
Lemma 13 Suppose qP attaches probability to two beliefs, q and q̃ = ϕ(q). Then the
optimal offer for the principal is one of s̃W or sW .
A.6.6 Summary: No-Delay Principal-Optimum Markov Equilibrium
We have established:
Proposition 7 Let ψ > 2 and ψ > σ. Then for sufficiently small ∆, there exists a
Markov equilibrium in which, whenever q > 2c/pπ, the principal makes an offer at every
opportunity, each such offer makes the agent indifferent between working and shirking,
and the agent works.
A.7 Other No-Delay Markov Equilibria
We can identify a collection of additional no-delay Markov equilibria.
A.7.1 The Final Period
We begin by examining the final period, beginning with a posterior q1 featuring




Hence, one more failed experiment will make the principal too pessimistic to continue.
The payoffs in the no-delay principal-optimum Markov equilibrium are then
V (1q1, q1) = pq1π − 2c,
W (1q1, q1) = c.
These payoffs place an upper bound on the principal’s payoff in a no-delay equilibrium,
and a lower bound on the agent’s payoff in a no-delay equilibrium. Let q̃ be such that
q = ϕ(q̃). Section A.20 proves:
Lemma 14 There exists q̂ ∈ (q, q̃) such that for q1 ∈ [0, q̂], the range of principal payoffs
achievable in a no-delay Markov equilibrium (and in any no-delay equilibrium) is [0, pq1π−
2c]. For q1 ∈ [q̂, q̃), the range is [pq1π −
2−δp
1−δp
c, pq1π − 2c].
For q ∈ (q̂, q̃), we have 0 < pq1π −
2−δp
1−δp
c < pq1π − 2c. Hence, we see that in the final
period, there is a range of equilibrium payoffs for the principal. In addition, the principal’s
minimum equilibrium payoff is zero for some posteriors, but for some posteriors, the
principal’s payoff is strictly positive in the final period.
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A.7.2 Constructing the Set of No-Delay Equilibria
We can work backwards from the final period to construct the set of no-delay Markov
equilibria. In the course of doing so, beliefs will run through a set of posteriors {qτ}
∞
τ=1,
which we can take as fixed throughout. We will generate a range of equilibrium payoffs in
each period. There are potentially two degrees of freedom in constructing these equilibria
that fix the upper and lower bounds of the range—the choice of continuation payoffs and
the choice of current shares. To maximize the principal’s payoff, we choose the lowest
equilibrium continuation payoff for the agent and choose share sW . To minimize the
principal’s payoff, we choose the largest continuation payoff for the agent and share sS
if sS < sW . The latter choice will be available for small values of q, but may not be
available for large values of q. This procedure generates the entire set of no-delay Markov
equilibria, as long as the principal’s payoff remains positive.
If the principal’s payoff is positive, then the multiplicity of the principal’s payoff dis-
appears in the limit as ∆ → 0. Section A.21 proves:
Lemma 15 Let the no-delay principal-optimum strategies give the principal a positive
payoff for posteriors in some interval [q, q̃] (and hence constitute an equilibrium for any
q ∈ [q, q̃]). Then if q ∈ [q, q̃], as ∆ → 0, the lowest equilibrium payoff for the principal,
over all equilibria, is positive and converges to the principal’s payoff from the no-delay
principal-optimum Markov equilibrium.
A.8 The Set of Markov Equilibria
Now we characterize the full set of Markov equilibria. The cases yet to be addressed
are those in which either ψ < 2 or ψ < σ holds.
A.8.1 A Canonical Equilibrium
We construct a canonical Markov equilibrium. We refer to an event in which the
principal makes an offer as a period. The agent works in response to every offer, so
for each posterior, the number of periods before the posterior crosses the termination
threshold q is fixed. The length of time between periods is at least ∆, but will be larger
if there is delay. We work backward from period 1, the final period, as follows:
(1) Let V τ be the largest principal payoff generated in period τ under a no-delay equi-
librium. Let τ ′ be the first period, if any, in which V τ ′ < 0. Then for q ∈ [q, qτ ′−1],
there exists a no-delay equilibrium with Vτ ′−1 = 0 (see Lemma 16 below), and we
choose this as our canonical equilibrium.
(2) Working backwards from τ ′, we insert just enough delay at each period τ to ensure
that V τ , the largest payoff available to the principal at period τ , equals zero. We
A-16
then set sτ to ensure Vτ = 0. We continue to do this until (possibly) reaching a
period τ ′′ at which, given Vτ ′′−1 = 0, a strictly positive principal payoff is available
at period τ ′′ without delay.
(3) Upon reaching such a period τ ′′, we set Vτ ′′−1 = 0, and then work backwards con-
structing no-delay strategies.
(4) This may continue until reaching a period τ ′′′ in which no delay ensures Vτ ′′′ < 0.
Then we choose the equilibria in periods {τ ′′, . . . , τ ′′′ − 1} so that Vτ ′′′−1 = 0, and
once again work backward with delay to set Vτ thereafter equal to zero.
We are thus alternating between periods of no delay and positive principal payoffs and
periods of delay and zero principal payoffs. Lemma 8 ensures that the regimes must come
in the sequence described in our construction, and that we have identified the complete
range of possibilities for such sequences.
If this procedure is to be well defined, we must show that whenever our no-delay
principal-optimum construction reaches its first period τ with Vτ < 0, there is an equi-
librium with Vτ−1 = 0. Let V denote the smallest no-delay Markov equilibrium payoff to
the principal, and V the largest such payoff. Section A.22 proves:
Lemma 16 Fix a posterior q. Then, for sufficiently small ∆,
V (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)) ≤ V (1q, q).
The implication of this is that the set of principal’s payoffs for a given belief can never
jump across zero (as we vary beliefs). If the smallest payoff for the principal at ϕ(q) is
positive, it cannot be that the largest payoff at q is negative.
A.8.2 Characterizing the Canonical Equilibrium
The canonical construction gives us periods of no delay and positive payoffs for the
principal interspersed with periods of delay and zero payoffs for the principal. Section
A.6.3 has characterized cases involving no delay and a positive payoff for the principal.
Here, we examine delay.
The principal’s payoff must be zero if there is to be delay, and hence
pqτ+1πsτ+1 = c.
We then have





















































































Note that delay Λτ must be less than one. Rearranging the expression above, this gives
qτ ≤
2− (2− δ) p
1−δ




v + 2− 2σ
=: q∗∗.
Also, (Λτ+2 − Λτ+1)− (Λτ+1 − Λτ ) is positively proportional to
2β − ψ
1 + ψ − β − l1βτ+2 (2 + β)
,
whenever Λτ < 1. It follows that delay is decreasing in τ for q < q
∗∗
∆ (when ψ < 2,
σ < ψ), so that delay is well-defined and positive there. Alternatively, we can appeal
to the limiting delay function λ given by (14), noting that λ(q) ≥ 1 over [q, q∗∗], as the
function λ given by (14) is decreasing in q over the interval (q, 1) in this case. It is also
simple to check that the payoffs of the principal and the agent are positive above q∗∗ in
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this case.22 To show that the equilibrium outcome must have this structure, note first
that we cannot have λ(q) ≥ 1, and hence cannot have delay, for values of q strictly above
q∗∗. Finally, we can show that there can be no interval without delay involving values of
q less than q∗∗.23
Conversely, delay is decreasing in τ for q > q∗∆ (when ψ > 2, σ > ψ). It is not hard to
show that the value of λ exceeds 1 on (q∗, 1].24 In fact, delay does not vary continuously
at q = q∗, i.e. limq↓q∗ λ(q) > 1. The uniqueness of this outcome follows from the fact that
there cannot be delay for q close to q (as (15) is violated at q = q). Hence, the principal’s
payoff is given by (2) for beliefs that are low enough, and it then follows by continuity of
the principal’s payoff that there cannot be delay for q < q∗, at which point the function
given by (9) dips below zero and delay arises.25
Combined with the observations following the derivation of the sequence ντ , we obtain
that, depending on ψ ≶ 2, and ψ ≶ σ, four cases can occur. We have thus established
the following:
Lemma 17 Given ψ and σ, there exists ∆̄ such that if ∆ < ∆̄, there exists an equilibrium
with
22This requires a calculation. First, we can solve for the differential equations giving v and w over the
range [q∗∗, 1], where we use as boundary conditions w(q∗∗) = (q∗∗(ψ+1)− 2/σ)c/r, and v(q∗∗) = 0. It is
easy to check that v′′(q∗∗) = 0 (compare, for instance, with v′′(q) above), so the curvature of v is actually
zero at q∗∗. However,
v′′′(q∗∗) =
σ3(ψ − 1)5




which is strictly positive. Since v admits at most one inflection point over the interval (q∗∗, 1), and it is
positive at 1, it follows that it is positive over the entire interval.
23That is, assume for the sake of contradiction that there is delay on a non-degenerate interval [q1, q2]
with q1 < q
∗∗. Then since v(q1) = 0 and w(q1) = ((q1(ψ + 2) − 2)/σ)(c/r), we can solve for v and w,
which gives v′(q1) = 0, while
v′′(q1) =
(







This value is strictly negative because ψ < 2 and ψ > σ imply σ − 2 + qσ(ψ − 1) < 0. This implies that
v is strictly decreasing at q1, and hence strictly negative over some range above q1, a contradiction.
24It is easy to check that the coefficient of ((1−q)q)/(q(1−q)) in (9) is positive given ψ > 2 and ψ < σ,
so that, by ignoring this term while solving for the root v(q) = 0, we obtain a lower bound on q∗. That
is, q∗ ≥ q̃ := (σ − 2)(σ + 1)/[(ψ − 2)σ]. Since λ(q) > 1 if and only if q > q∗∗ (from (15) given that ψ < 2
in this case), it suffices now to note that q̃ ≥ q∗∗.
25This is not enough to imply that there is delay for all beliefs above q∗. To prove that there cannot
be a subinterval (q1, q2) of (q
∗, 1] in which there is no delay, consider such a maximal such interval and
note that it would have to be the case that v(q1) = 0 and w(q1) = (q1π − 2c/p)c/r, by continuity in q
of the players’ payoff functions. Solving for the differential equations for v, w in such an interval (q1, q2),
one obtains that, at q1, v(q1) = v
′(q1) = 0, while v
′′(q1) is given in footnote 23. The numerator of v
′′ is
necessarily negative for all q1 > q̃ (cf. footnote 24), and thus, in particular, for q > q
∗. This contradicts
the fact that v must be nonnegative on the interval (q1, q2).
A-19
1. No delay (for any q ∈ [q, 1]) if ψ > σ, ψ > 2.
2. Delay if and only if q > q∗∆, where q
∗
∆ → q
∗ (cf. Lemma 9.2), if ψ < σ, ψ > 2.
3. No Delay for q ∈ [q, q̂∆], delay for q ∈ (q̂∆, q
∗∗
∆ ], and no delay if q > q
∗∗
∆ if ψ > σ,




4. No Delay for q ∈ [q, q̂∆], and delay for all q > q̂∆, if ψ < σ, ψ < 2, where again
q̂∆ → q.
To show that in the final case there cannot be an interval (q1, q2) in which there is no
delay, we again proceed as in footnote 25.26
A.8.3 Summary: Canonical Markov Equilibrium
We can summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 As ∆ → 0, the canonical Markov equilibrium approaches a limit whose
form depends on the project’s parameters as follows:
• High Surplus, Patient Projects (ψ > 2 and ψ > σ): The principal makes an offer to
the agent at every opportunity, until either achieving a success or until the posterior
probability of a good project drops below q = 2c
pπ
. The principal’s payoff is positive
for all posteriors exceeding q.
• High Surplus, Impatient Projects (ψ > 2 and ψ < σ): The principal initially con-
tinually delays before making each offer to the agent, until the posterior probability
drops to a threshold q∗ > q. The principal subsequently makes offers with no delay,
until the posterior hits q. The principal’s expected payoff is zero for q > q∗ and
positive for q ∈ (q, q∗).
• Low Surplus, Patient Projects (ψ < 2 and ψ > σ): The principal initially makes
offers at every opportunity, enjoying a positive payoff, until the posterior drops to
a threshold q∗∗ > q, at which point the principal introduces delay and commands an
expected payoff of zero.
• Low Surplus, Impatient Projects (ψ < 2 and ψ < σ): Here the principal delays
before making each offer, for every posterior, with a zero expected payoff.
26We show that, solving the differential equations for v and w, the value of v′′(q1) is negative. Since
v(q1) = v
′(q1) = 0, this implies that the payoff of the principal would be strictly negative for values of q
slightly above q1, a contradiction.
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A.8.4 Limit Uniqueness
We complete the argument with a limiting result, with Section A.23 providing the
proof:
Lemma 18 The limiting payoff of any sequence of Markov equilibria, as ∆ approaches
zero, equals the limiting payoff of the canonical Markov equilibrium.
A.9 sW vs. sS, Agent Offers
What if the agent makes the offers instead of the principal, as in Bergemann and
Hege [2]? The agent thus chooses the share st, but in doing so must respect the incentive
constraint that it be optimal to undertake an experiment whenever experimental funding
is advanced.
Consider a posterior q1 with ϕ(q1) < q < q1, so that there will be only one more exper-
iment before beliefs become sufficiently pessimistic (ϕ(q) < q) as to halt experimentation.
If the agent is expected to work, the incentive constraint is
pq1π(1− s1) ≥ pq1π − c.
We can solve this for the threshold
pq1πs
W
1 = pq1π − c.




Now suppose the agent faces share s1 and is expected to shirk, after which we come to the
next period with unchanged beliefs, at which point share s∗ is offered. Then the agent’s
incentive constraint is
c+ δpq1π(1− s
∗) ≥ pq1π(1− s1) + δ(1− pq1)max{c, pϕ(q1)π(1− s
∗)}.
We can use the definition of s∗ and rearrange to obtain
pq1πs
S
1 = (1− δ)(pq1π − c) + δ(1− pq1)max{c, pϕ(q1)π(1− s
∗)}.




as long as (1−pq1)max{c, pϕ(q1)π(1−s
∗)} < pq1π− c. The fact that c < pq1π− c follows
from q1 > q. Alternatively, we have
(1− pq1)pϕ(q1)π(1− s
∗) = (1− p)pq1π(1− s
∗) = (1− p)(pq1π − c) < pq1π − c.
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We thus have a range of shares [sS1 , s
W
1 ] for which the agent will work if expected to do
so, and will shirk if expected to do so. Bergemann and Hege [2] choose the value of s1 in
order to ensure the principal has a zero payoff. As long as this value falls in the interior of
[sS1 , s
W
1 ], as it will for q1 greater than but close to q, there will be multiple equilibria. This
in turn feeds into additional opportunities for multiplicity as we work backward from the
final period.27
To establish the possibility of sS > sW , notice that in general the incentive constraint
when the agent is expected to work is
pqπ(1− s) + δ(1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)) = c+ δW (1ϕ(q), q),
and the constraint when expected to shirk is
c+ δW (1q, q) = pqπ(1− s) + δ(1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q)).
We can solve for
pqπsW = pqπ − c− δW (1ϕ(q), q) + δ(1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)),
pqπsS = pqπ − c− δW (1q, q) + δ(1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q)).
Hence, it suffices to show
(1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q))−W (1q, q) > (1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))−W (1ϕ(q), q),
or
W (1q, q)− (1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q)) < W (1ϕ(q), q)− (1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)).
Now let ψ > 2 and ψ > σ > 2−2p, with p > r. (It is straightforward to find values of p,c,
r, and π satisfying these inequalities.) Then we have a high-surplus, impatient project
when the principal makes offers, and a high-return, high-discount project when the agent
makes offers (cf. Section 4.4). In either case, the resulting Markov equilibrium features no





W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))− (1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q)) < W (1ϕ(q), q)− (1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)).
We potentially underestimate the second term on the right side, and hence obtain a




W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))−(1−pq)[c+δW (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))] < W (1ϕ(q), q)−(1−pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)).
27We have not taken account here of the opportunity Bergemann and Hege [2] allow for the principal
to advance partial funding, but this will not eliminate this phenomenon.
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Now writing W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)) = W̃ , we note that c is added and subtracted on the left, and
then rearrange, to obtain
pqc+ δ(1− pq)W̃ < (1− δ)
q
ϕ(q)

















< W̃ . (41)
The proof of Lemma 10 in Section A.15 shows that if p > r and 2c/π < r (so that pq1 > r;
notice that we can ensure these inequalities while preserving our previously maintained
assumptions by taking π to be sufficiently large), then there will be a nonempty interval
of values [q†, 1) for which this inequality holds, given that (i) the principal makes offers,
(ii) continuation play features no delay, and (iii) the principal makes offer sW at every
opportunity. We can then find a value q ∈ [q†, 1) such that (41) holds at q when the
principal makes offers. But the agent’s payoff must if anything be larger when the agent
rather than the principal makes offers, since the agent will lower s at every opportunity
to reduce the principal’s payoff to zero, and hence (41) must hold when the agent makes
offers, giving the result.28
A.10 Proof of Lemma 4
Fix a prior q and waiting time ∆, both hereafter to be omitted from the notation.






, every continuation equilibrium outcome must give the
principal a negative payoff. In particular, the total expected surplus under the first-best
policy is negative (cf. Section 2.3), and hence so must be the principal’s payoff.
Suppose the result is false. Then there exists sequences of integers {k(n)}∞n=1, times
t(n), strategy profiles σ(n), and histories hPt(n)(n) such that
1. each σ(n) is an equilibrium,
2. each history hPt(n)(n) arises with positive probability under equilibrium σn, has length
t(n), and features k(n) offers (and failures),
3. limn→∞ kn = ∞,
28Section 4.4 noted that shifting the bargaining power from the principal to the agent need not make the
agent better off, but it must do so when the parameters are such that we have a high-surplus, impatient
project when the principal makes offers, and a high-return, high-discount project when the agent makes













denotes the principal’s expectation of the agent’s belief at
history hPt(n)(n) under equilibrium σ(n). This in turn implies that by taking a sub-
sequence and renumbering, we can construct sequences that preserve these properties











, and history hP (tn) features n offers
between periods κ′(n) and κ′′(n). Hence, we must be able to find equilibria with the
property that over arbitrarily long sequences of failures, beliefs change arbitrarily little.
However, this ensures that for sufficiently large n, the principal’s payoff upon reaching
history hPt(n)|κ′n must be negative. In particular, the probability that any single subsequent












every such offer incurs a cost of c. A negative expected payoff for the principal at history
hPt(n)|κ′n is a contradiction.
A.11 Proof of Lemma 5
The game begins with qA = q and with qP placing unitary probability on q. As long as
the agent chooses pure actions, the public belief qP continues to attach unitary probability
to a single belief. The first time the agent mixes between working and shirking, the public
belief subsequently puts positive probability on two posteriors, say q and ϕ(q).
Our method of proof is to argue that given any two such beliefs, if the agent charac-
terized by posterior ϕ(q) has a weak incentive to work, then the agent characterized by q
has a strict incentive to work. This ensures that qP never attaches positive probability to
more than two beliefs. In particular, once two such beliefs have arisen, in the subsequent
period either both are revised downward, with qP then again attaching positive probabil-
ity to two beliefs (one the Bayesian update of the other); or the smaller belief is subject
to no revision, in which case qP attaches positive probability to at most (the same) two
beliefs.
We work backward from the end of the game. Hence, let us renumber the sequence
of offers as s1, s2, . . ., where s1 is the last offer made, s2 the penultimate offer, and so on.
We let δτ be the discount factor relevant when sτ is offered. The magnitude of δτ will
depend on the time that elapses between offer sτ and offer sτ−1.
A.11.1 The Final Period
Suppose we are in the final period, with share s1 offered. Then it is obvious that if an
agent with belief q1 finds it optimal to work, so will any agent with belief q2 > q1.
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A.11.2 The Penultimate Period
Now suppose we are in the penultimate period, facing share s2, and consider agents
with beliefs q1 and q2, with q0 = ϕ(q1) and q1 = ϕ(q2). Hence, q0 is the update of q1 and
q1 is the update of q2.
We argue that it is impossible that q1 would prefer to work and q2 to shirk, i.e., that
it is impossible that
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)max{c, pq0π(1− s1)} ≥ c+ δ2max{c, pq1π(1− s1)},
pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)max{c, pq1π(1− s1)} ≤ c+ δ2max{c, pq2π(1− s1)}.
The value of s1 may be random. However, we will argue that for no value of s1 can these
constraints be satisfied. If so, then they cannot be satisfied on average. This suffices to
establish the result.
We consider four cases:
Case 1: c ≥ pq2π(1− s1). The incentive constraints are
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)c ≥ c+ δ2c, (42)
pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)c ≤ c+ δ2c.
This requires
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)c ≥ pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)c,
or
pq1[π(1− s2)− δ2c] ≥ pq2[π(1− s2)− δ2c].
Since π(1− s2)− δ2c > 0 (from (42)), this is a contradiction.
Case 2: c ∈ [pq1π(1− s1), pq2π(1− s2)]. The incentive constraints are
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)c ≥ c+ δ2c,
pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)c ≤ c+ δ2pq2π(1− s1),
or









c+ δ2c− δ2(1− pq1)c ≤
q1
q2














q2c+ δ2q1c ≤ q1c+ δ2pq1π(1− s1)q2.
We overestimate the right side by writing
q2c+ δ2q1c ≤ q1c+ δ2q2c,
which is
(1− δ2)q2 ≤ (1− δ2)q1,
a contradiction.
Case 3: c ∈ [pq0π(1− s1), pq1π(1− s1)]. The incentive constraints are
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)c ≥ c+ δ2pq1π(1− s1),
pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1) ≤ c+ δ2pq2π(1− s1),
or









c + δ2pq1π(1− s1)− δ2(1− pq1)c ≤
q1
q2




or, eliminating common terms and multiplying by q2,
q2c− δ2(1− pq1)cq2 ≤ q1c− δ2q1(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1).
We overestimate the right side by writing this as
q2c− δ2(1− pq1)cq2 ≤ q1c− δ2q1(1− pq2)c,
which is,
q2 − δ2q2 < q1 − δ2q1,
a contradiction.
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Case 4: c ≤ pq0π(1− s1). The incentive constraints are
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s1) ≥ c+ δ2pq1π(1− s1),
pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1) ≤ c+ δ2pq2π(1− s1),
or

















q2c− q2δ2(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s1) ≤ q1c− δ2q1(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1),
and hence
q2c+ δ2q1(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1) ≤ q1c+ q2δ2(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s1).
Since q2c > q1c, it suffices for a contradiction to show
δ2q1(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1) ≥ q2δ2(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s1),
or
q1(1− pq2)q1 ≤ q2(1− pq1)q0.
Using Bayes’ rule, this is
(1− p)q2q1 ≤ (1− p)q1q2,
which is obvious, and hence yields the contradiction.
A.11.3 The Induction Step
Now we examine the induction step. We suppose that we are facing offer sτ . The
induction hypothesis is that there is no future offer {s1, . . . , sτ−1} that induces an agent
to work while a more optimistic agent shirks.
Suppose that when making offer sτ , q
P attaches positive probability to two beliefs q1
and q2, with q1 being the belief reached from q2 via updating in the event of a failure. We
claim that it is impossible that q1 works while q2 shirks, i.e., that it is impossible that
pq1π(1− sτ ) + δ(1− pq1)W
0 ≥ c+ δW 1 (43)
pq2π(1− sτ ) + δ(1− pq2)W
1 ≤ c+ δW 2, (44)
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where q0 is the belief reached from q1 via Bayesian updating after a failure, W
0 is the
continuation value of an agent with posterior q0 who faces the subsequent sequence of
offers, and W 1 and W 1 are analogous for priors q1 and q2. The sequence of shares offered
to the agent may be random, in which case these are the appropriate expected values.
Rearranging, we need to show the impossibility of
pq1π(1− sτ ) ≥ c+ δτW
1 − δτ (1− pq1)W
0











Given that we have placed no restrictions on sτ , demonstrating this impossibility is equiv-
alent to showing (now phrasing things positively rather than seeking a contradiction)

































The terms W 0, W 1 are W 2 are sums of equal numbers of terms, one for each offer remain-
ing. Any given offer is common to the three sums, but the actions invoked by a given
offer may differ across the sums. By the induction hypothesis, the possible action config-
urations that might appear in any particular period of the continuation play generating
W 0, W 1 and W 2, respectively, offer are sss, ssw, sww, and www.
Now let us suppose that sss occurs in response to some future offer, at which point
continuation paths W 0, W 1, and W 2 have hit posterior beliefs q̃0, q̃1 and q̃2, respectively,
and that all previous periods have featured www. We argue that the contribution of this


























Using the updating rule, this is
(1−pq1)(1−pq̃1)− (1−p)(1−pq1) ≥ (1−pq1)(1−pq̃1)(1−pq̃0)− (1−p)(1−pq1)(1−pq̃1).
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Deleting the common (1− pq1) gives
(1− pq̃1)− (1− p) ≥ (1− pq̃1)(1− pq̃0)− (1− p)(1− pq̃1).
Collecting terms, we have
1− pq̃1 ≥ (1− pq̃1)(1− pq̃0) + (1− p)pq̃1,
or
pq̃0(1− pq̃1) ≥ p(1− p)q̃1,
or
q̃0(1− pq̃1) ≥ (1− p)q̃1,
which holds as an equality, as a restatement of the updating rule.
This means that we can effectively remove from consideration any action profile sss
that appears before the first sww or ssw, replacing the play of sss by inaction and
an appropriately reduced discount factor to capture the passage of time from the offer
preceding the (removed) instance of sss to the following offer. We thus need only consider
paths of play featuring a succession of periods of www followed by sww, or a succession
of periods of www followed by a period of ssw (and then some continuation).





which follows from the fact that q1
q2
< 1 and the pessimistic agent can always mimic the














We focus on the worst case by taking δτ = 1, in which case it suffices to show a weak



































≥ (1− pq1) + p
2− 2pq2 − 1 + p ≥ 1− pq1 − pq2 + p


















So, we need to establish (45). By assumption, the paths inducing W 0 and W 1 both
feature effort in response to offers sτ−1 through sτ̃ for some τ̃ . In responding to each
of these offers, the payoff under W 1 is precisely q1
q0
that of W 0, and hence these periods
contribute nothing to the difference W 0 − q0
q1
W 1. In the next period, W 0 shirks while
W 1 exerts effort. Letting Ŵ 0 and Ŵ 1 denote the continuation values beginning in period





























where W̃ is the same in both cases. The contribution to the expression W 0 − q0
q1
W 1 given
by terms involving W̃ is then, for some constant K,
K
(







which, using the rules for belief updating, equals zero. Hence, we have contributions to
the difference only from terms involving c. If we want to maximize the contribution to
the difference from these terms, we should examine cases in which this shirking happens
in the first period. This gives us an upper bound that matches (45).
The remaining possibility to be considered is that we have a succession of periods of
www followed by ssw. Here, a direct calculation shows that (43)–(44) cannot both hold.
Consider the agent with belief q2. Our putative equilibrium behavior calls for this agent
to shirk in period τ , and then work through period τ̃ , and shirk in period τ̃ − 1. If (44)
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is to hold, it must hold when we consider the alternative course of action in which player
q2 works for in periods τ through τ̃ , and then shirks in period τ̃ − 1. Hence, if (44) is to
hold, we must have
















Notice that no period after τ ′ − 1 enters these payoff calculations. The two paths under
consideration yield identical payoffs in later periods, and hence these periods can be
neglected.
Similarly, consider the player characterized by belief q1. In the putative equilibrium,
this player works for some number k of periods and then shirks. If (43) is to hold, it must
hold for the alternative continuation path in which player q1 first shirks and then works
for k periods. Again, these two paths lead to identical payoffs in periods beyond the first
k + 1. The requirement that (43) hold is then





τ−τ ′pq1π(1− sτ ′)










We can rewrite these as
c ≥ q2H,
c ≤ q1H,
for some H > 0. Since q2 > q1, this is a contradiction.
A.12 Proof of Lemma 6
We invoke a simple induction argument. To do this, let τ index the number of offers
still to be made along the equilibrium path, i.e., the number of failures that will be
endured until play ceases. Suppose we have reached the last offer s1 (and hence τ = 1)
of the game, and that (qP , qA) = (1q1, q1). In equilibrium, the agent’s value is then
W (1q1, q1) = (1− s1)q1pπ ≥ c,
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where the inequality is the incentive constraint that the agent want to work, devoid of
a continuation value in this case because there is no continuation. Now observe that if
the agent holds the private belief q̃ > q1, then again the agent will be asked to work one
period. Hence,










where the final inequality provides the (strict) incentive constraint, ensuring that the
agent will indeed work.
Now suppose we have reached a history in which, in equilibrium, there are τ periods
to go, with beliefs (1qτ , q̃) for qτ < q̃, and suppose that (32) holds for all periods τ̃ < τ .
Then we have






























W (1qτ , qτ ),
where the second equality uses the induction hypothesis, the third invokes the definition of
the updating rule ϕ, the fourth rearranges terms, and the final equality uses the definition
of W .
This argument assumes that, given the equilibrium hypothesis that the agent will work
in every period, an agent who arrives in period τ with posterior q̃ > qτ will find it optimal
to work. This follows from Lemma 5.
A.13 Proof of Lemma 7
We offer an induction argument. Let qτ identify the belief when there are τ periods
to go, so that qτ−1 is derived from qτ via Bayesian updating (given a failure).
In the last period, we have
W (1q1, q0) = c = c+ δ1W (1q0, q0),
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since an agent will shirk in the last period if too pessimistic to work.
In the final two periods, we have the equilibrium payoffs
W (1q1, q1) = pq1π(1− s1)
= c,
W (1q2, q2) = pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)W (1q1, q1)
= pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)pq1π(1− s1)
= pq2π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq2)c
= c+ δ2pq2π(1− s1),
where the final equality in each case is the incentive constraint. We then have
W (1q2, q1) = max
{
c+ δ2pq1π(1− s1) = c+ δ2c
pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)c,
where the first line is the value if the agent shirks in the current period, and the next line
is the value if the agent waits until the final period to shirk. (Never shirking is clearly
suboptimal, as is shirking in both periods.) We will have established the result (for the
case of the final two periods) if we show that the first of these is the larger, or
c+ δ2c ≥ pq1π(1− s2) + δ2(1− pq1)c.
We can eliminate a term δ2c from both sides to obtain the first inequality in the following
and then use the incentive constraint for W (1q2, q2) for the latter:







[c+ δ2pq2π(1− s1)− δ2(1− pq2)c] .
This rearranges to























Now we consider an arbitrary period τ , with the current belief being qτ , and with a
failure giving rise to the updated belief qτ−1, and a subsequent failure to the belief qτ−2.
We have






W (1qτ , qτ−1) = max
{




pqτ−1π(1− sτ ) + δτ (1− pqτ−1)[c+ δτ−1W (1qτ−2, qτ−2)],
where the first line is the value if the agent shirks in the current period (with the second
equality in this line using the Markov hypothesis to substitute for W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)), and
the second line is the value if the agent does not shirk in this period. In this case, we use
the induction hypothesis, ensuring that the agent will shirk in the next period, allowing
us to write W (1qτ−1, qτ−2) = c+ δτ−1W (1qτ−2, qτ−2).




Wτ−2 ≥ pqτ−1π(1− sτ ) + δτ (1− pqτ−1)c+ δτδτ−1(1− pqτ−1)Wτ−2.












Wτ−1 − δτ (1− pqτ )Wτ−1
]
−δτpqτ−1c+δτδτ−1(1−pqτ−1)Wτ−2









































(1− pqτ )Wτ−2 − δτpqτ−1c+ δτδτ−1(1− pqτ−1)Wτ−2.
A-34
Each side has a term δτδτ−1
qτ−1
qτ−2
Wτ−2 that can be eliminated, and the term δτpqτ−1c is
added and subtracted on the right, which can be eliminated, allowing us to move a δτ c
from the right to the left and obtain











(1− pqτ )Wτ−2 + δτδτ−1(1− pqτ−1)Wτ−2.
This is













which is verified by noting that the term in brackets on the right is zero.
A.14 Proof of Lemma 9
We study the pointwise limit of vτ . To do so, we make a change of variable to write
the principal’s payoff v as a function of the current posterior qt. We have, to the second
order,
v(qt) = [qtps(qt)π − c]∆ + (1− r∆)(1− pqt∆)v(qt+∆).
The pointwise limit of this function (as ∆ → 0) is differentiable, so that it must solve
0 = (pqπ − c)− pq(1− s(q))π − (r + pq)v(q)− pq(1− q)v′(q) = 0. (46)
Similarly, whenever the agent is indifferent between shirking and not, the on-path payoff
to the agent, w(qt), must solve, to the second order,
w(qt) = qtp(1− s(qt))π∆+ (1− r∆)(1− qtp∆)w(qt+∆)
= c∆+ (1− r∆)(w(qt+∆) + x(qt)∆),
where x(qt) is the marginal gain from t+∆ onward from not exerting effort at t (recalling
that effort is then optimal at all later dates, since the off-the-equilibrium path relative
optimism of the agent makes the agent more likely to accept the principal’s offer). Using
(32), we obtain







or, in the limit, given the evolution of the belief qt under full effort,
x(qt)∆ = p(1− qt)w(qt)∆.
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Inserting x(qt)∆ into the agent’s incentive constraint and taking limits, the agent’s payoff
satisfies
0 = qpπ(1− s(q))− pq(1− q)w′(q)− (r + qp)w(q)
= c− rw(q)− pq(1− q)w′(q) + p(1− q)w(q). (47)
We now solve for the equilibrium payoffs for this case. Equation (47) reduces to
qtpπ(1− st) = (r + qtp)wt − ẇt and rwt − ẇt − c = p(1− qt)wt.
The second of these equations can be rewritten as
rw(q) + pq(1− q)w′(q)− c = p(1− q)w(q),






+ A(1− q)r/pq1−r/p, (48)
for some constant A. Let γ(q) = pqπ(1 − s) (where, with an abuse of notation, s is a
function of q) so the first equation writes





+ Ap(1− q)r/pq1−r/p, (49)
giving us the share s. Finally, using the previous equation to eliminate s, equation (46)
simplifies to
0 = pqπ − c− γ(q)− (r + pq)v(q)− pq(1− q)v′(q).




















29To understand the expression for x(qt), note that, at any later time u, the agent gets his share
(1 − s(qu)) of π with a probability that is increased by a factor −q̇(u), relative to what it would have
been had he not deviated. Of course, even if the project is good, it succeeds only at a rate p, and this
additional profit must be discounted.
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which is positive if and only if ψ > σ.30
We have thus solved for the payoffs to both agents (given by (48) and (50)), as well
as for the share s (given by 49)), over any interval of time featuring no delay. Note that




and so it has at most three zeroes. Note also that, if the interval without delay includes


















Plugging back into the value for v, we obtain that
v′(q) = 0, v′′(q) =





From (53), v is positive or negative for q close to q according to whether v is convex
or concave at q; it is positive if
ψ > 2,
and negative if ψ < 2. From (10), v(1) is positive (and hence we can induce full effort
and avoid delay for high posteriors) if ψ > σ and negative if ψ < σ. Hence, when ψ > 2
and ψ < σ, ν must admit a root q∗ ∈ (q, 1). Finally, differentiating (50), we have that
v′′(q) 6= 0.
30We can obtain this result directly from (40). As τ → ∞, the initial conditions then become insignif-







This payoff exceeds zero if
1− δ
1− (1− p)δ
(ψ + 1) > 1. (52)
Condition (52) is thus necessary for a no-delay Markov equilibrium, with the candidate equilibrium
strategies otherwise driving the principal’s payoff below zero for high prior values q.








Then a necessary condition for our candidate strategies to be an equilibrium is that ψ > σ.
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A.15 Proof of Lemma 10
Fix q and simplify the notation by writing sW (q) and qS(q) simply as sW and sS. We
can rearrange the constraints defining sW and sS to give
1
δ
[pqπ(1− sW )− c] =
q
ϕ(q)
W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))− (1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))
1
δ
[pqπ(1− sS)− c] = W (1q, q)− (1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q)).
The condition that sS < sW is equivalent to
W (1q, q)− (1− pq)W (1q, ϕ(q)) ≥
q
ϕ(q)
W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q))− (1− pq)W (1ϕ(q), ϕ(q)).





W̃ − (1− pq)[c+ δW̃ ] ≥
q
ϕ(q)
W̃ − (1− pq)W̃ ,
or, noting that c is added and subtracted on the left and rearranging,
pqc+ δ(1− pq)W̃ ≥ (1− δ)
q
ϕ(q)

















≥ W̃ . (54)





For sufficiently small ∆, and hence large δ, this condition will hold. This establishes that
sS < sW for small values of q.
31We could have derived this result directly. In the penultimate period, the relevant incentive con-
straints are













Returning to (54), think of the equilibrium sequence q1, q2, q3, . . . of posteriors, with
q1 being the smallest posterior larger than the termination boundary q, and with qτ−1





which will suffice for sS(qt) ≤ s



































Now, it suffices to show that sS < sW for all q to show that the difference equation
giving us Wτ lies everywhere below that for
qτ c
1−δ




Ξτ to be the ratio) to get


















We rearrange to get
1
δc
[pqπ(1− sW )− c] =
q
ϕ(q)
− (1 − pq),
1
δc
[pqπ(1 − sS)− c] = 1 + δ
q
ϕ(q)
− (1 − pq)(1 + δ).
Then sS < sW if
q
ϕ(q)
− (1− pq) < 1 + δ
q
ϕ(q)

























which in turn gives us a difference equation
Ξτ+1 = δΞτ + (1− δ)
1
qτ+1








with initial condition Ξ1 =
1−δ
q1
. We have sSτ+1 < s
W
τ+1 if Ξτ < 1. We know that
limτ→∞ Ξτ = 1, and also that if any τ gives Ξτ > 1, so do all subsequent τ .
Let us simplify the notation by letting (1− q1)/q1 = Q1 and then write
Ξτ+1 = δΞτ + (1− δ)(1 +Q1(1− p)
τ ).
We can solve this by writing
Ξ1 = Ξ1
Ξ2 = δΞ1 + (1− δ)(1 +Q1(1− p))
Ξ3 = δ
2Ξ1 + (1− δ)(δ + 1 + δQ1(1− p) +Q1(1− p)
2)
Ξ4 = δ
3Ξ1 + (1− δ)(δ





τ−1Ξ1 + (1− δ)(1 + δ + . . .+ δ
τ−2 +Q1((1− p)
τ−1 + δ(1− p)τ−2 + . . .+ δτ−2(1− p))).







δτ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ







δ > 1− p,
δτ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ







δ < 1− p.
Suppose first that p < 1− δ (or, for arbitrarily small ∆, p < r). Then we have
Ξτ = δ
τ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ









= δτ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ
τ−1 + (1− δ)Q1(1− p)
(1− p)τ−1 − δτ−1
1− p− δ
.
For sS < sW , we need
1 ≥ δτ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ
τ−1 + (1− δ)Q1(1− p)
(1− p)τ−1 − δτ−1
1− p− δ
,











It is obvious that this will hold for small τ , where it reduces (for τ = 1) to 1 − Ξ1 ≥ 0.
But 1−p
δ
> 1, so that the left side grows without bound in τ , and so we will have sS > sW
for large τ .





This ensures that there is a lower interval of values of q for which sS(q) < sW (q), but also
a higher interval where this inequality is reversed. Hence, for p < r, each statement of
the lemma holds.
Suppose instead that p > 1− δ (or p > r). Then we have
Ξτ = δ
τ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ









= δτ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ






δ − (1− p)
. (56)
For sS < sW , we need, for all τ ,
1 ≥ δτ−1Ξ1 + 1− δ






δ − (1− p)
.
Dividing by δτ−1, this is






δ − (1− p)
.
The problematic case is that in which τ gets arbitrarily large, giving
1− Ξ1 ≥ (1− δ)(1− p)Q1
1
δ − (1− p)
.
This is










To gain some insight here, multiply by q1 and look at short time periods, making this
∆(p− r)(q1 − r∆) ≥ r∆(1− p∆)(1− q1),
and hence, eliminating second-order terms




If this inequality holds, we will always have sS < sW . If it fails, we will again have a lower
range of values of q with sS < sW , but an upper range where this inequality is reversed.
A.16 Proof of Lemma 11: Agent
Suppose we are in period τ , and hence there will be τ − 1 additional belief revisions
before rendering the players sufficiently pessimistic as to halt experimentation. Let z be
the period, if any, in which only the more optimistic agent is induced to work.
Suppose first that the principal always induces both types of agent to work. Then
using the definition of sW , the payoff to the agent from working, given by
pqτπ(1− sτ ) + δ(1− pqτ )W (1qτ−1, qτ−1),





for all s ∈ (sW , sS). On the other hand, suppose z = τ − 1, so that in the next period
using the definition of sS, the agent’s payoff from working, given by
pqτπ(1− s) + δ(1− pqτ )W (1qτ , qτ−1),
exceeds that from shirking, given by
c+ δW (1qτ , qτ ),
for all s ∈ (sW , sS). Fixing s, the payoff from working and the payoff from shirking
are each upper-hemicontinuous, convex-valued (using the ability of the principal to mix)
correspondences of z. There is accordingly for each s ∈ (sW , sS) a value of z and a
principal mixture that makes the agent indifferent.
A.17 Proof of Lemma 11: Principal
A.17.1 Outline
Suppose that the principal’s belief assigns positive probability to two types. By Lemma
5, these are types that differ by one belief revision. In this subsection, we argue that it
is optimal to have both types work for an initial number of periods, and then only one
type work for one period, so that the posterior belief is degenerate afterwards. Of course,
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the first phase might be either empty or take the entire horizon until the principal finds
experimentation no longer profitable. And, crucially, there might be one period in which
the principal is indifferent between having only the optimistic type or both work. The
point is that the incentives to have both types work decrease over time (of course, once
beliefs are degenerate, the agent works again.)
We refer to the event in which only the optimistic type works as a merger, since
the public belief is degenerate afterwards. We consider three consecutive periods, and
compare the relative value from merging in periods 0 and 1, with the relative value from
merging in periods 1 and 2.
Our strategy is the following. We show that, if the principal prefers to merge in the
third rather than in the second, she also prefers to merge in the second rather than the
first, and hence she waits until some point before merging. This requires deriving first
three payoffs for the principal, according to the period in which merger occurs. Then, we
must compute the differences of consecutive values, and then compare those differences.
In all three cases, since merger will have occurred within two periods, continuation payoffs
to both players will be the same.
A.17.2 The Value of Merging
Before computing the relative values, we must compute the values from merging in
each of the three periods. This requires solving a system of equations for the value of the
agent (as a function of his belief and period), and the value to the principal, for each of
the three cases.
Periods are labeled 0, 1, 2, which is identified by the first subscript in the notation. The
second subscript refers to the agent’s type: type k has belief qk, where q0 > q1 > q2 > q3.
So wtk refers to the agent’s payoff in period t with belief qk. In period 0, the principal
assigns probability µ to the agent having belief q0, and 1− µ to belief q1 = ϕ(q0).
1. Let v0 denote the value from merging in the first period (in period 0). In that case,
w00 = (1− s0) pq0π + δ (1− pq0)w11,




w11 = (1− s1) pq1π + δ (1− pq1)w22,





w22 = (1− s2) pq2π + δ (1− pq2)w3,





We can solve this system, and plug the solution for shares in the principal’s payoff.
As a function of the continuation payoff v3 (from the third period onward), this
value is given by (before substituting)
v0 = s0pq0µπ − c+ δ [1− pq0µ]×
(s1pq1π − c+ δ (1− pq1) (s2pq2π − c+ δ (1− pq2) v3)) .
2. Consider the system of equations in which merging (of beliefs) occurs in the second
period. We have,
w12 = c+ δw22,
as well as




w11 = (1− s1) pq1π + δ (1− pq1)w22,
and
w00 = (1− s0) pq0π + δ (1− pq0)w11,
w01 = (1− s0) pq1π + δ (1− pq1)w12,
w01 = c+ δw11,
and finally
w22 = (1− s2) pq2π + δ (1− pq2)w3,




Hence, the time-0 payoff to the principal from merging in the second period is
v1 = s0p (µq0 + (1− µ) q1) π − c + δ [1− p (µq0 + (1− µ) q1)] ·




µq0 + (1− µ) q1
.






3. Finally, we consider the system in which two periods elapse before merging. This
system is given by
w00 = (1− s0) pq0π + δ (1− pq0)w11,
w01 = (1− s0) pq1π + δ (1− pq1)w12,
w11 = (1− s1) pq1π + δ (1− pq1)w22,
w12 = (1− s1) pq2π + δ (1− pq2)w23,
w23 = c+ δw3,




w22 = (1− s2) pq2π + δ (1− pq2)w3,
w12 = c+ δw22,
w01 = c+ δw11,
and hence, solving this system, the payoff to the principal of this course of action is
v2 = s0p (q0µ+ q1 (1− µ)) π − c+ δ (1− p (q0µ+ q1 (1− µ))) ·
[s1p (q1µ1 + (1− µ1) q2) π − c+ δ (1− p (q1µ1 + (1− µ1) q2)) v] ,
where




µ1q1 + (1− µ1) q2
.
Note that the (unknown) continuation payoffs v3, w3 after the third period are the same
in all cases, as merging has occurred by then.
A.17.3 The Relative Value of Merging: Intuition
As mentioned, we are interested in the relationship between the differences
∆1 := v
1 − v0, ∆2 := v
2 − v1.
We need the result for a fixed (if arbitrarily small) ∆ > 0. However, because the argument
is extremely tedious (see Section A.17.4), we first provide a simpler suggestive argument
that holds in the limit, as ∆ → 0.
We argue that ∆1 < 0 implies ∆2 < 0. This will be an easy consequence of the claim
that ∆1 = 0 implies ∆2 < 0.
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Let us take limits: c→ c∆, p→ p∆, δ → 1− r∆, and of course ∆ → 0. Fix µ. We get








where (letting q := q0, w := w3 and v := v3 for notational simplicity),
γ1 := (3 (1 + q)− 2µ (2 + q)) rc− r (1− µ) (2q (2 + q) π − 3µ (1− q) (w + qv)) p+
µ (1− µ) (1− q) p [(1 + 5q) c− 3pq ((1 + q)π − 2w − (1 + q) v)] ,
and









γ2 := (4 + 5q − µ (7− µ+ q (2 + µ))) rc−
r (1− µ) (qπ (7− µ+ q (2 + µ))− 2µ (1− q) (w + qv)) p+
µ (1− µ) (1− q) p [(3 + 4q) c+ (2w − q ((5 + 2q)π − 2qv − 5 (w + v)))] .
These expressions might be positive or negative, depending (among other things) on v, w.
Note that there is no first-order term, which should not be surprising, given that we are
considering differences. Note also that the second-order term is identical, which means
we must look at the third-order term, namely γ2 vs. γ1.
We will solve for the value of µ for which ∆1 = 0, and plug it in our expression for
∆2, showing that ∆2 < 0, and hence ∆2 < ∆1. The general result will then follow from
monotonicity of these expressions in µ.
Note that γ1 > 0 for µ = 0, and γ1 < 0 for µ = 1. It is not hard to show that ∆1 is
monotone in µ, so that there exists at most one solution µ ∈ [0, 1] to ∆1 = 0. It is also
easy to see that µ→ 1 as ∆ → 0. We claim that this solution must be given by
µ = 1− κ∆+ o (∆) ,
for some κ to be defined. Indeed, plugging in such an expression into ∆1 and solving for
the root gives us
κ =
(1− q) rcp
r (pqπ − c)− p (1− q) (c+ p (w + qv − qπ))
.
For our claim to make sense, we must check that κ > 0 (so that our formula gives us a
well-defined probability).
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Claim A.1 It holds that κ > 0.
Proof of claim: We have to consider different cases. Throughout, we conserve on clutter
by normalizing c to 1.
First, consider the high surplus, impatient case, in which a > 4 and a− σ > 2 (where
a := pπ > 2). We insert the closed-form formulas for v, w to get
κ =
1− σ2













1 + 3σ − 2qσ + 2 (1− q)2 σ
)




2− q + σ (1− q)2
))]
.







that appears in the denom-
inator, noting that the (upper or lower) bound it provides (according to whether σ ≶ 1)
gives us a lower bound to µ, given that the numerator changes signs at σ = 1 as well.
The resulting expression is positive if and only if









1 + σ + 4q + σq
(
9− 5q + (1− q)2
))
− 8− 8σ (2− q) + 8a (1 + q) (1 + σ (2− q)) > 0.
We claim that S0 is increasing. First, it is convex, as its second derivative is
2 (a− 2) a2 (1− q)2 q > 0.
Second, its first derivative, evaluated at 0, equals
4 (a− 1) (a− 2)2
a
+ 3 (a− 2)3 q̃ + 4 (a− 2) aq̃2 − a3q̃3,
where q̃ = q − q. This is positive for all q̃ < 1 − a if it is positive for q̃ = 1 − a, and for
q̃ = 1− a, we obtain an expression which is increasing in a and equal to 0, for a = 2 –so,
positive everywhere.
We are left to claim that S0 (0) > 0. But
S0 (0) = 2 (2− a)
2 (aq − 1) > 0,
since q > q = 2/a. This establishes that κ > 0 in case 1.
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Next, suppose we have a high surplus, patient project. Note that nothing in our
previous analysis hinged on patience, so the claim is true for q < q∗. So we can focus on
the case in which the principal’s profit is zero. In that case, we know that




and inserting into κ, we get
κ =
(1− q) rσ
aq − 1 + (1− q) σ
> 0.
This also applies to the other cases whenever there is zero profit to the principal. This
establishes that κ > 0 in case 2.
We are left with the case of low surplus and impatience, when the belief is such
that the principal’s payoff is positive, i.e. q > q∗∗. Using the boundary conditions
w (q∗∗) = q∗∗π − 2c
p
, v (q∗∗) = 0, and our formula for q∗∗, we can solve for the two
differential equations that give v, w and plugging into κ gives that κ is of the sign of
aq − 1 +
σ (1− q)
1− σ2
[q (1− (1− q)σ) (a (1− σ) + 2σ)− 1− σ + C] ,
where










Again, we note that using Bernoulli’s inequality, applied to C, provides us a lower bound
to this expression whether or not σ is less than one. Simplifying gives us the following
expression:
S1 (q) := aq−1+
(1− q)σ (2 + a2q2 + σ (8q − 7− 4q (1− q)σ) + a (1 + σ + 2q (σ − 2− 2qσ)))
(a− 2− σ) (1 + σ)
.
First, we have
S ′′′1 (q) = −
6 (a− 2σ)2 σ





















S1 (1) = a− 1 > 0,
and finally that
S ′1 (q
∗∗) = a− σ > 0.
Hence, S1 (q) > 0 for all q ∈ [q
∗∗, 1], and we are done with this case as well.
We have now verified that κ > 0 in all cases, and that our expansion for the root µ of
∆1 is valid. End of the proof of claim.
We now can come back to our comparison between ∆1 and ∆2. Plugging in our formula
for κ (and hence µ) into ∆2, we get






Because ∆2 is also monotone in µ, it follows that, more generally,
∆1 < 0 =⇒ ∆2 < 0,
which establishes “concavity:” if the principal is indifferent between merging and not in
some period, she strictly prefers to merge after, and strictly prefers to keep beliefs separate
before, for all ∆ > 0 small enough.
A.17.4 The Relative Value of Merging: Formal Analysis
The remainder of this section provides a formal analysis for fixed (non-vanishing)
∆ > 0. The strategy of proof is exactly the same: setting ∆1 = 0, solving for one of the
“parameters” (in this case, v), and showing that ∆2 < 0 for that value. Unfortunately,
as mentioned, the analysis is significantly more tedious. In what follows, we drop the
reference to ∆, keeping in mind that it is fixed once and for all, to a value that is such
that δ = exp(−r∆) ≥ 2/3, and p∆ ≤ 1/2.
Now, using the formulas for payoffs, we have ∆1 ∝ A1 − A2, where












+ (p− 1)(δ − 1)((p − 2)pq + 1)
)
−p(q − 1)δ3µ(p((p − 3)p + 3)q − 1)
(




A2 := c(p− 1)((p − 2)pq + 1)
[
p2(q − 1)δ2(µ − 1)µ(((p − 2)p + 2)q − 1)− δ(pq − 1)
(
p2(q − 1)2µ2 + (p − 1)µ(p(q − 2) + 1) + (p − 1)2
)
+(pq − 1)(p(q − 2)µ + p+ µ − 1)(p(q − 1)µ + p− 1)]
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It holds that ∆1 is decreasing in v: its derivative w.r.t. v is
−δ3(p− 1)3p2(q − 1)q(µ− 1)µ(p((p− 3)p+ 3)q − 1) ≤ 0.
Similarly, ∆2 is decreasing in v, as the second derivative is
δ2(p− 1)5p2(q − 1)q(µ− 1)µ(pq(p((q − 1)µ+ 1)− 2) + 1) ≤ 0.
Hence, it suffices to solve for v such that ∆1 = 0 and show that ∆2 ≤ 0 for that value of
v. Solving gives v = (A4 + A5)/A3, where
A3 := −(p− 1)
3p2(q − 1)qδ3(µ− 1)µ(p((p− 3)p+ 3)q − 1),
and












+ (p − 1)(δ − 1)((p − 2)pq + 1)
)




A5 := c(p− 1)((p − 2)pq + 1)
[
p2(q − 1)δ2(µ − 1)µ(((p − 2)p + 2)q − 1)− δ(pq − 1)
(
p2(q − 1)2µ2 + (p − 1)µ(p(q − 2) + 1) + (p − 1)2
)
+(pq − 1)(p(q − 2)µ + p+ µ − 1)(p(q − 1)µ + p− 1)] .




2)pq + 1)(B2 + δB3)), with
B1 := π(p − 1)








(p − 2)2pq − 1
)




+((p − 2)pq + 1)(p(−qµ + µ− 1) + 1)] ,
and
B2 := (p− 1)
3(pq− 1)(p(q− 2)µ+ p+µ− 1)(p(q− 1)µ+ p− 1)(pq(p(q− 1)µ+ p− 2)+1),





















p(p(p(p((p− 9)p + 34) − 69) + 75)− 35)q3
−(p − 2)(p(p(p(p(3p − 19) + 53)− 74) + 44) + 2)q2 + (p− 2)(p(p + 2)(2p − 5) + 24)q − 3p + 3
]













p(p(p(p((15 − 2p)p − 49) + 85) − 79) + 31)q3
+(p(p(p(p(p(3p − 23) + 78)− 139) + 128) − 39) − 11)q2 − p(p(p(p+ 2)− 21) + 50)q + 2p + 38q + 1
]







C4 := −(p− 1)
4(p((p− 3)p+ 3)q − 1)2.
We normalize throughout c to 1. We now note that
d∆∗
dπ








(p − 2)2pq − 1
)




+((p − 2)pq + 1)(p(−qµ + µ− 1) + 1)] ,
which is always negative. To see this, note that (p − 1)5pq(1 − µ)(pq(p(q − 1)µ + p −
2) + 1) < 0. The last factor appearing in d∆
∗
dπ
is linear in µ, with coefficient equal to
p(q− 1)((p− 2)pq(d(p− 2)(p− 1)− 1) + d(−p) + d− 1) > 0, i.e., it is increasing in µ; yet
at µ = 0 it equals (p− 1)(δ(p− 1)(p((p− 3)p+ 3)q − 1)− (p− 2)pq − 1) > 0, and so it is
positive for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
To check that ∆∗ ≤ 0, it thus suffices to consider the case in which π = 2/(pq). We also
note that ∆∗ = ∆∗(δ) is linear in δ, and so it suffices to consider the two extreme cases δ =







p((p− 3)p((p− 3)p+ 7) + 11)q3
+(p(p(p(p((p− 9)p+ 32)− 63) + 70)− 35) + 1)q2 − (p− 4)((p− 2)(p− 1)p+ 1)q + p− 2
]
,





p(p(p(p((p− 9)p+ 31)− 59) + 64)− 31)q3






D4 := (p− 1)
4(q(p(−((p− 3)p((p− 3)p+ 5) + 7)q + p− 2) + 3)− 1),
and finally





p(p(p(p(p(2p− 15) + 46)− 74) + 66)− 26)q3





It is a matter of tedious algebra to show that this polynomial function is always negative
for p ≤ 1/2. Here are the details. First, we show that ∆∗(1) is concave in q. As
d2∆∗(1)/dq2 is equal to
−2(1− p)6p2
[
µ3(p− 3)(p− 1)p2 + µ2((p− 4)(p− 3)(p− 1)p+ 1)
+µ(p(p((13− 3p)p− 18) + 4) + 2) + p(p((p− 6)p+ 14)− 16) + 9] ≤ 0
(leaving aside the negative factor −2(1 − p)6p2, the remainder is decreasing in p, yet
positive at p = 1/2), at q = 1, it is enough to show that its third derivative, ∆(3)(1)
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(p− 2)(p− 1)p((p− 4)p+ 2)µ3 − (p− 1)(p((p− 2)p(3p− 5) + 6)− 6)µ2
+p(p(p((p− 9)p+ 31)− 58) + 62)µ+ p(p(p((p− 8)p+ 26)− 43) + 37)− 14(2µ+ 1)] ≥ 0,
(leaving aside the negative factor −6(1 − p)4p3, this is decreasing in µ and increasing in
p, yet negative at (µ, p) = (0, 1/2)), it suffices to argue that the fourth derivative w.r.t. q,





















+p(p(p(p((19− 2p)p− 76) + 166)− 214) + 158)− 31µ− 52] ≤ 0.
(Leaving aside the positive factor 24(1− p)2p4µ, this is decreasing in µ and increasing in
p, yet negative at (p, µ) = (1/2, 0)). In turn, to show that ∆(5)(1) ≥ 0, we note that the
sixth derivative is
720(p− 2)p6((p− 3)p((p− 3)p+ 7) + 11)µ3 ≤ 0,
and that, evaluated at 1, the fifth derivative is
120(p− 1)p5µ2(p(p(p(p(p(p(µ− 1)− 6µ+ 11) + 12µ− 49)− 2µ+ 121)− 2(12µ+ 91)) + 29µ+ 159)− 9µ− 62) ≥ 0.
(Leaving aside the negative factor 120(p− 1)p5µ2, this is increasing in p and negative at
p = 1/2). Having shown that ∆∗(1) is concave in q, we note that d∆∗(1)/dq evaluated at





µ2(2(p− 3)p+ 3) + µ
(





(leaving aside the positive factor (1 − p)8p, the last factor is decreasing in µ and equals
(1− p)2 at µ = 1), so it is increasing in q. Yet it is equal to −(1−µ)(2− p)p(1− p)10 < 0
at q = 1, so it is negative everywhere.






E2 := (p − 1)




















p(p(p(p((p− 9)p + 34) − 69) + 75) − 35)q3
−(p − 2)(p(p(p(p(3p − 19) + 53) − 74) + 44) + 2)q2 + (p − 2)(p(p + 2)(2p − 5) + 24)q − 3p+ 3
)














p(p(p(p((15 − 2p)p− 49) + 85)− 79) + 31)q3
+(p(p(p(p(p(3p− 23) + 78) − 139) + 128) − 39)− 11)q2 − p(p(p(p+ 2) − 21) + 50)q + 2p+ 38q + 1
)





Again, it is tedious but straightforward to show that this is negative provided p ≤ 1/2
(the steps are the same, consisting in showing that the derivatives w.r.t. q alternate in
sign). The case in which there is delay is dealt with similarly (solving for w from ∆1 = 0,
inserting into ∆2 and showing it is negative).
A.18 Proof of Lemma 12
Refer to each passage of ∆ time as a period, and let periods be numbered beginning
with 0, with subsequent periods numbered 1, 2, . . . Suppose the principal makes an offer
s ∈ (sW , sS) in period 0, facing agent belief q0. The agent mixes between working and
shirking. The principal then makes offers that induce both the optimistic and pessimistic
agent to work, until reaching period t, in which only the optimistic agent works. The
agents’ beliefs are then “merged,” after which both agents work in each period. We argue
that this gives the principal a lower payoff than does sW .
If the principal makes the equilibrium offer sW in period 0, she receives
V (1q0, q0) = pq0πs
W − c+ δ(1− pq0)V (1q1 , q1).
If the principal instead makes offer s ∈ (sW , sS) and the agent shirks, then the principal’s
payoff is
−c+ δṼ ,
for some continuation payoff Ṽ that satisfies
Ṽ ≤ V (1q0, q0).
The latter inequality follows from the observations that the (i) continuation payoffs
V (1q0, q0) and Ṽ are both generated by continuation paths under which the principal
makes some number T of offers, to posteriors q0, q1, . . . , qT−1, (ii) along both continua-
tion paths, the agent works in every period, (iii) the principal’s offers under continuation
paths V (1q0, q0) and Ṽ from the t-th period on are identical under the two paths, and
(iv) during the first t− 1 period, the outcome generating payoff Ṽ faces an additional set
of constraints not imposed on V (1q0 , q0), namely that the more pessimistic agent also be
willing to work.
Hence, the principal’s payoff is lower under s if the agent shirks. Suppose instead
the principal offers s and the agent works. We again need to show that this generates
a lower payoff for the principal than offering sW . The continuation paths following sW
and s generate identical outcomes over the periods 1, . . . , t − 1. The path following sW
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then continues with payoff V (1qt, qt), while the path following s delays this payoff by one









(1− pqτ )V (1qt , qt),
or
pq0π(s− s
W ) < δt
∏t−1
τ=0
(1− pqτ )[c+ (1− δ)V (1qt, qt)].
We consider the worst case in terms of satisfying this inequality, namely that in which
V (1qt, qt) = 0, and hence we need
pq0π(s− s
W ) < δt
∏t−1
τ=0
(1− pqτ )c. (57)
In response to offer sW , the agent is indifferent between shirking and working. We let
Wt denote the continuation payoff received by the agent after period t, along the Markov-
equilibrium path. We letW1,t−1 identify the payoffs collected by the agent between periods























Under offer s, a working agent receives payoff






(1− pqτ )(c+ δWt)
]
,








(1− pqτ )Wt−1. (59)
We can use (58) to rewrite the payoff (59) of a shirking agent as
pq0π(1− s



















The condition that the agent be indifferent between shirking and working, after offer s,
is then




























We can rewrite this as
pq0π(s− s
W ) = δt
∏t−1
τ=0




































(1−pqτ )Wt−1 < 0.



























































which holds for small ∆.
A.19 Proof of Lemma 13
We have four cases to consider.
First, if s̃S ≤ s̃W and sS ≤ sW , the result is immediate. The agents do not mix in
these circumstances, and the optimality of the principal’s strategy follows from the fact
that the agent whose belief is (q̃) (alternatively, q) shirks if and only if the offer falls short
of s̃W (or sW ).
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Second, suppose s̃S ≥ s̃W and sS ≤ sW . Then we need to consider offers in (s̃W , s̃S).
The argument follows that of the fourth case below.
Third, suppose s̃S ≤ s̃W and sS ≥ sW . We must then consider offers in (sW , sS). Here,
the result is straightforward. For any such offer, the agent believing q̃ shirks. The payoff
and the continuation play, if the agent believes q̃, is then independent of the current offer,
and we can condition on the event that the agent believes q. Here, Lemma 12 uses only
the information that this agent is indifferent between working and shirking to show that,
no matter what the agent’s action, the principal receives a lower payoff than would be
the case under offer sW .
We thus have the case s̃S ≥ s̃W and sS ≥ sW . An argument identical to that of the
preceding case addresses offers s ∈ (sW , sS). This allows us to focus attention on the case
s ∈ (s̃W , s̃S). Here, the q̃ agent mixes between working and shirking, while the q agent
works. If the agent happens to have belief q̃, then the proof of Lemma 12 applies to ensure
that the principal is better off with offer s̃W than s, whether the agent shirks or works.
If the agent is type q, then we need to establish the counterpart of (57), or
pq−1π(s− s̃




where we take q = q−1 and q̃ = q0. The information we have available is that the agent
believing q̃ = q0 is indifferent, or
pq0π(s− s
W ) = δt
∏t−1
τ=0

























































































































pWt − c < cp(qt−1 − 1),
which holds for small ∆.
A.20 Proof of Lemma 14
We now examine the smallest payoff available to the principal in the final period of
a no-delay equilibrium. The task is to minimize s1. To do this, we assume that should
the principal choose a larger value of s1, the agent is expected to shirk. We are thus
identifying the value sS, via the following constraint:
c + δpq1π(1− s0) ≥ pq1π(1− s0) + δ(1− pq1)max{c, pq0π(1− s0)}.
The Markov restriction will require setting s0 = s1. Notice, however, that if we are
allowed to set these separately, then minimizing s1 is achieved by minimizing s0. Hence,
the minimum final-period principal payoff, over all no-delay equilibria, can be achieved
by a Markov equilibrium. Hence, we can write
c+ δpq1π(1− s) ≥ pq1π(1− s) + δ(1− pq1)max{c, pq0π(1− s)}. (60)
We now argue that for q1 sufficiently close to q, we can set the principal’s payoff equal
to zero. This requires showing that s with pq1πs = c can satisfy the incentive constraint
(60). First, we notice that for q1 close to q, we have c > pq0π(1 − s).
32 Hence, using
pq1πs = c, from (60) we need to show
(2− δ)c ≥ (1− δ)pq1π + δ(1− pq1)c,






(pq1π− c) (using pq1πs− c). For q1 very
close to q, this is c ≥ q0
q1
(2c− c), which holds.
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or
2(1− δ)c ≥ (1− δ)(pq1π − c).
But for q1 sufficiently close to q, we have pq1π− c arbitrarily close to c, giving the result.
Hence, for q1 ∈ [q, q̂] for some q̂, the principal’s lowest Markov equilibrium payoff is 0.
Now let us examine values of q1 large enough that q0 is very close to q. Here, we have
c < pq0π(1 − s).
33 We now show that we cannot reduce the principal’s payoff to zero in
this case. This is equivalent to showing that we cannot satisfy (60) with pq1πs = c, or
equivalently that it is impossible that (with subsequent simplifications)
c+ δpq1π(1− s) ≥ pq1π(1− s) + δ(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s),
(2− δ)c ≥ (1− δ)pq1π + δ(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s),

























−δq0 ≥ −2δq1 + 2δ(1− p)q1 − δq0q1,
−δq0 ≥ −2δpq1 − δq0q1,
δq0 ≤ 2δpq1 + δq0q1,
which fails for small ∆ (and hence small p).
To calculate the principal’s minimum payoff over the region [q̂, q̃), we note that the
principal’s payoff is given by pq1πs− c for the lowest value of s, which satisfies the agent’s
incentive constraint, given by
c+ δpq1π(1− s) = pq1π(1− s) + δ(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s).
33Using the fact that q0 is set at its upper limit if q and hence pq0π = 2c, we have















c = (1− δ)pq1π(1− s) + δ(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s),
c = (1− δ)pq1π(1− s) + δ(1− pq1)pq0π(1− s),




c = pq1π(1− s)[(1− δ) + δ(1− p)],
and hence









A.21 Proof of Lemma 15
Fix a posterior q. Let W ∗(1q, q) be the agent’s value in the no-delay principal-optimum
Markov equilibrium, given that the agent holds belief q and the principal holds a degener-
ate belief concentrated on the value q. We seek a lower bound on the principal’s payoff in
any equilibrium. The strategy of proof is to note that one feasible option for the principal
is to induce the agent to work in every period. Then we ask what is the most expensive
such a strategy could be for the principal, or equivalently, what is the largest equilibrium
payoff for the agent in an equilibrium in which the agent works in every period? We
denote this payoff by W (1q, q). The principal’s payoff in the corresponding equilibrium
poses a lower bound on the principal’s equilibrium payoff.
We compare this bound on the principal’s equilibrium payoff with the principal’s payoff
in the no-delay principal-optimum Markov equilibrium. Since the total surplus is fixed
by the convention that the agent works in every period, we can do this by comparing the
agent’s payoff in the two equilibria. In particular, for any q we
- construct an equilibrium in which the agent always works, giving the agent payoff
W (1q, q),
- show W (1q, q) ≤W
∗(1q, q),
- show that W (1q, q) converges to W
∗(1q, q) as ∆ gets small.
This gives us a lower bound on the principal’s payoff that is tight (since we have an
equilibrium achieving the payoff) and that converges to the Markov payoff as ∆ gets
small. Notice that W (1q, q) is also an upper bound on the agent’s payoff. The equilibrium
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we construct maximizes the surplus and gives the principal her lowest payoff. Any other
equilibrium must feature a (weakly) higher payoff for the principal and a (weakly) smaller
surplus, and hence can only decrease the agent’s payoff.
Let τ(∆, q), typically written simply as τ , be the number of failed experiments required
to push the posterior expectation below the threshold q for abandoning the project. We








Hence, if an experiment is undertaken at posterior q1, no further experimentation will
occur.
A.21.1 The No-Delay Principal-Optimum Markov Equilibrium
We start with the no-delay principal-optimum Markov equilibrium. In the last period,
we have
W ∗(1q1, q1) = c.
In general, we have





where the second equality is the incentive constraint. Using this second equality to iterate,
we have












































































We now ask what would be the most the principal would have to pay each period,
in order to get the agent to work, and what would be the agent’s resulting payoff. We
proceed recursively. First, we set
W (1q1, q1) ∈ [c, pq1π − c].
This is simply the statement that in the final period, the payoff of the agent is bounded
by the Markov payoff and the entire surplus.
There are two possibilities for the largest amount the principal must pay the agent to
work. First, it may be that the agent is indifferent between working and shirking, and
any larger value of s induces the agent to shirk. In this case, we can write the agent’s
incentive constraint as




and hence the agents’ maximum value as




Alternatively, it may be that the agent’s incentive constraint is slack and the agent
strictly prefers to work. If the agent strictly prefers to work, why doesn’t the principal
increase s to some s + ε? The equilibrium presumption is that if the principal does so,
the agent shirks, consuming the advance c and prompting no belief revision. For this to
be suboptimal, it must be that
c+ δW (1qτ , qτ ) ≥ (1− (sτ + ε))pqτπ + δ(1− pqτ )W (1qτ , qτ−1).
Since this must hold for every ε > 0, it must hold for the limiting case of ε = 0 (the
most stringent form of the inequality). We can also focus on the case in which this
constraint holds with equality, since this will fix the bound on sτ . Hence, the relevant
agent’s incentive constraint is then
c+ δW (1qτ , qτ ) = (1− s
S
τ )pqτπ + δ(1− pqτ )W (1qτ , qτ−1). (62)
We can rearrange (62) to obtain
pqτπs
S
τ = pqτπ − c− δw(qτ , qτ ) + δ(1− pq)W (1qτ , qτ−1).
How small can we make sSτ ? The tools we have for doing this are the continuation payoffs
W (1qτ , qτ ) and W (1qτ , qτ−1). We would like to make the former as large as possible, and
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the latter as small as possible. However, these are not independent. A lower bound on
the latter is given by the fact that
W (1qτ , qτ−1) ≥
qτ−1
qτ
W (1qτ , qτ ),
since a pessimistic agent can always duplicate the actions of a more optimistic agent.




τ = pqτπ − c− δW (1qτ , qτ ) + δ(1− pq)
qτ−1
qτ
W (1qτ , qτ ).
We can reformulate this condition as
pqτπs
S






W (1qτ , qτ ).
Now it is apparent that we want to make W (1qτ , qτ ) as large as possible.
We claim that an upper bound on W (1qτ , qτ ) is W (1qτ , qτ ), the largest bound available
to the agent when the agent always works. Suppose we have an alternative candidate equi-
librium giving the agent a larger payoff. Then the equilibrium must involve some delay,
and hence must involve a smaller surplus than the equilibrium giving payoff W (1qτ , qτ ).
It must then involve a smaller payoff from the principal than the payoff the principal
receives from the most expensive way of inducing the agent to always work. But since the
principal has the option of always inducing the agent to work, the candidate equilibrium
cannot be an equilibrium. Instead, the principal would induce work, earning a higher










W (1qτ , qτ ).
We can then calculate
W (1qτ , qτ ) = (1− s
S
τ )pqτπ + δ(1− pqτ )W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)






W (1qτ , qτ ) + δ(1− pq)W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)


















Combining these calculations, an upper bound on the agent’s payoff is given by the
solution to the difference equation



















Taking the maximum in each case, we can write







:= B + AτW (1qτ−1, qτ−1).
We now solve for
W (1qτ , qτ ) = AτW (1qτ−1, qτ−1) +B
= AτAτ−1W (1qτ−2, qτ−2) + AτB +B
= AτAτ−1Aτ−2W (1qτ−3, qτ−3) + AτAτ−1B + AτB +B
= AτAτ−1Aτ−2Aτ−3W (1qτ−4, qτ−4) + AτAτ−1Aτ−2B + AτAτ−1B + AτB +B
...
...
= Aτ · · ·A2W (1q1, q1)
+ Aτ · · ·A3B





Now we compare (61) and (63), holding fixed the posterior q that comprises our point
of departure, but allowing ∆ to approach zero and hence τ(∆) to grow large. The final








while our bound (63) has as its corresponding term
Aτ(∆) · · ·A2W (1q1, q1) ≤ δ(∆)
τ(∆)−1 qτ(∆)
q1





We then note that both terms approach zero as does ∆. The sum of the remaining terms






































→ 1 as time periods get short, while the common term is bounded, and
hence lim∆→0W (1q, q) ≤W
∗(1q, q), giving the result.
We now show that for an interval [q, q̃] of priors and for sufficiently small ∆, the upper
bound we have calculated on the agent’s payoff is tight. The requirement on the interval
of priors is that it be such that sS < sW , which we know is the case for a lower interval
that remains nondegenerate as ∆ → 0.
We used one approximation in the course of constructing the bound on the agent’s
payoff, namely that
W (1qτ , qτ−1) ≥
qτ−1
qτ
W (1qτ , qτ ).
It thus suffices to show that this is an equality for the range of priors in question. To
do this, it suffices to show that a pessimistic agent (one with posterior qτ−1) will work
in every period, given that the principal’s current belief is qτ , and given the equilibrium
that we have constructed, involving offer sS in every period. Notice that we know a
pessimistic agent will not do so when the share offered in every period is sW . In that
case, the pessimistic agent shirks at first opportunity and then has a belief matching the
degenerate belief of the principal. However, we are now assuming that share sS is offered
in each period, which is more generous to the agent, making work more attractive.
We argue by induction. Suppose the last period has been reached, meaning that the
principal is characterized by a belief q1. On the equilibrium path, the principal offers share
sS, which induces the agent to work. We must show that this offer also induces work from
an agent characterized by belief q0 = ϕ(q1) to work. From the incentive constraint fixing
sS, we have
pq1π(1− s
S) = c+ δpq1π(1− s
S)− δ(1− pq1)W (1q1, q0). (64)
We need to show
pq0π(1− s
S) ≥ c, (65)





















S), c} ≥ c.
We suppose that the pessimistic agent shirks and show that this inequality holds, con-
tradicting the supposition that the agent shirks and establishing the result. Taking
max{pq0π(1 − s









(1− p) ≥ 1.
A successive series of manipulations gives
q0
q1




1− p ≥ (1− δp)(1− pq1),
1− p ≥ 1− δp− pq1 + δp
2q1,
δp+ pq1 ≥ p+ δp
2q1,
δ + q1 ≥ 1 + pδq1,
which holds for sufficiently small ∆.
Now we turn to the induction step. We consider a belief qτ and the associated more
pessimistic belief qτ−1 = ϕ(qτ ). The induction hypothesis is that




We know, from the definition of sS, that
pqτπ(1− s
S) = c+ δW (qτ , qτ )− δ(1− pqτ )W (1qτ , qτ−1).
Using the equilibrium definition of W (qτ , qτ ), this is
pqτπ(1−s
S) = c+δ[pqτπ(1−s
S)+δ(1−pqτ)W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)]−δ(1−pqτ)W (1qτ , qτ−1). (66)
Our goal is to show that an agent who is one step more pessimistic would prefer to work,
or
pqτ−1π(1− s
S) + δ(1− pqτ−1)W (1qτ−1, qτ−2) ≥ c + δW (1qτ−1, qτ−1). (67)
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(1− pqτ )W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)−
δ
1− δ
(1− pqτ )W (1qτ , qτ−1),
and then multiply by qτ−1
qτ















(1− pqτ )W (1qτ , qτ−1)
≥ c + δW (1qτ−1, qτ−1)− δ(1− pqτ−1)W (1qτ−1, qτ−2).
We use the induction hypothesis to rewrite W (1qτ−1, qτ−2) as
qτ−2
qτ−1
W (1qτ−1, qτ−1). It then
suffices to assume that the payoff W (1qτ , qτ−1) is generated by a path of play that begins
with a shirk, yielding a contradiction that establishes the result. This allows us to rewrite















(1− pqτ )[c+ δW (1qτ−1, qτ−1)]


















(1− p)W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)
≥ c+ δW (1qτ−1, qτ−1)− δ(1− p)W (1qτ−1, qτ−1).



























− δ(1− p)− (1− δ)
]
≥ W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)
[
p(1− δ)− δ(1− p) + δ2(1− p)
]
,
c [(1− p)− (1− δp)(1− pqτ )] ≥ W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)
[





1− p− (1− δp− pqτ + δp
2qτ )
]
≥ W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)
[





−p+ δp+ pqτ − δp
2qτ
]
≥ W (1qτ−1, qτ−1)
[
p− δ + δ2 − δ2p
]
(1− pqτ ),







As ∆ → 0, the coefficient on c on the left side approaches qτ . On the right side, (1− pqτ )
approaches 1, and the coefficient onW (1qτ−1, qτ−1) approaches −
r
p
, ensuring the inequality.
A-66
A.22 Proof of Lemma 16
Let V (1qτ−1, qτ−1) be the smallest principal payoff available from a no-delay Markov
path of play, given the common belief qτ−1, and let V (1qτ , qτ ) be the largest such payoff,
given the common belief qτ , with qτ−1 = ϕ(qτ ). We need to show that V (1qτ−1, qτ−1) ≤
V (1qτ , qτ ).
Let Sτ be the surplus available at posterior qτ and St−1 be the surplus available at
posterior qτ−1. Let, conserving on notation, W τ be the smallest agent payoff from a no-
delay path of play, given common belief qτ , and let W τ−1 be the largest agent no-delay
payoff given belief qτ−1. Then we need to show
Sτ −W τ ≥ Sτ−1 −W τ−1.
A sequence of manipulations gives the equivalent statements:
(pqτπ − c) + δ(1− pqτ )Sτ−1 ≥ Sτ−1 −W τ−1 +W τ ,





1− δ(1− pqτ )
≥ Sτ−1 −








≥ Sτ−1 −W τ−1, since the left side is the payoff the principal would
receive if the principal had to pay only c in each period and if failures did not diminish
the posterior, and hence it suffices to show




1− δ(1− pqτ )W τ−1
≤ 1 + ε,



























≥ (1− p)− ε(1− p)




In the course of proving Lemma 15, we have derived an expression for W τ−1 and an upper





≥ (1− p)− ε
1− δ(1− pqτ )
δ(1− pqτ )
,
where we will later need that k1 = θc and k2 = θ(pq1π − c), and we need to know about
θ and Z only that if we fix a posterior q and let ∆ get small (holding q constant, so that
the number of revisions following q grows), θ and Z are bounded away from zero. Every
term r and p should also be multiplied by ∆, but we omit these to improve readability.
Now we manipulate to give
(1− δp)(k1∆+ Z)
(1− δp)k2∆+ Z
≥ (1− p)− ε(1− p)
1− δ(1− pqτ )
δ(1− pqτ )
,
δ(1− pq)(1− δp)(k1∆+ Z) ≥ (1− p)(1− pq)δ[(1− δp)k2∆+ Z],
− ε(1− p)(1− δ(1− pq))[(1− δp)k2∆+ Z],
(1− r)(1− pq)(1− (1− r)p)(k1∆+ Z) ≥ (1− p)(1− pq)(1− r)[(1− (1− r)p)k2∆+ Z],
− ε(1− p)(1− (1− r)(1− pq))[(1− (1− r)p)k2∆+ Z],
(1− r)(1− pq)(1− p+ pr)(k1∆+ Z) ≥ (1− p)(1− pq)(1− r)[(1− p+ pr)k2∆+ Z],
− ε(1− p)(r + pq − rpq)[(1− p+ pr)k2∆+ Z].
To evaluate this inequality, we first examine the terms involving ∆0, which give us simply
Z ≥ Z, which obviously holds with equality. Hence, we examine terms involving ∆1,
finding
−r∆− pqZ − pZ + k1∆ ≥ −pZ − pqZ − rZ + k2∆− εrZ − εpqZ.
Hence, we need to show (using the definitions of k1 and k2 to obtain the second inequality)
k1∆ ≥ k2∆− εZ(r + pq),
θc ≥ θ(pq1π − c)− εZ(r + pq),
εZ(r + pq) ≥ θ(pq1π − 2c),











We now note that the left side is constant in ∆, while the right side approaches zero as
does ∆, giving the result.
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A.23 Proof of Lemma 18
For the case of ψ > 2 and ψ > σ, in which there is no delay, this result already follows
from Lemma 15. Lemma 15 also ensures this is the case for beliefs q < q∗ when ψ > 2 and
ψ < σ (delay for high beliefs). It is a straightforward adaptation of Lemma 2, requiring
only a substitution of the appropriate initial conditions, to show that this is the case for
q > q∗∗ when ψ < 2 and ψ > σ (delay for low beliefs). We thus need to consider periods
of delay.
We begin with the following preliminary result. Suppose we have an equilibrium and
a period τ with values vτ−1 > 0 and vτ = 0. We bound the amount of delay we can
introduce between periods τ1 and τ . We fix the continuation behavior prescribed by
this equilibrium, and then introduce delay between periods τ + 1 and τ , with the total
discounting being these periods given by Λδ(∆). We show that as ∆ → 0, Λ approaches
1.
Suppose that ∆ time has passed since the offer was made that caused the belief to be
revised from qτ+1 to qτ . The principal is supposed to wait an additional period of time
equivalent to discount factor Λ, and we have an equilibrium only if the principal does not
find it profitable to “jump” this waiting time.
We consider two cases. Suppose first that sWτ ≥ s
S
τ . We need to formulate the incentive
constraint for qτ . If sτ = s
W
τ , as would be the case if the continuation equilibrium were
the no-delay principal-optimum equilibrium, the incentive constraint is




However, we have chosen the continuation equilibrium to be such that vτ = 0, which may





there is some ε such that




where ε is nonnegative and bounded (for example, by pqτπ − 2c).
Consider what happens if the principal makes an offer sτ + ε. The equilibrium calls
for the agent to reject this offer, conditional on being expected to reject the offer. If the
agent were to accept the offer, it would be profitable for the principal to make it, since the
Markov assumption would then force the continuation of the equilibrium play appropriate
for belief qτ−1, and the principal would have reached this continuation play more quickly
and via a slightly more lucrative offer than the equilibrium prescription. We must allow
ε to be arbitrarily small, and hence must show that the agent must find it at least weakly
profitable to reject sτ if made, given that such a rejection is expected. Hence, it must be
that
c+ Λwτ ≥ pqτπ(1− sτ ) + Λ(1− pqτ )[c+ δwτ−1].
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Using the incentive constraint in the latter, this is
c+ Λwτ ≥ c+ δτ
qτ
qτ−1
wτ−1 − δτ (1− pqτ )wτ−1 + Λ(1− pqτ )c+ Λ(1− pqτ )δτwτ−1] + ε.
Eliminating c from each side, substituting for wτ , and rearranging, this is




. A series of successive rearrangements now gives
Λc[1− (1− p)θτ ] ≥ θτwτ−1[δτ − δτ (1− p) + δτΛ(1− p)− δτΛ] + (1− Λ)ε,
Λcpqτ ≥ θτwτ−1(δτp− δτpΛ) + (1− Λ)ε,













As ∆ → 0, as long as δτ (∆) does not approach zero, the first term on the right side grows
without bound, while the second remains nonnegative. This ensures that Λ converges to
1 as ∆ → 0.
For the second case, suppose that sWτ ≤ s
S
τ . Here, we must ensure that the agent at
least weakly prefers to reject an offer s′′τ , conditional on being expected to reject. It is
then immediate that Λ ≥ δ(∆). The value s′′τ is is by definition a value that makes the
agent just indifferent between accepting and rejecting, given that a rejection is expected
and that there is delay δ(∆) until the next offer. Should the equilibrium strategies, after
the offer that prompted the belief reduction from qτ+1 to qτ and after a waiting time
of length ∆, prescribe further discounting of length exceeding δ(∆), then the agent will
strictly prefer to accept offer s′′τ immediately, which would be profitable for the principal
and hence would disrupt the equilibrium.
This in turn allows us to show the following. Fix a posterior q and consider an
equilibrium in which v(q) = 0. Fix ε > 0 and suppose that continuing with the maximal
no-delay program backward from q gives vq+ε < 0. Then for sufficiently small ∆, there
exists a q′ ∈ (q, q + ε] with vq′ = 0. To show this, number periods so that q occurs at
period 0 and q + ε at period T . We will be interested in the case in which ∆ gets small,
and so T will depend on ∆. The value v at the posterior ϕ(q) will either be positive, in
which case there is no delay between q and ϕ(q) and hence δ0 = δ(∆), or the value v at
posterior ϕ(q) will equal zero, in which case δ0 is set by the need to set v(q) = 0. In either
case, δ0 will remain bounded as ∆ → 0.
Suppose the claim fails and hence the principal’s payoff is positive over the interval














+(δ(∆))T−1Λ1θT θT−1θT−2 · · · θ1c.
But as ∆ gets small, Λ1 → 1, and this agent payoff approaches the agent’s payoff
under the maximal full-effort construction. The latter payoff ensures that the principal
earns a negative payoff at q + ε, a contradiction.
Now consider an interval of beliefs [q′, q′′] over which the canonical Markov equilib-
rium features a zero principal payoff. The preceding result ensures that for any Markov
equilibrium, the set of posteriors at which the principal receives a zero payoff becomes
dense in [q′, q′′] as ∆ gets small. A continuity argument then ensures that all equilibrium
payoffs converge to the limiting payoffs.
B Online Appendix: Comparative Statics, The First-
Best Policy





and hence, the posterior belief that the project is good evolves according to
q̇t = −pqt(1− qt),

























It is immediate from this expression that the first-best policy operates the project longer
when the prior probability q̄ is larger, when (holding p fixed) the benefit-cost ratio pπ/c
is larger, and when (holding pπ/c fixed) the success probability p is smaller.
C Online Appendix: Proofs, Unobservable Effort
C.1 Proof of Lemma 3
C.1.1 The Agent’s Highest No-Delay Payoff
To find the agent’s lowest equilibrium payoff, we first need to solve explicitly for the
agent’s highest payoff wA across Markov equilibria without delay. Let {qτ}
∞
τ−1 be the
sequence of posteriors through which equilibrium beliefs will pass, with qτ−1 = ϕ(qτ ).










for all values of q that are below some value bounded above q (uniformly in ∆). Let us
restrict attention for now to such values. In addition, in the last period (period 1), all the
surplus goes to the agent.
The solution to the sequence of beliefs qτ is given by (39). It is more convenient to
work with the value normalized by the belief, and so we define ωAτ := w
A
τ / (qτc) (where
wAτ := w




1− δ + δβ
+
δβ
1− δ + δβ
ωAτ ,
with ωA1 = B + 1 − Q1β, where B := 2(1 − q)/q, β = 1 − p, and Q1 := (1 − q1)/q1 is
the inverse likelihood ratio in the last period. Because it turns out to be irrelevant for




((β − 2)δ + 1)(δ −B(1− δ)) + β(1− δ)Q1((β − 2)δ + 2)
(δ − 1)((β − 2)δ + 1)((β − 1)δ + 1)τ−1
+
(1− β)δ − (1− δ)−Q1(1− δ)β
τ
(1− δ)((1− β)δ − (1− δ))
.
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C.1.2 The Principal’s Lowest Payoff
The principal’s lowest payoff v (corresponding to the agent’s highest payoff) across all
Markov equilibria without delay, is given by the difference between total surplus and the
agent’s highest payoff. Given that we have already solved for the agent’s payoff, it is more








+ δ(1− p)sτ = B + 1−Q1β
n+1 + δβsτ ,
with s1 = ω
A
1 , as the agent gets all the surplus in the last period. This gives
sτ =
βτ [Q1(βδ − 1)− δ
τ (Q1(β − 2)δ +Q1 − δ + 1)] + (2Q1 + 1)(1− δ)
(1− δ)(1− βδ)
.
Section A.21.2 establishes that the principal’s payoff in any equilibrium, Markov or not,
must be at least the resulting payoff v.
C.1.3 The Agent’s Lowest Payoff
We now turn to the lowest payoff of the agent. Let us write w for what we will call the
interim value of the agent’s payoff, that is, the agent’s payoff given that the mandatory
waiting time ∆ since the last offer has passed, but before any additional, discretionary
delay (if any) has occurred. This discretionary delay cannot drive the principal’s payoff
below v. Accordingly, we peg the principal’s interim value to v. Working with the interim
values gives a lower bound to the principal’s ex post payoff, i.e., her payoff after delay,
so the principal also gets at least her lower bound at the point where she makes the offer
(and receives a higher payoff when on the verge of making an offer if there is additional
delay and v > 0). This lower bound will be tight, since the principal’s payoff is v after the
mandatory waiting period ∆ since the last offer has passed, and the principal has reached
the first point at which she can act.
We capture the possibility of discretionary delay by introducing a variable Λ(q) ≤ 1,
representing the additional discounting caused by such delay. We have Λ(q) = 1 if there
is no discretionary delay, and otherwise Λ(q) < 1, in order to capture the reduction in

















where q̃ = ϕ(q) is the posterior belief, as well as
v(q) = Λ(q)
(












which can be solved for Λ(q). Hence, plugging back into the recursion for w,
w(q) =
v(q)










This is a discrete-time Riccati equation that converges pointwise to the continuous-time
Riccati equation (19) of Section 3.2.1. The same Riccati equation obtains if we work
with the principal’s best Markov equilibrium without delay: the choice is irrelevant to the
evolution of this lowest payoff, but it is key to the boundary condition that determines the
solution to this Riccati equation. Because this boundary condition is at q, our restriction
to low beliefs (necessary to assert that the lower bound on the principal’s equilibrium
payoffs, wA, is actually an equilibrium payoff, as shown in Section A.21.2), is innocuous.
To complete the argument, we must show that the boundary condition at q selects
the lower of the two solutions identified Section 3.2.1. This requires a fine analysis of the
game with ∆ > 0. To this end, let us define ω(q) := w and (q)/(cq), ν(q) := v(q)/(cq)
(and also ντ , ωτ for q = qτ ). Rearranging the Riccati equation, we get
ωτ+1ωτ −








ντ+1 = 0. (68)
We now must insert our explicit solution for ντ , given our formulas for sτ and ω
A
τ , namely,
ντ = sτ − ω
A
τ . Further, let a
∆
τ := ωτ∆/(qτ − q1), τ > 1. Note that, given τ , this is a
measure of the slope of ω at q1 → q. Inserting (a


















δpqτ+1(qn − q1)(qτ+1 − q1)
= 0.















a∆τ = a∞ :=





Given the definition of ωτ , this implies that wτ∆/(qτ − q1) converges precisely to w
′(q),
as given in Section 3.2.1, which was to be shown. For reference, if we compute the same
limit for aA,∆τ := lim∆→0w
A












and we note that a∞ < a
A
∞, i.e. we have created some “slack” between our new lower
bound and the Markov equilibrium payoff (note that Q1 > 2 so Q1 − 1 > 0). One can
check that the same limit obtains with the Markov payoff (independently of the initial
condition ω1, ν1), i.e. a
M
∞ = limτ→0 lim∆→0 ωτ∆/(qτ − q1) = a
A
∞: that is, the averages of
the agent’s canonical (or highest) Markov payoff select the solution wM to the Riccati
equation in the continuous-time limit, as should be expected.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Given w(q), we would like to characterize the value of v(q) that maximizes the prin-
cipal’s payoff among the set of equilibrium payoffs that give the agent w(q). We simplify
the argument by assuming the players have access to a public randomization device, de-
scribing at the end of the proof the modifications required if no such device is available.
We make critical use of the fact that we have a “worst equilibrium” that simultaneously
delivers the worst possible equilibrium payoffs to both the principal and the agent.
Fix a value q. Let (w(q), v(q)) denote the worst equilibrium payoffs given q. Let Ẽ be
the set of payoffs corresponding to equilibria in which there is no initial delay, i.e., in which
the principal immediately makes a serious offer. Then the set of equilibrium payoffs E(q)
is given by that part of the convex hull of (0, 0) and Ẽ(q) in which the principal receives
payoff at least v(q).34
Fix an equilibrium w(q) and let ṽ(q) be the largest principal payoff consistent with an
equilibrium in which the agent receives w(q). We argue that payoffs (w(q), ṽ(q)) can be
achieved as a convex combination of the worst equilibrium and an equilibrium in Ẽ . If
(w(q), ṽ(q)) is itself in Ẽ , the result is immediate, as it is if (w(q), ṽ(q)) is not contained in
Ẽ but the line passing through (w(q), v(q)) and (w(q), ṽ(q)) intersects Ẽ .35 Now suppose
34Any equilibrium outcome must consist of a (possibly null) initial delay followed by an offer. The
resulting payoff is then a convex combination of the continuation payoff following the offer, which lies
in Ẽ , and (0, 0). To be an equilibrium outcome, the principal must obviously receive a payoff of at least
v(q). In addition, the principal must find it optimal to endure the initial delay rather than make an
earlier offer. As long as the equilibrium payoff is at least v(q), we can construct an equilibrium in which
an earlier offer triggers an immediate switch to a continuation equilibrium with payoff v(q), giving the
result.
35Notice that (w(q), v(q)) is weakly smaller than any element of E , and since E is a collection of convex
combinations of (0, 0) and points in the convex set Ẽ , the payoff (w(q), ṽ(q)) must lie between (w(q), v(q))
and some point in Ẽ , on the line containing the latter.
C-75
that the line passing through (w(q), v(q)) and (w(q), ṽ(q)) does not intersect Ẽ . The
point (w(q), ṽ(q)) is itself a convex combination of (0, 0) and a point (w′(q), v′(q)) in Ẽ .
If (w′(q), v′(q)) lies above the (non-negatively sloped) line passing through (w(q), v(q))
and (w(q), ṽ(q)), then there is a convex combination of (w(q), v(q)) and (w′(q), v′(q)) that
gives the agent payoff w(q) and the principal a payoff exceeding ṽ(q), a contradiction to
the hypothesis that ṽ(q) is the highest principal payoff consistent with an equilibrium
in which the agent receives w(q). If (w′(q), v′(q)) lies below the line passing through
(w(q), v(q)) and (w(q), ṽ(q)) (or to the right, if the latter is vertical), then the convex
combination of (0, 0) and (w′(q), v′(q)) that gives the principal payoff v(q) gives the agent
a payoff smaller than w(q), a contradiction to the hypothesis that (w(q), v(q)) is the worst
equilibrium payoff.
Any equilibrium payoff can thus be generated as a mixture between the worst equi-
librium and a continuation equilibrium with no delay. (In many cases, the weight on the
latter equilibrium will be one.) Hence, we can restrict attention to equilibria generated
by sequences (x(q), s(q)), where, given posterior q, the worst equilibrium (given the cur-
rent posterior) is played with probability 1−x(q) (determined by a public randomization
device); and if not, a share s(q) is offered in that period that induces the agent to work.
C.2.1 A Preliminary Inequality
We fix a posterior probability and let w(q) and v(q) be equilibrium values, with w(q)
and v(q) being the values of the worst equilibrium given that posterior. Now, let ζ be




Our first step is to place an upper bound on ζ .
We first argue that these exists a bound on v(q)−v(q)
w(q)−w(q)
. Let s(q) = w(q) + v(q) be the
total surplus generated to the equilibrium. To begin, we consider the case in which the







which suffices to bound v(q)/w(q). The bound on s(q)/w(q) follows from noting that
surplus is generated only if the agent exerts effort. Any exertion of effort on the part of
the agent creates a discounted surplus of (pqπ − c)∆, where the discounting reflects the
delay until the effort is exerted and the probability that the interaction may terminate
before reaching such effort. Of this surplus, at least c∆ must go to the agent, since
otherwise the agent’s incentive constraint is surely violated. The ratio s(q)/w(q) can then
never exceed (pπ − c)/c.
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Now suppose the worst equilibrium payoff is not (0, 0). The preceding argument







Suppose this is not the case. Then the line connecting (w(q), v(q)) with (0, 0) passes
above (w(q), v(q)). This ensures that there exists a convex combination of (w(q), v(q))
and (0, 0) that provides payoff v(q) to the principal and a payoff lower than w(q) to the
agent, contradicting the hypothesis that (w(q), v(q)) is the lowest equilibrium payoff.
We now seek an upper bound on the bound ζ . Fix a posterior q. We first note that
v(q) = x(q) [(pqsπ − c)∆ + δ(∆)(1− pq∆)[x(ϕ(q))v(ϕ(q)) + (1− x(ϕ(q)))v(ϕ(q))]]
+ (1− x(q))v(q),
w(q) = x(q) [pq(1− s)π∆+ δ(∆)(1− pq∆)[x(ϕ(q))w(ϕ(q)) + (1− x(ϕ(q)))w(ϕ(q))]]
+ (1− x(q))w(q)
≥ x(q) [c∆+ δ(∆)[x(ϕ(q))θw(ϕ(q)) + (1− x(ϕ(q)))θw(ϕ(q))]] + (1− x(q))w(q),
where ϕ(q) is the posterior belief obtained from q given a failure (cf. (31)). The inequality








and hence is the ratio of the current posterior to next period’s posterior, given a failure.
We have used here the fact that the continuation values, relevant for posterior ϕ(q), can
be written as convex combinations of equilibrium payoffs (w(ϕ(q)), v(ϕ(q))) and the worst
equilibrium payoffs (w(ϕ(q)), v(ϕ(q))). Note that in writing this convex combination, we
take w(ϕ(q)) and v(ϕ(q)) to be the interim values, i.e., values at the point at which the
posterior is ϕ(q) and precisely ∆ time has elapsed since the previous offer. The equilibrium
generating these values may yet entail some delay.
Let us simplify the notation by letting x(q) = x, v(q) = v, w(q) = w, v(q) = v,
w(q) = w, x(ϕ(q)) = x̃, v(ϕ(q)) = ṽ, w(ϕ(q)) = w̃, v(ϕ(q)) = ṽ, and w(ϕ(q)) = w̃, and
let us drop the explicit representation of ∆. Setting an equality in the agent’s incentive
constraint and rearranging gives
pqsπ = (pqπ − c) + δ(1− pq)[x̃w̃ + (1− x̃)w̃]− δ[x̃θw̃ + (1− x̃)θw̃].
Using this to eliminate the variable s from the value functions gives
v − v = x [(pqπ − 2c) + δ(1− pq)[x̃w̃ + (1− x̃)w̃]− δ[x̃θw̃ + (1− x̃)θw̃]
+ δ(1− pq)[x̃ṽ + (1− x̃)ṽ]− v] , (69)
w − w = x [c+ δ[x̃θw̃ + (1− x̃)θw̃]− w] . (70)
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(pqπ − 2c) + [δ(1− pq)− δθ]x̃[w̃ − w̃] + [δ(1− pq)− δθ]w̃
c+ δθ[x̃(w̃ − w̃) + w̃]− w
+
δ(1− pq)x̃(ṽ − ṽ) + δ(1− pq)[ṽ − v]
c+ δθ[x̃(w̃ − w̃) + w̃]− w
.
Using the fact that ṽ− ṽ ≤ ζ(w̃− w̃), we can substitute and rearrange to obtain an upper
bound on ζ , or
ζ ≤
(pqπ − 2c) + (δ(1− pq)− δθ)(w̃ − w̃) + (δ(1− pq)− δθ)w̃ + δ(1− pq)ṽ − v
c+ δθx̃(w̃ − w̃) + δθw̃ − w − [δ(1− pq)x̃](w̃ − w̃)
.
We obtain an upper bound on the right side by setting w̃ − w̃ = 0, obtaining
ζ ≤
(pqπ − 2c) + (δ(1− pq)− δθ)w̃ + δ(1− pq)ṽ − v
c+ δθw̃ − w
.
C.2.2 Front-Loading Effort
We now show that it is impossible for x and x̃ to both be interior. Suppose they are.
Then we consider an increase in x and an accompanying decrease in x̃, effectively moving
effort forward. We keep w constant in the process, and show that the result is to increase
v, a contradiction.








+ δxθ(w̃ − w̃),





















(v − v) + δx ((1− pq − θ)[w̃ − w̃]− (1− pq)[ṽ − ṽ]) .
It concludes the argument to show that this derivative is negative. Multiplying by w−w,
the requisite inequality is
(w − w) ((1− pq − θ)(w̃ − w̃) + (1− pq)(ṽ − ṽ))− (w̃ − w̃)(v − v)θ < 0.
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Substituting for v− v and w−w from (69)–(70) and dropping the common factor x, this
is
[(1− pq − θ)(w̃ − w̃) + (1− pq)(ṽ − ṽ)] (c+ δ(x̃θw̃ + (1− x̃)θw̃)− w)
< (w̃ − w̃)θ [(1− δ)(pπ − 2c) + δ(1− pq − θ)[x̃w̃ + (1− x̃)w̃]
+ δ(1− pq)(x̃ṽ + (1− x̃)ṽ)− v] .
We can then note that the terms involving x̃ cancel, at which point the expression sim-
plifies to




(pπ − 2c) + (δ(1− pq)− δθ)w̃ + δ(1− pq)ṽ − v
c+ δθw̃ − w
,
for which, using the definition of ζ , it suffices that (1 − p − θ) + (1 − p)ζ < θζ , which is
immediate.
An implication of this result is that x(q) is interior for at most one value of q. This in
turn implies that the public randomization device is required only for one value of q. If
no public randomization device is available, we can construct an equilibrium in which no
values of x(q) are interior that approximates the equilibrium examined here. As ∆ → 0,
the public randomization device becomes unimportant and the approximation becomes
arbitrarily sharp.
D Online Appendix: Proofs, Observable Effort
D.1 Proof of Proposition 4
We fix ∆ > 0, and then suppress the notation for ∆, writing simply δ for δ(∆) = e−r∆.
To capture the effects of delay, we write δΛ(q) for the effective discounting that elapses
before the principal makes an offer at belief q. If the principal undertakes no delay, making
the offer as soon as ∆ length of time has passed since the previous offer, then Λ(q) = 1.
Delay gives rise to values of Λ(q) < 1.
We start with the Markov equilibria. As in Bergemann and Hege [2], these raise no
issue of existence with observable effort. The usual arguments yield that the agent is
either offered no contract, or works on the equilibrium path whenever offered a contract,
in which case he is indifferent between doing so or not. We use the same notation as for
the unobservable case: v is the principal’s payoff, w is the agent’s, s is the share, and so
on. So the agent’s payoff satisfies
w(q) = pqπ(1− s) + δΛ(ϕ(q))(1− pq)w(ϕ(q)) = c + δΛ(q)w(q), (72)
while the principal’s payoff solves
v(q) = pqπs− c + δΛ(ϕ(q))(1− pq)v(ϕ(q)). (73)
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If the project is terminated after one more failure, the values are
w(q) = pqπ(1− s) = c+ δΛ(q)w(q), v(q) = pqπs− c, (74)
and so, because the principal is only willing to delay if her payoff is zero, in the last period,
combining the equations in (74), either













, while the second requires Λ(q) ≥ 0 i.e.
q ≥ 2c/(pπ) —a lower threshold. It thus follows that the equilibrium is such that no offer
is made for q ≤ q := 2c/(pπ), and delay for beliefs q above, but sufficiently close to, q.
We shall argue that, at least along any equilibrium path, there is first no delay, and









a sequence of beliefs such that, given qτ , the effort of an agent takes us to belief qτ−1 (note
that q0 = q). Let Iτ := [qτ , qτ+1). Fix a Markov equilibrium, and define q̂ := inf{q|v(q) >
0} (set q̂ = 1 if there is no q ≤ 1 for which v(q) > 0) and define τ̂ such that q̂ ∈ Iτ̂ . We
know that q̂ > q. We have, for τ = 0,
w(q) = pqπ − c,
and, from (72), for τ = 1, . . . , τ̂ − 1, q ∈ Iτ , q̃ = ϕ(q),




= pq(π + c)− 2c+ (1− pq)w(q̃), (76)
where the first equality uses w(q̃) = c+ δΛ(q̃)w(q̃) to solve for Λ(q̃). The solution to this
difference equation is
w(q) = π + c−
2q0c+ (1− p)
τ (p (1− pq0)π + 2c (p (τ + 1)− (τp + 1) q0))
p ((1− q0) (1− p)
τ + q0)
. (77)
Taking derivatives, w′ (q) is positively proportional to




pπ + 2c ((τ + 1) p− 1) .
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Because this expression is independent of q, it means, in particular, that the sign of w is
constant over each interval Iτ . To evaluate its sign, note that




+ p2 (1− p)τ+1 π > 0,
so that, if w is increasing on Iτ , it is also increasing on Iτ+1. Because it is increasing on
I0, it is increasing on each interval.
Consider now some q̆ arbitrarily close to q̂ such that v(q̆) > 0. Then Λ(q̆) = 1, and
so w(q̆) = c/(1 − δ). Note that, because v(q̃) = 0, we can write, for all for all beliefs
q ∈ Iτ̂ ∩ [q̆, 1], using (73) first, and then (72),
v(q) = pqπ − c− pq(1− s)π = pqπ − c+ δ(1− pq)Λ(q̃)w(q̃)− w(q).
The term pqπ−c+δ(1−pq)Λ(q̃)w(q̃) must be increasing in q: it is precisely the definition
of w(q) in the sequence studied above.36 The last term, −w(q), is minimized at q̆, since
it equals −c/(1 − δ) there. Therefore, v must be also strictly positive for all beliefs
q ∈ Iτ̂ ∩ [q̆, 1], and both v, w must be continuous at q̂. This means that (τ̂ , q̂) are such




= pq̂π − 2c+ pq̂c + (1− pq̂)w(q̃),
and so, since w(q̃) < c/(1− δ), δpq̂c < (1− δ)(pq̂π − 2c), or equivalently
((1− δ)pπ − δpc)q̂ > 2(1− δ)c,
which implies that, at the very least, pπ− δpc/(1− δ) > 0 (from which it is apparent that
the existence of such a q̂ < 1 only holds for some parameters). Consider now the belief q











Because, as we have seen, pπ − δpc/(1− δ) > 0, the term pqπ − 2c− δpqc
1−δ
is increasing in
q, and since it is non-negative at q̂, it is strictly positive at q. Therefore, v(q) > 0, and it
is clear that there cannot be delay at q, because Λ(q) < 1 would imply a higher value of
s(q), and thus v(q) would still be strictly positive. Indeed, this argument applies to any q
for which q̃ ≥ q̂ and w(q̃) = c/(1− δ). This implies that, for any sequence of beliefs that
can be obtained from Bayes’ rule after strings of failures, the equilibrium must be such
that v is first strictly positive (when the belief is high enough, and the prior might not be
enough to begin with), after which v = 0 and there is delay until the belief drops below
q at which point the project is abandoned.
36Of course, this is not the value of the agent at q, since now Λ = 1.
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This does not, however, imply that v(q) = 0 if and only if q < q̂. The discreteness of
the problem does not rule out multiple solutions to (77). It remains to show that all such
solutions converge to the same belief as period length shrinks. Replace p, c, 1− δ by p∆,
c∆ and r∆ respectively, and let κ = τ∆. Taking limits in (77), we obtain that the value
of κ for which Λ (q) = 1, i.e. w(q) = c/(1− δ), solves







so all solutions q̂ converge to the same solution q∗ as ∆ → 0. Taking the same limits in















where W−1 is the negative branch of the Lambert function (the positive branch only
admits a solution to the equation that is below q). Then q∗ < 1 if and only if ξ > 1 + σ.





D.2 Proof of Proposition 5







which is automatically satisfied as ∆ → 0, since the left side is approximately r∆, while
the right side converges to the positive constant 1/(1 + ψ).
We start by arguing that equilibria in which the principal makes zero profits exist
for every q < 1. If such an equilibrium exists, then there is a “full-stop” equilibrium in
which the project is terminated at this belief, i.e. the principal offers no contract, with
the threat that doing otherwise would lead to reversion to the equilibrium in which the
principal makes zero profits. Let q̃ denote the infimum over values of q for which such an
equilibrium does not exist. From the analysis of Markov equilibria, we know that q̃ > q.
Consider some q above q̃ for which it does not exist, and such that a failure leads to a
belief strictly below q̃. That is, we can specify that the game terminates after a failure. To
D-82
see whether there exists an equilibrium in which the principal makes zero profits starting





which follows from our assumption on δ. This is the desired contradiction: a full-stop
equilibrium exists for all values of q.
The best equilibrium for the principal, then, obtains if cheating by the agent is threat-
ened by termination. Setting Λ(q) = 1 is then optimal, unless it is best to terminate the
project. The agent prefers to work at the last stage (and thus, at all stages) if and only if
pqπ(1− s) ≥ c,
so that the seller’s payoff at the last stage is




and so the project is terminated as soon as the posterior belief drops below q = 2c/(pπ).
More generally, the values are obtained from solving
w(q) = pq(1− s)π + δ(1− pq)w(ϕ(q)) = c, v(q) = pqsπ − c+ δ(1− pq)v(ϕ(q)),










except when q ∈ I0, when v(q) = pqπ − 2c, and so it is optimal to terminate as soon as
the belief drops below q. Equation (79) is straightforward to solve explicitly, and taking
limits gives the value given by (30).
E Online Appendix: Derivations and Proofs, Good Projects
This appendix examines the case in which the project is known to be good (q = 1).
We fix ∆ > 0, but omit ∆ from the notation whenever we can do so without confusion.
E.1 The First-Best Policy
The value of conducting an experiment is given by











The first-best strategy thus either never conducts any experiments, or relentlessly conducts
experiments until a success is realized, depending on whether p < c/π or p > c/π.
E.2 Stationary No-Delay Equilibrium: Impatient Projects
We first investigate Markov equilibria. We begin with a candidate equilibrium in which
the principal extends funding at every opportunity, and the agent exerts effort in each
case. If the principal offers share s, she receives an expected payoff in each period of
pπs− c.
The agent’s payoff solves, by the principle of optimality,










Such an equilibrium will exist if and only if the principal finds it optimal to fund the








Combining and rearranging, this is equivalent to
p ·min{(1− δ)πs, (1− δ)π(1− s)− δc} ≥ (1− δ)c.
There is some value of s ∈ [0, 1] rendering the second term in the minimum positive, a
necessary condition for the agent to work, only if (1 − δ)π > δc. If this is the case, then
since the arguments of the minimum vary in opposite directions with respect to s, the
lowest value of p or lowest ratio π/c for which such an equilibrium exists is attained when





















which implies (1−δ)π > δc. Hence, necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
a full-effort stationary equilibrium are that the players be sufficiently impatient to satisfy
(83). Taking the limit as ∆ → 0, the constraint given by (83) becomes
ψ > σ, (84)
which we have deemed impatient projects.
The principal will choose s to make the agent indifferent between working and shirking,
giving equality of the two terms in (81) and hence an agent payoff of W ∗ = c/(1−δ). This
is expected—by always shirking, the agent can secure a payoff of c. In a Markov equilib-
rium, this must also be his unique equilibrium payoff, since the principal has no incentive
to offer him more than the minimal share that induces him to work (the continuation play
being independent of current behavior).
The total surplus S of the project satisfies











(1− δ)(pπ − 2c)− δpc
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
=: V ∗,
which, in the limit as ∆ → 0, is positive if and only if ψ > σ.
E.3 Markov Equilibria for Other Parameters
E.3.1 Patient Projects: Delay
It is straightforward that there is no equilibrium with experimentation if pπ− 2c < 0.













or, in the limit as ∆ → 0,
0 < ψ < σ,
giving a patient project.
We now have an equilibrium with delay. The principal waits ∆Ψ time between offers,
with Ψ ≥ 1. The agent exerts effort at each opportunity, but is indifferent between doing
so and shirking, and so his payoff is ∆(c+ δ(∆Ψ)c+ δ(∆Ψ)2c+ · · · = c∆
1−δ(∆Ψ)
.37
37More formally, the agent’s strategy specifies that he works if and only if s ≥ c/(pπ).
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The principal is indifferent in each period between offering the contract s < 1 and
delaying such an offer, and so it must be that she just breaks even: psπ = c. On the other




































, and increases without bound as ψ
approaches zero.





We now have completed the characterization of Markov equilibria, yielding payoffs
that are summarized in Figure 5.
E.4 Non-Markov Equilibria
We now extend our analysis to a characterization of all equilibria. We first find equilib-
ria with stationary outcomes backed up by the threat of out-of-equilibrium punishments,
and then use these to construct a family of equilibria with nonstationary outcomes.
Our first step is the following lemma, proved in Appendix E.5.1.










. Section E.2 established that there then exists a Markov
equilibrium in which the agent always works on the equilibrium path, with payoffs





(1− δ)(pπ − 2c)− δpc
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
)
.
It is immediate that V ∗ puts a lower bound on the principal’s payoff in any equilibrium.






















Figure 5: Payoffs from the Markov equilibrium of a project known to be good (q = 1), as
a function of the “benefit-cost” ratio π/c, fixing c (so that we can identify c on the vertical
axis). Both players obviously earn zero in the null equilibrium of an unprofitable project.
The principal’s payoff is fixed at zero for patient projects, while the agent’s increases as
does π. The agent’s payoff is fixed at c∆/(1 − δ(∆)) for impatient projects, while the
principal’s payoff increases in π.
the agent to work, since it does so when the agent expects his maximum continuation
payoff of W ∗ (cf. Lemma 19), and hence when it is hardest to motivate the agent. By
continually offering this share, the principal can then be assured of payoff V ∗.
We begin our search for additional equilibrium payoffs by constructing a family of
potential equilibria with stationary equilibrium paths. We assume that after making an
offer, the principal waits a length of time ∆Ψ until making the next offer, where Ψ ≥ 1.
Why doesn’t the principal make an offer to the agent as soon as possible? Doing so
prompts an immediate switch to the full-effort equilibrium with payoffs (W ∗, V ∗) (with
the agent shirking unless offered a share at least as large as in the full-effort equilibrium).
We will then have an equilibrium as long as the principal’s payoff exceeds V ∗/δ((Ψ−1)∆),
ensuring that the principal would rather wait an additional length of time (Ψ − 1)∆ to
continue along the equilibrium path, rather than switch immediately to the full-effort
equilibrium.
The agent is indifferent between working and shirking, whenever offered a nontrivial
contract, and so his payoff is c∆ + δ(∆Ψ)c∆ + · · · = c∆
1−δ(∆Ψ)
. Using this continuation
value, the agent’s incentive constraint is













Using this for the second equality, the principal’s value is then
V = (psπ − c)∆ + δ(∆Ψ)(1− p)V





(1− δ(∆Ψ))(pπ − 2c)∆− δ(∆Ψ)pc∆2
(1− δ(∆Ψ))(1− δ(∆Ψ)(1− p∆))
.
This gives us a value for the principal that equals V ∗ when Ψ = 1, in which case we
have simply duplicated the stationary full-effort equilibrium. However, these strategies
may give equilibria with a higher payoff to the principal, and a lower payoff to the agent,
when Ψ > 1. In particular, as we increase Ψ, we decrease both the total surplus and the
rent that the agent can guarantee by shirking. This implies that the principal might be
better off slowing down the project from Ψ = 1, if the cost of the rent is large relative
to the profitability of the project, i.e., if π/c is relatively low. Indeed, this returns us
to the intuition behind the existence of Markov equilibria with delay for low-discount
projects, where π/c is too low for the existence of an equilibrium with Ψ = 1: by slowing
down the project, the cost of providing incentives to the agent is decreased, and hence
the principal’s payoff might increase.38
Let V (Ψ) denote the principal’s payoff as a function of Ψ. We have limΨ→∞ V (Ψ) = 0,
giving the expected result that there is no payoff when no effort is invested. Are there
any values for which V (Ψ) > V (1)? The function V (·) is concave, and the function
V (Ψ) = V (1) admits a unique root Ψ† > 1 if its derivative at 1 is positive. It is most
convenient to examine the limiting case in which ∆ → 0, allowing us to write
V =
rΨ(pπ − 2c)− pc
rΨ(rΨ+ p)
and then to note that the resulting derivative in Ψ has numerator equal to
rΨ(rΨ+ p)(pπ − 2c)− [rΨ(pπ − 2c)− pc](2r2Ψ+ rp).
Taking Ψ = 1, this is positive if
r(r + p)(pπ − 2c) > [r(pπ − 2c)](2r + p),
38We were considering Markov equilibria when examining patient projects, and hence the optimality
of delay required that the principal be indifferent between offering a contract and not offering one, which
in turn implied that the principal’s payoff was fixed at zero. Here, we are using the nonstationary threat
of a punishment to payoff V ∗ to enforce the delay, and hence the principal need not be indifferent and




























), then V (Ψ) < V ∗ for all Ψ > 1. Therefore, our search for
non-Markov equilibria has not yet turned up any additional equilibria. Indeed, Lemma















), then as the delay factor Ψ rises above unity,
the principal’s payoff initially increases. We have then potentially constructed an entire
family of stationary-outcome equilibria, one for each value Ψ ∈ [1,Ψ†] (recalling again
that V is concave).39 These nonstationary (but stationary-outcome) equilibria give the
agent a payoff less than W ∗ = c/(1− δ) and the principal a payoff larger than V ∗.
The following lemma, proven in Appendix E.5.2, states that these equilibria yield the
lowest equilibrium payoff to the agent.
Lemma 20
















then the lowest equilibrium payoff W to the agent is given by W ∗ = c
1−δ
. Hence, there is
then a unique equilibrium with payoffs (W ∗, V ∗).




























In the latter case, the limit of the equilibria giving the agent his lowest equilibrium
payoff, as ∆ → 0, sets Ψ = Ψ† and gives the principal payoff V ∗, and so gives both players
their lowest equilibrium payoff. To summarize these relationships, it is convenient let
(W (Ψ†), V ∗) = (W (Ψ†), V (Ψ†)) := (W,V ).
We have now established (W ∗, V ∗) as the unique equilibrium payoffs for very impatient
projects. For moderately impatient projects, we have bounded the principal’s payoff below
by V and bounded the agent’s payoff below by W and above by W ∗.
39We have an equilibrium for each Ψ ∈ [1,Ψ†] satisfying the incentive constraint δ(Ψ−1)∆V (Ψ) ≥ V ∗.
As ∆ → 0, the set of such z converges to the entire interval [1,Ψ†].
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To characterize the complete set of equilibrium payoffs for moderately impatient
projects, we must consider equilibria with nonstationary outcomes. Appendix E.5.3 es-
tablishes the following technical lemma:















and let (W,V )










The geometric interpretation of this lemma is immediate: the ratio of the principal’s
to the agent’s payoff is maximized by the limiting worst payoffs (W,V ).
Any equilibrium payoff can be achieved by an equilibrium in which, in the first period,
the equilibrium delivering the worst equilibrium payoff to the agent is played with some
probability 1 − x0, and an extremal equilibrium (i.e, an equilibrium with payoffs on the
boundary of the set of equilibrium payoffs) is played with probability x0.
40 If the former
equilibrium is chosen, subsequent play continues with that equilibrium. If the latter
equilibrium is chosen, then the next period again features a randomization attaching
probability 1− x1 to an equilibrium featuring the worst possible payoff to the agent and
attaching probability x1 to an extremal equilibrium. Continuing in this way, we can
characterize an equilibrium giving payoffs (W0, V0) as a sequence {xt, (Wt, Vt)}
∞
t=0, where
xt is the probability that an equilibrium with the extremal payoffs (Wt, Vt) is chosen in
period t, conditional on no previous mixture having chosen the equilibrium with the worst
equilibrium payoffs to the agent.
Given W , consider the supremum over values of V among equilibrium payoffs, and
say that the resulting payoff (W,V ) is on the frontier of the equilibrium payoff set. Our
goal is to characterize this frontier. If (W0, V0) is on the frontier, it sacrifices no gener-
ality to assume that in each of the equilibria yielding payoffs (Wt, Vt) (in the sequence
{xt, (Wt, Vt)}
∞
t=0), the principal offers a contract to the agent without delay.
41 In addition,
we can assume that each such equilibrium calls for the principal to offer some share st
40Because the set of equilibrium payoffs is bounded and convex, any equilibrium payoff can be written
as a convex combination of two extreme payoffs. One of these extreme payoffs can be chosen freely, and
hence can be taken to feature the worst equilibrium payoff.
41If the principal delays, we can view the resulting equilibrium payoff as a convex combination of
two payoffs, one (denoted by (W ′t , V
′
t )) corresponding to the case in which a contract is offered and one
corresponding to offering no contract. But the latter is an interior payoff of the form (δ(W ′′t , V
′′
t )), given
by δ times the accompanying continuation payoff (W ′′t , V
′′
t ). We can then replace (Wt, Vt) by a convex
combination of (W ′t , V
′




t ), to obtain a payoff of the form (Wt, V
†
t ), with V
†
t > Vt. Because
Wt is unchanged, none of the incentives in previous periods are altered ensuring that we still have an
equilibrium. Because the principal’s payoff Vt has increased, so has V0, contradicting the supposition
that the latter was on the payoff frontier.
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to the agent that induces the agent to work.42 Using Lemma 21, Appendix E.5.4 proves
the following, completing our characterization of the equilibrium frontier in the case of
an impatient project:
Lemma 22 In an equilibrium whose payoff is on the frontier of the equilibrium payoff set,
it cannot be that both xt ∈ (0, 1) and xt+1 ∈ (0, 1). More precisely, xt is weakly decreasing
in t, and there is at most one value of t for which xt is in (0, 1).
This lemma tells us that the equilibria on the frontier can be described as follows:
for some T ∈ N ∪ {∞} periods, the project is funded without delay by the principal,
and the agent exerts effort, being indifferent between doing so or not. From period T
onward, an equilibrium giving the agent his worst payoff is played. We have already seen
the two extreme points of this family: if T = ∞, there is never any delay, resulting in
the payoff pair (W ∗, V ∗). If T = 0, the worst equilibrium is obtained. For very impatient
projects, all these equilibria are equivalent (since the no-delay equilibrium is then the
worst equilibrium), and only the payoff vector (W ∗, V ∗) is obtained. For moderately
impatient projects, however, this defines a sequence of points (one for each possible value
of T ), the convex hull of which defines the set of all equilibrium payoffs. Any payoff in
this set can be achieved by an equilibrium that randomizes in the initial period between
the worst equilibrium, and an equilibrium on the frontier.
This result in turn leads to a concise characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs,
in the limit as ∆ → 0. In particular, as ∆ → 0, the set of equilibrium payoffs converges
to a set bounded below by the line segment connecting the payoffs (W,V ) and (W ∗, V ) =
(W ∗, V ∗), and bounded above by a payoff frontier characterized by Lemma 22. This set
of payoffs is illustrated in the two right panels of Figure 6. An analytical determination
of the set of equilibrium payoffs is provided in Section E.4.3, for the convenient case in
which the length of a time period ∆ is arbitrarily small.
E.4.2 Patient Projects













The Markov equilibria in this region involve a zero payoff for the principal. This means, in
particular, that we can construct an equilibrium in which both players’ payoff is zero: on
the equilibrium path, the principal makes no offer to the agent; if she ever deviates, both
42Should the principal be called upon to offer a contract that induces the agent to shirk, it is a straight-
forward calculation that it increases the principal’s payoff, while holding that of the agent constant, to
increase the share st just enough to make the agent indifferent between working and shirking, and to
have the agent work, again ensuring that (W,V ) is not extreme.
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players play the stationary equilibrium from that point on, which for those parameters
also yields zero profit to the principal. Since this equilibrium gives both players a payoff
of zero, it is trivially the worst equilibrium.
Lemma 22 is valid here as well,43 and so the equilibrium payoffs on the frontier are
again obtained by considering the strategy profiles indexed by some integer T such that
the project is funded for the first T periods, and effort is exerted (the agent being in-
different doing so), after which the worst equilibrium is played. Unlike in the case of an
impatient project, we now have a constraint on T . In particular, as T → ∞, the value
to the principal of this strategy profile becomes negative. Since the value must remain
nonnegative in equilibrium, this defines an upper bound on the values of T that are con-
sistent with equilibrium. While the sequence of such payoffs can be easily computed, and
the upper bound implicitly defined, the analysis is once again crisper when we consider
the continuous-time limit ∆ → 0, as in Section E.4.3. The set of equilibrium payoffs is
illustrated on the second panel of Figure 6.
E.4.3 Characterization of Equilibrium Payoffs
Sections E.4.1–E.4.2 characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs. However, this charac-
terization is not easy to use, as the difference equations describing the boundaries of the
equilibrium payoff set are rather unwieldy. We consider here the limit of these difference
equations, and hence of the payoff set, as we let the length ∆ of a period tend to 0.
Given an equilibrium in which there is no delay the agent invariably exerts effort, the
value Vt at time t to the principal solves (up to terms of order ∆
2 or higher)
Vt = pπst∆− c∆+ (1− (r + p)∆)(Vt + V̇t∆),
or, in the limit as ∆ → 0,
0 = pπst − c− (r + p)v(t) + v̇(t), (85)
where st is the share to the principal in case of success, and v̇ is the time derivative of v
(whose differentiability is easy to derive from the difference equations). Similarly, if the
agent is indifferent between exerting effort or not, we must have (up to terms of order ∆2
or higher)
Wt = pπ(1− st)∆ + (1− (r + p)∆)(Wt + Ẇt∆) = c∆+ (1− r∆)(Wt + Ẇt∆),
where Wt is the agent’s continuation payoff from time t onwards. In the limit as ∆ → 0,
this gives
0 = pπ(1− st)− (r + p)wt + ẇt = c− rw(t) + ẇt. (86)
43In this range of parameters, W = V = 0, and upon inserting these values, the proof of Lemma 22






We may use these formulae to obtain closed-forms in the limit for the boundaries of the
payoff sets described above.
Let us first ignore the terminal condition and study the stationary case in which












which are positive provided ψ ≥ σ. If instead ψ < σ, the principal’s payoff is zero in
the unique stationary equilibrium. It is easy to check that if in addition ψ < 0, it is not
possible to have the agent exert effort in any equilibrium, and the unique equilibrium
payoff vector is (0, 0). This provides us with two of the relevant boundaries, between
unprofitable and patient projects, and between patient and moderately impatient projects.
The derivation of the boundary between moderately impatient and very impatient projects
is more involved, and available along with the proof of Proposition 9 in Section E.5.5.
Proposition 9 The set of equilibrium payoffs for a project that is known to be good
(q = 1), in the limit as period length becomes short, is given by:
• Unprofitable Projects (ψ < 0). No effort can be induced, and the unique equilib-
rium payoff is (w, v) = (0, 0).
• Patient Projects (0 < ψ < σ). The set of equilibrium payoffs is given by the pairs
(w, v), where w ∈ [0, w†], and














where w† is the unique positive value for which the upper extremity of this interval
is equal to zero. In the equilibria achieving payoffs on the frontier, there is no delay,
and the agent always exerts effort, until some time T < ∞ at which funding stops
altogether. Such equilibria exist for all T below some parameter-dependent threshold
T .
• Moderately Impatient Projects (σ < ψ < σ(σ + 2)). The set of equilibrium
payoffs is given by the pairs (w, v), for w ∈ [w, c
r
], and
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and w = v∗/σ. In the equilibria achieving payoffs on the frontier,
there is no delay, and the agent exerts effort, until some time T ≤ ∞ from which
point on there is delay, with continuation payoff (w, v∗).
• Very Impatient Projects (ψ > σ(σ+2)). The unique equilibrium payoff involves






































Figure 6: Set of equilibrium payoffs for a project that is known to be good (q = 1), for the
limiting case of arbitrarily short time periods ( ∆ → 0). We measure the agent’s payoff w
on the horizontal axis and the principal’s payoff v on the vertical axis. To obtain concrete
results, we set c/r = p/r = 1 and, from left to right, (pπ−c)/c = 0 (unprofitable project),
(pπ − c)/c = 3/2 (patient project), (pπ − c)/c = 3 (moderately impatient project), and
(pπ − c)/c = 7 (very impatient project). The point in each case identifies the payoffs of
Markov equilibria. The dotted line in the case of a moderately impatient project identifies
the payoffs of the equilibria with stationary outcomes, and the shaded areas identify the
sets of equilibrium payoffs. Note that neither axis in the third panel starts at 0.
E.4.4 Summary
Figure 6 summarizes our characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs, for the
limiting case as ∆ → 0. In each case, the Markov equilibrium puts a lower bound on the
principal’s payoff. For either very impatient or (of course) unprofitable projects, there
are no other equilibria. It is not particularly surprising that, for moderately impatient
projects, there are equilibria with stationary outcomes backed up by out-of-equilibrium
punishments that increase the principal’s payoff. The principal has a commitment prob-
lem, preferring to reduce the costs of current incentives by reducing the pace and hence
the value of continued experimentation. The punishments supporting the equilibrium
path in the case of moderately impatient projects effectively provide such commitment
power, allowing the principal to increase her payoff at the expense of the agent. It is
somewhat more surprising that for patient and moderately impatient projects the prin-
cipal’s payoff is maximized by an equilibrium whose outcome is nonstationary, coupling
an initial period of no delay with a future in which there is either delay or the project
is altogether. Moreover, in the case of a patient project, such equilibria can increase the
payoffs of both agents.
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E.5 Proofs
E.5.1 Proof of Lemma 19
Let W be the agent’s maximal equilibrium payoff. We can restrict attention to cases
in which the principal has offered a contract to the agent, and in which the agent works.44
We first note that a lower bound on the principal’s payoff is provided by always
choosing that value sW satisfying (and hence inducing the agent to work, no matter how
lucrative a continuation value the agent expects)
pπ(1− sW ) + δ(1− p)W = c+ δW,
which we can rearrange to give
pπsW − c = −δpW + pπ − 2c,




pπ − 2c− δpW
1− δ(1− p)
.
We can then characterize W as the solution to the maximization problem:
W = max
s,W,V
pπ(1− s) + δ(1− p)W
s.t. W ≥ c+ δW,
W ≥W,
psπ − c+ δ(1− p)V ≥







where the first constraint is the agent’s incentive constraint, the second establishes W
as the largest agent payoff, the third imposes the lower bound on the principal’s payoff,
and the final constraint imposes feasibility. Notice that if the first constraint binds, then
(using the second constraint) we immediately have W ≤ c
1−δ
, and so we may drop the first
constraint. Next, the final constraint will surely bind (otherwise we can decrease s and
increase V so as to preserve the penultimate constraint while increasing the objective),
44If c/(1 − δ) is an upper bound on the agent’s payoff conditional on a contract being offered, then it
must also be an upper bound on an equilibrium path in which a contract is offered only after some delay.
Next, if a contract is offered and the agent shirks, then we have W = c+ δW , giving W = c1−δ .
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allowing us to write
W = max
s,W
pπ(1− s) + δ(1− p)W
s.t. W ≥W







pπ − 2c− δpW
1− δ(1− p)
.
Now notice that the objective and the final constraint involve identical linear tradeoffs of
s versus W . We can thus assume that W = W , allowing us to write the problem as
W = max
s
pπ(1− s) + δ(1− p)W (87)







pπ − 2c− δpW
1− δ(1− p)
. (88)
We now show that this implies W = c/(1 − δ). From (87), we have (letting s∗ be the
maximizer, subtracting c from both sides, and rearranging)
pπs∗ − c = pπ + δ(1− p)W −W − c.
Now using (88), we can write this as








= pπ + δ(1− p)W −W − c,













− [pπ − c],
or (simplifying the left side and multiplying by −1),
(1− δ)W
1− δ(1− p)
= (pπ − c) +














E.5.2 Proof of Lemma 20
We consider an artificial game in which the principal is free of sequential rationality






n=0 such that, barring a success, the principal makes an offer sn at time tn. To
preserve feasibility, we must have tn+1 − tn ≥ ∆, with strict inequality if there is delay.
The principal’s objective is to minimize the agent’s payoff subject to the constraints that
the agent be willing to exert effort in response to any offer, and that the principal’s payoff
in the continuation game starting at each period is at least V ∗. We show that the bounds
on the agent’s payoff given by c
1−δ
(if Ψ† < 1) and V
∗
δp
(if Ψ† > 1) apply to this artificial
game. The bounds must then also hold in the original game. Since we have equilibria of
the original game whose payoffs approach (as ∆ → 0) the proposed payoff in each case,
this establishes the result.
First, we note that t0 = 0, since otherwise the principal could increase her payoff by
eliminating the initial delay without compromising the constraints. Next, each offer sn
must cause the agent’s incentive constraint to bind. Suppose to the contrary that at some
time tn the agent’s incentive constraint holds with strict inequality. Then replacing the
offer sn with the (larger) value s
∗
n that causes the agent’s constraint to bind, while leaving
continuation play unaffected, preserves the agent’s incentives (since the continuation value
of every previous period is decreased, this only strengthens the incentives in previous
periods) while increasing the principal’s and reducing the agent’s payoff, a contradiction.
Let W be the agent’s minimum equilibrium payoff. Because the agent’s incentive
constraint always binds, W must equal the expected payoff from persistent shirking, and





Notice that the continuation payoff faced by the agent at each time tn must be at least
W , since otherwise W is not the lowest equilibrium payoff possible for the agent. Next,
we claim that each such continuation payoff equals W . If this is not the case for some
tn, then we can construct an alternative equilibrium featuring the same sequence of times
and offers for n = {0, . . . , tn−1}, and then continuing with an equilibrium in the resulting
continuation game that gives payoff W . Because the continuation value at time tn has
been reduced, this allows us to reduce the first-period value s0 while still preserving all of
the agent’s incentive constraints. The resulting lower first-period payoff and lower con-
tinuation value decrease the agent’s payoff (and increase the principal’s), a contradiction.




















where the final equality uses the fact that the agent’s continuation value at t1 is W . We















We can conclude in this fashion, concluding that there exists some Ψ such that for all
n ≥ 1,
tn − tn−1 = Ψ∆.
However, we have characterized the equilibria that feature such a constant value of Ψ,
finding that the only such equilibrium gives payoff W ∗ = c
1−δ
when Ψ† < 1 and that the
agent’s lowest payoff from such an equilibrium is V
∗
δp
if Ψ† > 1.
E.5.3 Proof of Lemma 21
We consider an equilibrium with payoffs (W0, V0). We are interested in an upper
bound on the ratio V0−V
W0−W
, which we denote by ζ . It suffices to consider an equilibrium in
which a period-0 mixture with probability (1− x0) prompts the players to continue with
equilibrium payoffs (W,V ), and with probability x0 calls for a current contract s, followed
by a period-1 mixture attaching probability 1 − x1 between continuation payoffs (W,V )
and probability x1 to continuation play with payoffs (W1, V1), and so on. In addition, we
can assume that any contract offered to the agent induces the agent to work.45 Hence,
45Any such contract is part of an extreme equilibrium. Suppose we have a contract that does not
induce effort, and hence gives payoffs −c+ δV and c+ δW to the principal and agent, respectively, for
some continuation payoffs (W,V ). There exists an alternative equilibrium with the same continuation
payoffs, but in which the principal induces effort by offering a share s satisfying
c+ δW = (1− s)pπ + δ(1− p)W.
Solving this expression gives pπ−c−δpW = pπs, and hence a principal payoff of pπ−2c−δpW+δ(1−p)V .
It is then a contradiction to our hypothesis that we are dealing with an extreme equilibrium, hence
establishing the result, to show that this latter payoff exceeds −c+ δV , or pπ− 2c− δpW + δ(1− p)V >




The left side is an upper bound on the value of the project without an agency problem, giving the result.
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we have
V0 = x0 [pπs− c+ δ(1− p)[x1V1 + (1− x1)V ]] + (1− x0)V
W0 = x0 [pπ(1− s) + δ(1− p)[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ]] + (1− x0)W
≥ x0 [c+ δ[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ]] + (1− x0)W,
where the inequality is the agent’s incentive constraint. Setting an equality in the incentive
constraint, we can solve for
pπs = pπ − c− δp[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ].
Using this to eliminate the share s from the principal’s payoff, and returning to the agent’s
binding incentive constraint, we obtain
V0 − V = x0 [pπ − 2c− δp[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ] + δ(1− p)[x1V1 + (1− x1)V ]− V ]






pπ − 2c− δp[x1(W1 −W ) +W ] + δ(1− p)[x1(V1 − V ) + V ]− V
c + δ[x1(W1 −W ) +W ]−W
.
We obtain an upper bound on this expression by first taking V1−V = ζ(W1−W ) on the
right side and then rearranging to obtain
ζ ≤
pπ − 2c− δp[x1(W1 −W ) +W ] + (1− δ)V
c+ δ[x1p(W1 −W ) +W ]−W
.
We now note that W1 − W appears negatively in the numerator and positively in the
denominator, so that an upper bound on ζ is obtained by setting W1 −W = 0 on the
right side, giving
ζ ≤






where the final equality is obtained by using W = 1−δ
δp
V to eliminate W , and then sim-
plifying.
E.5.4 Proof of Lemma 22
We assume that x0, x1 ∈ (0, 1) and establish a contradiction. Using the incentive
constraint, we can write
W0 = x0 [c+ δ[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ]] + (1− x0)W
V0 = x0 [pπ − 2c− δp[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ] + δ(1− p)[x1V1 + (1− x1)V ]− (1− x0)V ] .
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We now identify the rates at which we could decrease x1 and increase x0 while preserving
the valueW0. Thinking of x0 as a function of x1, we can take a derivative of this expression








+ δx0(W1 −W ) = 0,



















(V0 − V ) + δx0[(1− p)(V1 − V )− p(W1 −W )].
It is a contradiction to show that this derivative is negative, since then we could increase
the principal’s payoff, while preserving the agent’s by decreasing x1. Eliminating the term
δx0 and multiplying by W0 −W > 0, we have
[(1− p)(V1 − V )− p(W1 −W )](W0 −W )− (V0 − V )(W1 −W ) ≤ 0.
We now substitute for W0 −W and V0 − V to obtain
[(1− p)(V1 − V )− p(W1 −W )]x0 [c + δ[x1W1 + (1− x1)W ]−W ]
− x0 [pπ − 2c− δp[x1W
′
1 + (1− x1)W ] + δ(1− p)[x1V
′
1 + (1− x1)V ]− V ] (W1 −W )
≤ 0.
Deleting the common factor x0 and canceling terms, this is
[(1− p)(V1 − V )− p(W1 −W )] [c− (1− δ)W ]
− [pπ − 2c− δpW + δ(1− p)V − V ] (W1 −W ) ≤ 0.
Rearranging, we have
(1− p)(V1 − V )− p(W1 −W )
W1 −W
≤
pπ − 2c− δpW − (1− δ(1− p))V
c− (1− δ)W
,
which follows immediately from the inequality in (90) from the proof of Lemma 21.
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E.5.5 Proof of Proposition 9











rt + (C1 + C2)e
r(1+σ)t.
If 0 < ψ < σ (the case of a patient project), then, since the first term of the principal’s
payoff is strictly negative, it must be that either C1, or C1 + C2 is nonzero. Since the
solution must be bounded, this implies, as expected, that effort cannot be supported
(without delay) indefinitely. If effort stops at time T , then, since w(T ) = 0, C1e
rT =
−c/r, and C2 is then obtained from v(T ) = 0. Eliminating T then yields the following















We let w† denote the unique strictly positive root of the previous expression. If w ∈ [0, w†],
then v ≥ 0, and these are the values that can be obtained for times T for which the
principal’s payoff is positive. This yields the result for patient projects. For reference, the





Now consider impatient projects, or ψ > σ, so that the principal’s payoff in the
stationary full-effort equilibrium is positive. We need to describe the equilibrium payoffs
of potential stationary-outcome equilibria with delay. We encompass delay in the discount
rate. That is, players discount future payoffs at rate rλ, for λ ≥ 1. The payoffs to the










There exists at most one value of λ > 1 for which the principal’s payoff is equal to that





which is larger than one if and only if ψ < σ(σ + 2). As before, if ψ > σ(σ + 2), then we
have the case of a very impatient project, for which there is no other equilibrium payoff
than the Markov payoff (w∗, v∗).
Let us then focus on moderately patient projects for which
ψ ∈ (σ, σ(σ + 2)),
in which case λ > 1, so that there exists an equilibrium in which constant funding is











We may now solve the differential equations with boundary condition v(T ) = v∗, w(T ) = w
for an arbitrary T ≥ 0. Eliminating T gives the following relationship between v = v(0)
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completing the results for moderately impatient projects.
F Online Appendix: Proofs, Commitment
F.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Given w(q), we would like to characterize the value of v(q) that maximizes the prin-
cipal’s payoff among equilibrium payoffs {w(q), v(q)}. We simplify the argument by as-
suming the players have access to a public randomization device, describing at the end
of the proof the modifications required if no such device is available. We make use of the
fact that we have a “worst continuation” that simultaneously delivers the worst possible
equilibrium payoffs to both the principal and the agent. In particular, given that the
principal has commitment power, this worst continuation is a full-stop continuation that
delivers payoff zero to both agents.
The proof is quite similar in structure to the corresponding proof of Proposition 2 for
the case without commitment (cf. Section C.2). Fix a value q. Then, because the worst
equilibrium gives payoffs (0, 0), it is immediate that any equilibrium payoff (w(q), v(q))
can be achieved as a mixture of an equilibrium that features no delay and the worst
equilibrium. Hence, we can restrict attention to sequences (x(q), s(q)), where, given pos-
terior q, full-stop continuation is played with probability 1−x(q) (determined by a public
randomization device); and if not, a share s(q) is offered in that period that induces the
agent to work.
F.1.1 A Preliminary Inequality








In particular, any equilibrium exertion of effort on the part of the agent creates a dis-
counted surplus of (pqπ − c)∆, where the discounting reflects the delay until the effort
is exerted and the probability that the interaction may terminate before reaching such
effort. Of this surplus, at least c∆ must go to the agent, since otherwise the agent’s
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incentive constraint is surely violated. The ratio of principal to agent payoffs can then
never exceed (pπ − 2c)/c.
F.1.2 Front-Loading Effort
Fix a posterior q. We first note that
v(q) = x(q) [(pqsπ − c)∆ + δ(∆)(1− pq∆)[x(ϕ(q))v(ϕ(q))]]
w(q) = x(q) [pq(1− s)π∆+ δ(∆)(1− pq∆)[x(ϕ(q))w(ϕ(q))]]
≥ x(q) [c∆+ δ(∆)[x(ϕ(q))θw(ϕ(q))] ,
where ϕ(q) is the posterior belief obtained from q given a failure (cf. (31)). The inequality








and hence is the ratio of the current posterior to next period’s posterior, given a failure.
We have used here the fact that the continuation values, relevant for posterior ϕ(q), can be
written as convex combinations of equilibrium payoffs (w(ϕ(q)), v(ϕ(q))) and the full-stop
continuation values (0, 0). Note that in writing this convex combination, we take w(ϕ(q))
and v(ϕ(q)) to be the interim values, i.e., values at the point at which the posterior is
ϕ(q) and precisely ∆ time has elapsed since the previous offer. The equilibrium generating
these values may yet entail some delay.
Let us simplify the notation by letting x(q) = x, v(q) = v, w(q) = w, x(ϕ(q)) = x̃,
v(ϕ(q)) = ṽ, w(ϕ(q)) = w̃, and let us drop the explicit representation of ∆. Setting an
equality in the agent’s incentive constraint and rearranging gives
pqsπ = (pqπ − c) + δ(1− pq)x̃w̃ − δx̃θw̃.
Using this to eliminate the variable s from the value functions gives
v = x [(pqπ − 2c) + δ(1− pq)x̃w̃ − δx̃θw̃ + δ(1− pq)x̃ṽ] , (91)
w = x [c+ δx̃θw̃] . (92)
We now show that it is impossible for x and x̃ to both be interior. Suppose they are.
Then we consider an increase in x and an accompanying decrease in x̃, effectively moving
effort forward. We keep w constant in the process, and show that the result is to increase
v, a contradiction.































(v) + δx ((1− pq − θ)w̃ − (1− pq)ṽ) .
It concludes the argument to show that this derivative is negative. Multiplying by w, the
requisite inequality is
w ((1− pq − θ)w̃ + (1− pq)ṽ)− w̃vθ < 0.
Substituting for v and w from (69)–(70) and dropping the common factor x, this is
[(1− pq − θ)w̃ + (1− pq)ṽ] (c+ δx̃θw̃)
< w̃θ [(1− δ)(pπ − 2c) + δ(1− pq − θ)x̃w̃
+ δ(1− pq)x̃ṽ] .
We can then note that the terms involving x̃ cancel, at which point the expression sim-
plifies to







for which, using the definition of ζ , it suffices that (1 − p − θ) + (1 − p)ζ < θζ , which is
immediate.
An implication of this result is that x(q) is interior for at most one value of q. This in
turn implies that the public randomization device is required only for one value of q. If
no public randomization device is available, we can construct an equilibrium in which no
values of x(q) are interior that approximates the equilibrium examined here. As ∆ → 0,
the public randomization device becomes unimportant and the approximation becomes
arbitrarily sharp.
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